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Abstract
Huntington’s disease (HD) is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder, caused by a repeat
expansion in the HTT gene, carried on chromosome 4. HD causes motor symptoms (chorea,
dystonia and an eye movement disorder), cognitive decline (impairments in social cognition,
memory and executive function) and neuropsychiatric disorders. The commonest neuropsychi-
atric problems are apathy, depression and irritable behaviour, whilst disinhibited behaviour and
perseveration are also frequently reported later in the disease course. The neuropsychiatric symp-
toms are common in HD and have significant, deleterious effects on quality of life and function,
yet the underlying cognitive processes and neurobiology remain unclear. This study addresses
the gap in knowledge: we have used a battery of established and novel tasks to delineate the
specific cognitive processes leading to neuropsychiatric disorders in HD.
53 patients, with a confirmed genetic test for HD were recruited from the South Wales HD
service, and 26 controls were recruited from both gene negative family members and local adver-
tising. Subjects completed gold standard measures of neuropsychiatric symptoms in HD: Prob-
lem Behaviours Assessment- short form (PBA), Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES), Behavioural
Inhibition Scale Behavioural Activation Scale (BISBAS), Urgency, Premeditation (lack of), Per-
severance (lack of), Sensation Seeking, Positive Urgency, Impulsive Behaviour Scale (UPPSP),
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS), Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI); in
addition to a battery of novel and established tasks measuring depressive cognition, planning,
learning, reward value, reward-effort calculation, option generation, susceptibility to provoca-
tion, reactive aggression, delay discounting and response inhibition. We compared performance
between groups and then used regression models, generalised linear models and generalised linear
mixed models to study the cognitive processes underlying the neuropsychiatric symptoms in HD.
We found that apathy in HD is predicted by a selective deficit in learning from aversive stimuli,
in addition to impairments in executive dysfunction and option generation, whilst reward value
and reward-effort calculations do not make major contributions to apathy in HD. Impulsivity
in HD is associated with impairment on tasks measuring inhibition of pre-potent responses and
cognitive impulsivity, with relative preservation of delay discounting and risk-taking. HD par-
ticipants also had higher scores on some questionnaire measures of impulsive behaviour: the
UPPS P Negative Urgency scale, Barratt Impulsiveness scale and the inhibitory subscale of the
BISBAS. Irritability in HD is related to enhanced negative anticipatory emotional reactivity, but
v
not with measures of impulsive behaviour or reactive aggression. The data on mood disorders
suggests that suicidal ideation is associated with executive dysfunction and over-estimate of per-
formance. Reward and effort measures did not significantly contribute to mood symptoms in HD.
This study has demonstrated an entirely novel cognitive mechanism leading to apathetic be-
haviour, and the finding of relatively preserved reward and effort in apathy and mood disorders
is also novel. We have replicated previous findings of an executive function deficit leading to
apathy. The data on impulsivity with regard to response inhibition and delay discounting is
consistent with the known pattern of striatal degeneration in HD. Irritability in HD is not re-
lated to impulsive or reactive aggression, but to measures of negative mood induction. The
data do not support anhedonia or negative cognitive bias as contributory mechanisms to mood
disorders in HD, but executive dysfunction and over-estimate of performance are related to suici-
dal behaviour. This work demonstrates that the cognitive processes leading to neuropsychiatric
symptoms in HD are consistent with the known degeneration in cortico-striatal circuits. The
selective preferential degeneration in the indirect compared with the direct pathway is consistent
with impaired learning from punishment, but not reward which we found in association with
apathy in HD, whilst the dorso-ventral progression of striatal degeneration is consistent with the
finding of preserved delay discounting, but impaired pre-potent response inhibition.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introductory Remarks
Chapter 1 describes the molecular biology and neurobiology of Huntington’s disease in humans,
the clinical features of Huntington’s disease and finally the antecedents of neuropsychiatric symp-
toms in other disorders. Chapter 2 describes the materials and methods used in the completion
of this work. Chapters 3-6 describe the experimental work, comparing task performance between
a cohort of cases carrying the repeat expansion for Huntington’s disease, and healthy controls
on assessments designed to probe the hypothesised cognitive processes underpinning apathy,
impulsive behaviour, irritability and depressed mood in Huntington’s disease. Chapter 7 gives
an overview of what we have found, and describes this in the context of the wider literature.
Huntington’s disease was first described in detail by George Huntington in 1872. His report
documents the motor features of the disease, but also comments on the psychiatric symptoms,
such as disinhibited behaviour, and the inherited nature of the condition. Despite this, the illness
was referred to as ‘Huntington’s chorea’ for most of the 20th century, reflecting the compara-
tive lack of interest in the clinical and scientific community regarding the behavioural changes
associated with the disease. This thesis focusses on these behavioural changes, as the cognitive
processes and neurobiology underlying the neuropsychiatric symptoms in Huntington’s disease
remain relatively obscure.
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1.2 Introductory Review
This introductory review aims to give an overview of Huntington’s disease: describing the epi-
demiology of the condition; the nature of the underlying genetic changes; the molecular biology
of the gene product, including how it functions in health and the changes known in the diseased
state; the neurological structures and systems affected in Huntington’s disease, with a particular
emphasis on cortico-striatal circuitry and the limbic system; the clinical symptoms experienced
by sufferers of Huntington’s disease; and finally an overview of the cognitive processes and neuro-
biology associated with neuropsychiatric symptoms in other neurodegenerative and psychiatric
disorders.
1.3 Epidemiology of Huntington’s disease
HD is a rare genetic disorder, predominantly affecting the central nervous system. Estimates of
prevalence and incidence have been hampered in the past by several factors: prior to the discovery
of the gene, it was difficult to know if the choreiform movement disorder experienced by patients
represented HD or a phenocopy, it is now thought that a number of cases diagnosed as ‘senile
chorea’ were in fact late onset HD(1, 2) moreover the stigma associated with carrying an inherited
condition, may preclude many from coming forward for genetic testing. Despite this, a number
of attempts have attempted to capture the prevalence and incidence of Huntington’s disease from
the 1930’s onwards(3). Two recent systematic reviews(3, 4) give a comprehensive account of the
incidence(4) and prevalence(3) of the disease. Given the nature of HD as a genetic disorder,
small sample sizes are even more likely to be misleading owing to the possibility of a cluster
of cases from a common founder: in both systematic reviews the smallest population included
is >75000 strong. There are two major features arising from the epidemiological work. First
there is marked geographical variability in the prevalence: studies in predominantly caucasian
populations in Western Europe, Oceania and North America (the North American studies have a
high degree of heterogeneity) report rates of between 0.35 and 17.27 cases per 100 000, with mean
prevalence of 7.33 in North America, 3.60/100 000 in Western Europe, 6,68/100 000 in UK and
5.63/100 000 in Oceania; whilst in Asia, the mean prevalence is 0.40. Secondly, regardless of the
geographical region, the prevalence appears to be rising with time. This may reflect the improved
availability of genetic testing, better clinical care, or an increased willingness of sufferers to come
forward for testing. The incidence review, included 8 papers in the meta analysis. In keeping
with the prevalence studies, the incidence is markedly higher in Europe, North America and
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Canada (rates 0.11-0.76 new diagnoses per 100 000 per year), compared with 0.046-0.16/100 000
new diagnoses per year in Asia. The lower incidence and prevalence in Asia may reflect fewer
founders (although there is a de novo mutation rate in the HD gene(5)), or protective genetic
loci which remain, as yet, unknown.
1.4 Molecular Biology
1.4.1 Genetic Description
HD has been recognised as an inherited disorder, since George Huntington’s initial description.
However, it was only in 1983, that linkage analysis allowed identification of likely gene carriers(6).
The polymorphism was localised to chromosome 4(6). The identity of the responsible gene was
settled in 1993 by the Huntington’s disease collaborative research group. Using samples from
a Venezuelan kindred, they localised the gene to chromosome 4p16.3. The HD gene (HTT ) is
180kb long and has 67 exons, a CAG repeat expansion in exon 1 is responsible for the disease
process. It was noted in this work that larger repeat lengths led to earlier onset disease. Further
studies in cases with repeat lengths between 30 and 40 clarified that repeats between 36 and
39 were associated with reduced prevalence, whilst repeat lengths of 40 or more inevitably led
to disease onset within the normal lifespan(7–9). Extending this observation, very high repeat
lengths were associated with earlier onset(10, 11). Juvenile onset HD (symptoms before the age
of 21) is associated with repeat lengths of over 50(12, 13). The repeat expansion is unstable(12):
leading to two important observations: firstly, the repeat length is dependent on the tissue of
origin, with longer repeat lengths found in neural tissue, particularly from the striatum, these
hyper-expanded HTT repeat lengths are predictive of cell-type vulnerability(14, 15); and sec-
ondly, that HD displays anticipation(5, 16). The increases in repeat expansion length occurs at
meiosis in the father, hence patients who inherit mutant HTT from the male line, often have an
earlier age of onset(10, 17, 18).
1.4.2 Function of Huntingtin in Health
HTT codes for a 350 kDa protein (HTT). HTT is expressed throughout the human body, but
the levels are highest in brain and testes(19–21). The repeat expansion codes for a polyglu-
tamine repeat at the n-terminal end of HTT (22). This may mediate membrane association(23).
HTT is involved in many cellular processes. Early evidence demonstrated that HTT is neces-
sary for embryogenesis, as homozygotic gene knockout is embryonically lethal(24, 25). There
is some disagreement about the effects of reduction of function, as some groups have reported
3
that heterozygotic inactivation of HTT did not result in any ill effects in a murine model(24,
26), but other workers have found subtle cognitive and behavioural changes, in addition to dam-
age to the subthalamic nucleus(27). HTT in healthy subjects has a role in vesicle movement,
particularly in axonal transport(28, 29). It is involved in mitochondrial transport(30) and pre-
vents apoptosis(31). HTT also plays a critical role in gene regulation: a number of groups have
demonstrated knock-down or alteration of gene expression by mutant HTT(32, 33). HTT binds
to transcriptional regulators, and is associated with BDNF reduction following a reduction in
transcription(34).
1.4.3 Disease Mechanisms of Mutant Huntingtin
The mechanism or mechanisms by which the repeat expansion leads to disease are not entirely
elucidated, and are an ongoing subject of considerable complexity beyond the scope of this
review. The earliest work attempted to clarify whether the damage associated with mutant
HTT relates to loss of function, gain of toxic function or a combination of the two: the pa-
per by O’Kusky et al, describing behavioural deficits and basal ganglia damage associated with
heterozygotic knock-down in a murine model is suggestive of some effects related to loss of func-
tion(27). Intracellular aggregates of HTT and intracellular inclusions are well described(35–37)
in HD, possibly analogous to those found of beta amyloid and alpha synuclein in Alzheimer’s
and Parkinson’s disease respectively. A paper in 2000 by Yamamoto et al(38), lends strong
support to toxic gain of function. They showed that in a murine model with a conditional
knock-in mutant HTT, gene expression resulted in HD neuronal inclusions, neurodegeneration
and the HD motor phenotype, but silencing of mutant HTT led to reversal of the behaviour and
the neuronal damage. The cellular aggregates of mutant HTT (inclusion bodies) are also the
subject of considerable debate, regarding whether the inclusion bodies are incidental to cellular
toxicity, prevent toxic effects of mutant HTT, or if the inclusion bodies themselves are toxic
to neurons(39, 40). Mutant HTT has been shown to disrupt mitochondrial function, leading
to reductions in ATP production and altered calcium homeostasis, which can activate the p53
pathway(41–46). Wild-type HTT has also been shown to interact with HIP-1, whereas the mu-
tant HTT does not: release of this protein triggers apoptosis by a caspase pathway(47).
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1.5 Neuropathology of Huntington’s disease
Much of the formal neuropathology undertaken in any disease, is of necessity focussed on end
stage cases who have died as consequence of the illness. Therefore, results of pathological analysis
regarding the most significantly affected structures does not imply that these are affected earliest
in the disease course, without comparator samples of brains from cases with earlier stage dis-
ease. Neuroimaging offers an alternative method of determining the earliest affected structures,
however, many modern imaging techniques have not been verified with definite pathological or
physiological data, and the methods are reliant on multiple significance tests to infer changes in
brain structure or function: hence have a very high vulnerability to type II error. Thus where
possible, this review includes both imaging and pathological evidence for the structures and net-
works affected by HD. Furthermore, one unresolved issue regarding the neuropathology of HD,
(particularly in the latter stages of the disease) is the extent to which atrophy in any structure
is due to retrograde degeneration when the structure loses its target neurons – it is unclear how
much of the later stage degeneration is secondary rather than primary.
1.5.1 Striatum and Basal Ganglia Structures
The striatum is comprised of the caudate and putamen nucleii, which are divided by the internal
capsule. It forms part of a network responsible for the refinement of motor patterns gener-
ated in the cortex: modulatory input from the cortex activates the striatum (and substantia
nigra), leading to disinhibition of the thalamus by deactivation of the internal segment of the
globus pallidus (GPi); the thalamus then provides excitatory input back to the cortex(48–51).
The striatum also receives excitatory input from the substantia nigra (dopaminergic) and dorsal
raphe nucleus (serotonergic)(52, 53). The striatum has two major efferent pathways, mediated
by GABAergic medium spiny neurons (MSNs): the direct pathway which is modulated by D1
receptor stimulation on medium spiny neuron cell bodies – these cells reduce activity of the GPi,
leading to the afore-mentioned disinhibition of the thalamus. MSNs innervating the direct path-
way carry enkephalin. The indirect pathway, modulated by D2 receptor stimulation on MSNs,
leads to increased Gpi inhibition via a pathway involving the external segment of the globus
pallidus and subthalamic nucleus(54–56). MSNs in the indirect pathway carry substance P. It is
hypothesised that the direct and indirect pathways act together to inhibit motor activity in some
muscle groups and facilitate it in other, so movement can occur in a co-ordinated fashion(57).
An overview of this network is shown in Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.1: Functional Organisation of the Basal Ganglia
  
GPi-Globus Pallidus Interna, GPe-Globus Pallidus Externa, STN-Subthalamic Nucleus, SNc-Substantia Nigra
Pars Compacta. Adapted from Lanciego et al(57).
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In HD, it is well recognised that the striatum is one of the earliest structures affected, with
damage occurring in a characteristic directional pattern: dorsal to ventral, medial to lateral
and caudo-rostral (18, 58–62). Vonsattel developed the grading system for striatal damage in
HD(58). Grade 0 represents absent macro or microscopic damage to the striatum. Grade 1
shows no macroscopic damage, but microscopic neuronal loss in the head of the caudate, whilst
grades 2, 3 and 4 reflect moderate, severe and very severe striatal damage. The major cell type
affected is the medium spiny neuron, and the indirect pathway is affected prior to the direct
pathway(58, 63–67). The striatum is divided into matrix and striosomes: generally speaking it
is thought that degeneration of medium spiny neurons in the matrix leads to motor symptoms,
whilst striosomal loss leads to affective symptoms(68, 69). However, the strongest symptom
associations with striatal damage in HD relate to cognitive and motor changes(70–72).
Other basal ganglia structures are also affected by HD: some groups have found the substan-
tia nigra to be abnormal in HD, particularly the pars reticulata(18, 73). The globus pallidus
atrophies as a consequence of HD, and in keeping with the involvement of the indirect prior
to the direct pathway, the external segment atrophies prior to the internal segment(74). The
subthalamic nucleus is also affected by this atrophy(62, 70, 74).
1.5.2 Cortex
The cortex is also affected by HD pathology; much of the early neuropathological work focussed
on the striatal damage, however some studies recognised cortical degeneration. De la Monte(62)
and co-workers demonstrated early involvement of the cortex (21-29% atrophy in HD cases com-
pared with controls), albeit this atrophy was smaller than that affecting the striatum (caudate
57%, putamen 64%). Cortical atrophy had also been demonstrated by Lange et al(74). The
cortical atrophy preferentially affects specific layers: namely layers III, V and VI, which are
predominantly composed of cortical pyramidal neurons. These layers are involved in commu-
nication between cortical layers, but the main efferent pathway terminates on medium spiny
neurons in the striatum(48, 75–78). Cortical atrophy occurs in concert with striatal damage,
having been found even at Vonsattel stage 1(62). Later imaging work has confirmed the ear-
lier pathological studies. Rosas(79), demonstrated cortical thinning in HD, (importantly from
a methodological perspective, they confirmed the reliability of their imaging technique in post-
mortem HD brains). Although the sample size was small (11 HD cases, 13 controls), they
were able to show that cortical thinning progressed from posterior to anterior regions, and the
sensori-motor cortex was the most affected region in manifest disease. Later work in a much
larger sample confirmed these findings in a presymptomatic cohort: showing a posterior- ante-
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rior progression, with relative sparing of the ventro-medial frontal cortex(80). Further work by
this group(81), demonstrated heterogeneity of cortical thickness in early HD, with most marked
thinning affecting sensori-motor cortex, precuneus, parahippocampal gyrus, superior regions of
parietal, temporal and superior and middle frontal cortex. Thinning in these regions was shown
to correlate with cognitive measures (for example verbal fluency performance correlated with
frontal regions: pre-central gyrus, posterior superior frontal cortex, but also parietal, temporal
and occipital regions: superior temporal, lingual gyrus, precuneus and cuneus.)
These observations have been extended by other groups. The anterior cingulate cortex is in-
volved in the functions of cognitive control and conflict monitoring, with connections to the
limbic system and prefrontal cortex, modulating activity within these structures(82–85). Patho-
logical studies have demonstrated that atrophy in anterior cingulate cortex is associated with
affect scores of HD patients in life(68), and this observation is supported by imaging work(86);
smaller cingulate volume has been found to correlate with depression scores and impaired recog-
nition of negative emotion(87). Insular cortex plays a role in recognition of aversive stimuli(88),
such as pain, but also in social behaviour and negative emotion recognition (89–91). Pathology
studies in HD have demonstrated insular atrophy(92), whilst neuroimaging studies have also
shown insular damage(93, 94), several groups have proceeded to show insular changes mediate
impairments in disgust recognition(95, 96). The orbito-frontal cortex has functions in predicting
rewarding outcomes and decision making; lesions of this structure are associated with impaired
learning under conditions of ambiguity(97, 98, 98, 99). The orbito-frontal cortex has strong
connections with the ventral striatum, and in keeping with the relative sparing of medial and
ventral frontal regions seen in the structural neuroimaging studies(79, 80), there are fewer stud-
ies demonstrating involvement in HD. Ille et al(100), found that orbito-frontal cortical atrophy
in HD correlated with poorer performance on a negative emotion recognition task, whilst Holt-
bernd(101) and co-workers showed altered functional activity during motor sequence learning.
Dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex mediates classical executive functions: set shifting, planning mo-
tor actions, working memory(102–104). Early pathology studies have shown HD related damage
to this region(77, 105), whilst later functional neuro-imaging studies have shown altered activ-
ity during executive function (working memory and Simon) tasks(106–109). Intriguingly one
of the studies in premanifest patients showed increased activity rather than the decreases seen
in the other studies: this may reflect neural compensation, prior to performance decrement(109).
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1.5.3 Thalamus and Subthalamic Nucleus
The thalamus forms one of the major nodes in the cortico striatal network(49, 51), in addition
to relaying sensory information from the body to the cortex, and motor patterns to the body
by cortico-spinal tracts. The medial aspects of the thalamus carry fibres from the reticular for-
mation involved in arousal and attention(110, 111). The subthalamic nucleus forms part of the
indirect pathway, along with the external segment of the globus pallidus(51). Thalamic atrophy
has been found in the brains of patients affected by HD: predominantly in stages 3 and 4(18, 62).
Atrophy of the subthalamic nucleus has also been noted(74), again occurring later in the dis-
ease process(58), although a more recent study suggests that the degree of subthalamic nuclear
damage correlates with that of damage to the striatum(70). Imaging work using a voxel-based
morphometry (VBM) protocol in HD patients, has shown that thalamic atrophy predicts poorer
cognitive performance(112), and is associated with impairments in fear recognition: a combined
fMRI protocol and VBM study showed thalamic atrophy and hypoactivation during a facial
emotion recognition task predicted poorer fear recognition(87).
1.5.4 Hypothalamus
The hypothalamus regulates homeostatic functions such as sleep, and appetite(113–116). Post-
mortem studies demonstrated atrophy of the lateral hypothalamus in HD (117, 118), demonstrat-
ing that the degree of cell loss predicted age at onset of disease and age at death. This region of
the hypothalamus produces orexin, which has roles in arousal and appetite, and has been shown
to be abnormal in a mouse model of HD(119). Alterations of somatostatin levels (which has
roles in regulating insulin and glucagon) have been found in HD(120). Structural neuroimaging
studies have shown atrophy of the hypothalamus even in pre-symptomatic individuals(93, 121,
122), however this has not been replicated by all groups(123).
1.5.5 Amygdala
The amygdala, which forms part of the limbic system plays a central role in the experience
of emotion, and mediates the foundation of stimulus-reward and stimulus-punishment relation-
ships(124, 125). The amygdala is atrophied in HD, both in pathological studies and on neuro-
imaging(81, 93, 95, 126, 127). The atrophy is not as severe as that affecting the caudate and
putamen, with one study finding a reduction in amygdalic volume of 24% compared with con-
trols, whilst the putamen was reduced by 53%(128). A PET study found reduced dopaminergic
binding in the amygdala of HD patients(129), whilst functional imaging studies have suggested
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changes in amygdalic connectivity related to irritability(130), impairment on a social cognition
task (‘reading the mind in the eyes’)(131) and the experience of sadness(87).
1.5.6 Hippocampus
The hippocampus is a central structure in episodic memory: it is critical to sequence learn-
ing, and both spatial and temporal learning processes. Pathology studies in HD have shown
macroscopic atrophy of the hippocampus, whilst microscopy of the region has shown prefer-
ential cell loss in the CA1 region(18, 62, 132). This region has been shown to mediate the
context-dependent aspect of autobiographical memory formation (133, 134) in animal models,
whilst in a cohort of patients with selective CA1 lesions, extensive autobiographical memory
was lost(135). In neuro-imaging studies, hippocampal atrophy has been seen in HD, although
it was comparatively spared (9% reduction in volume compared with controls) when set against
the atrophy in putamen(53%) and caudate (37%). Pavese and co-workers also demonstrated
a reduction in hippocampal dopamine receptor binding in subjects with HD. Whilst cognitive
psychology studies have shown a range of deficits in HD patients on tasks that specifically target
mnemonic function(136, 137).
1.5.7 White Matter
White matter forms connections between brain regions, governing network integrity and hence
is necessary for normal network function throughout the central nervous system. De la Monte
and co-workers demonstrated macroscopic atrophy of white matter at all stages of HD, almost as
severe as that affecting the striatum(62), whilst neuroimaging studies have shown white matter
damage prior to motor onset (particularly in the occipital region: in keeping with work show-
ing posterior-anterior progression of cortical damage(79, 138)), furthermore statistical modelling
techniques predicting onset showed that adding white matter loss improved predictive power
over the predictive model with striatal atrophy in isolation(128, 139, 140). White matter loss
has been correlated with both motor and cognitive impairment in HD; particularly corpus cal-
losal atrophy and frontal white matter loss(141, 142). What remains unclear is whether this
is related to primary damage from HD leading to axonal or myelin loss, or whether the white
matter loss is secondary to cell body damage in grey matter structures.
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1.5.8 Cerebellum
The cerebellum plays a central role in balance and movement sequencing and co-ordination.
Early work did not find significant cerebellar involvement in HD; however, later studies have
shown atrophy in the latter stages of the disease(18, 58, 128, 138).
1.6 Clinical symptoms of Huntington’s disease
1.6.1 Motor Deficits in Huntington’s disease
The motor symptoms of HD are the most obvious, even to a lay observer, and consequently have
received much of the research attention and clinical focus. For much of the 20th century, the
condition was referred to as Huntington’s chorea, with the change in terminology to Hunting-
ton’s disease arising as a result of the increased recognition of cognitive and behavioural changes.
HD causes choreiform movements – flitting, writhing movements of the limbs, trunk and facial
muscles, which can appear semi-purposeful. Later in the disease, patients often become more
bradykinetic, with increasing dystonia (co-contraction of agonist and antagonist muscles) and
rigid. Oculomotor deficits (impaired saccadic and pursuit movements) and dysphagia (perhaps
as a consequence of impaired motor sequencing) are all well-described(143–145). The appear-
ance of hyperkinetic abnormalities prior to the onset of akinetic-rigid features, may reflect the
relatively earlier damage to the indirect pathway(22, 145).
The earliest motor features, seen even in some pre-manifest individuals are dysarthria, impair-
ments on the Luria tri-step test, and chorea; the oculomotor, dystonic and dysphagic changes
tending to occur later in the disease. Unsurprisingly the development of chorea is the most likely
herald of a diagnosis of motor onset(146, 147).
1.6.2 Cognitive Changes in Huntington’s disease
Limitations of Testing for Cognitive Decline
Measuring cognitive changes in any disease can be problematic because of the inherent confound-
ing in the testing process. Longitudinal testing is vulnerable to memory deficits in the patient
population- visuo-spatial task performance (for example) may improve in healthy controls be-
cause of practice effects, but memory deficits in affected subjects may lead to less prominent
practice effects; thereby demonstrating an apparent visuo-spatial deterioration over time in af-
fected cases compared with controls. The tasks may be confounded by differing pre-morbid
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ability of subjects (which may in part be driven by socio-economic status – a particular problem
for families with inherited disease). Finally, the tests themselves are often dependent on multiple
cognitive processes (a minimum level of executive function is needed to follow instructions for
example), and may have ceiling and floor effects.
Early Descriptions of Cognitive Decline in HD
George Huntington described cognitive impairment in his initial monograph: “As the disease
progresses the mind becomes more or less impaired”, despite this, recognition of the dementing
process in HD was relatively limited until the latter 20th century. Early reports of cognitive
dysfunction were purely descriptive: alluding to the cognitive changes seen in HD sufferers in
state asylums, authors used unpalatable terms such as ‘unemployable’, ‘mentally weak’(148).
Formal diagnosis of cognitive change in HD, was first found using the mini-mental state exami-
nation(149, 150) Cognitive testing in HD patients, using the MMSE in addition to the symbol
digit modalities test was found to correlate with structural changes in the caudate using com-
puted tomography imaging(151).
Formal Diagnosis of Dementia in HD
A formal diagnosis of dementia was made in 66% of a manifest HD cohort, using a criterion of
performance 2 standard deviations below the mean values of control performance(152), whilst
Leroi and colleagues found 80% of manifest HD patients had a diagnosis of dementia or cogni-
tive disorder by DSM IV criteria(153). DSM(154) criteria originally made specific reference to
memory decline, which is not the earliest, or most severely affected cognitive domain(136, 147,
155, 156) in HD. Peavy and co-workers (155), proposed alternative criteria: significant decline
in two major cognitive domains leading to functional impairment that is progressive, based on
the major cognitive contributors to functional decline in HD (attention, psychomotor speed, ini-
tiation). These changes have been adopted into the criteria for dementia diagnosis in the most
recent update of the DSM(154).
Progression of Cognitive Changes in HD
It has become generally accepted that cognitive decline is one of the earliest features of HD.
Work in a large at-risk cohort (family history of HD in first degree relatives, manifest individ-
uals were excluded from the cohort) blind to their own genetic status has shown differences on
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performance of the symbol digit modalities task (SDMT)(147) in gene positive compared with
gene negative patients. The PREDICT-HD study found declines on a range of tasks in presymp-
tomatic HD patients: the earliest deficits were found on facial emotion recognition, psychomotor
slowing (speeded tapping) and a smell recognition test; these findings have also been seen by
earlier groups in smaller cohorts(136, 157–160). Further work in the PREDICT-HD cohort has
found that declines in the SDMT, Trails A & B, smell identification and Stroop interference test
occurred prior to any motor deficits(156). The impairments in recognition of facial emotion have
been found by other groups, and negative emotion (anger, fear, disgust) seems disproportion-
ately affected, a finding which has been linked to insula dysfunction(96, 161, 162). Deterioration
in performance on tasks of executive function is apparent at a later phase of the pre-manifest
period with worse performance in pre-symptomatic patients on tasks of set-shifting, verbal flu-
ency and planning(136, 163–167). Memory impairment, with recall disproportionately affected
over recognition memory occurs in late presymptomatic and early symptomatic periods(136,
168–170). Visuo-spatial and attentional impairments have also been found in presymptomatic
cohorts(136, 164, 171).
Social Cognition in HD
Impaired recognition of facial emotion is part of a wider pattern of deficits of deficits in so-
cial cognition (interacting with other people and interpreting human behaviour) found in HD.
Snowden et al(172), found impaired interpretations of social cues in HD patients when asked
to describe the motivations of characters in humorous cartoons, which has been replicated on a
similar test of social inference(173). A number of tasks of social cognition have been developed
such as the faux-pas test (vignettes are read to the subject, they are then asked if anyone in the
scenario did something inappropriate)(174), ‘reading the mind in the eyes’ test(175), and theory
of mind tests(176). A number of these tests have been used in HD subjects(177–179). A recent
meta-analysis showed deficits in social cognitive tasks both in manifest and pre-symptomatic
patients(180).
1.6.3 Psychopathology in Huntington’s Disease
Prevalence in Manifest HD
Early accounts of HD, including the original description, by George Huntington, comment
on psychopathology, describing ‘insanity’ and allude to an increased frequency of suicide(148,
181–185). Most studies were pedigree descriptions and gave brief descriptive accounts of be-
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havioural changes seen in the disease. Nonetheless, these early workers were often very per-
ceptive in describing some the features that have since been more systematically described;
alluding to ‘poverty of thought’ ‘carelessness’ and also describing violent and aggressive be-
haviour. Later accounts relate more disinhibited or impulsive behaviour, such as addiction and
hypersexuality(186–189), whilst affective disorders were also recognised(190, 191). Caine and
co-workers(192), systematically documented the psychopathology using formal note review and
diagnostic assessment using the mental state examination. They found psychiatric symptoms
in 14/18 cases; predominantly apathy and irritability. Studies using formal diagnostic instru-
ments(193–195), confirmed the central nature of the triad of apathy, irritability and depression.
This work all predates the advent of genetic testing programmes for HD. A systematic re-
view(196), included 7 papers describing the prevalence of psychiatric symptoms in manifest HD
patients with a confirmed genetic test. This study found the highest rates for apathy (34-76%),
and irritability (38-73%), lower rates for depression(33-69%), anxiety (34-61%) and obsessive
compulsive symptoms(10-52%), with a minority of patients developing psychotic symptoms (3-
11%). Obsessive compulsive symptoms can be nosologically difficult in HD, as whilst some
HD patients undoubtedly do develop obsessive compulsive disorder(197), some of the symp-
toms overlap with perseveration: reflecting the executive dysfunction seen in the disease. Most
researchers from a psychiatric background would distinguish between ego-dystonic obsessive-
compulsive symptoms and ego-neutral perseveration, although concrete neuropsychological or
neurobiological evidence to support this distinction is limited. The UHDRS behaviour score
which was used for some of the studies in the review, does not distinguish between perseveration
and obsessive-compulsive symptoms(198). Later studies in large data sets from the REGISTRY
study, confirmed the central nature of apathy (28%), irritability (13.9%) and depression (12.7%).
Pre-Symptomatic Psychopathology
Some controversy existed over the appearance of psychiatric features prior to motor onset; with
some studies not finding evidence of psychopathology in pre-symptomatic carriers(199). How-
ever, ‘mental onset’ was described by a number of groups, even prior to genetic testing pro-
grammes(186, 189, 200). Large cohorts in the PREDICT-HD study have found higher levels of
obsessive compulsive symptoms using the Schedule of Compulsions, Obsessions, and Pathological
Impulses (SCOPI)(201, 202). Whilst assessment of general psychopathology in large cohorts us-
ing the symptoms checklist – revised(203), and the frontal systems behavioural scale (measuring
apathy, disinhibition and executive dysfunction) (204), has found increased rates of psychiatric
symptoms across most domains for carriers versus non-carriers(205–208), although the domains
14
covering psychotic and anxiety symptoms did not show consistent differences between gene car-
riers and controls.
Psycho-social versus Neurobiological Nature of Psychopathology
Prior to genetic testing, significant controversy existed over whether the increased rates of psy-
chopathology in HD related to the consequences of having a neurodegenerative disease (or being
at risk of developing HD), or whether the neurodegenerative cerebral damage led directly to
neuropsychiatric symptoms. Several studies have addressed this: Julien(209) and colleagues
measured psychopathology immediately prior to gene testing in a cohort of people undergoing
predictive testing: they found higher rates of depression and irritability among gene positive
individuals compared with those testing negative. The PHAROS study found higher rates of
psychopathology, particularly apathy and irritability in a cohort ‘at-risk’ for HD, but blinded to
their own genetic status(147, 210).
Longitudinal Progression of Psychopathology in Huntington’s Disease
The studies in presymptomatic cohorts outlined above show higher prevalence of neuropsychiatric
symptoms in presymptomatic subjects, however, they do not address changes in prevalence of
these symptoms as HD progresses. Craufurd et al(211), showed increasing prevalence of apathy
in later disease stages of HD, whilst irritability was present from the earliest stages, peaked then
decreased, and depressive symptoms were not clearly linked to any disease stage. This work
was replicated in a longitudinal study by the same group(212). The TRACK-HD study(165,
166), found that the only psychiatric variable to reliably distinguish between cases and controls,
and progress even from the pre-symptomatic stages was apathy. Reedeker et al(213), also found
that apathy progressed with disease, whilst, a further study by this group(197) using a formal
psychiatric diagnostic instrument the composite international diagnostic interview (which does
not include symptoms such as apathy and perseveration) in 106 presymptomatic HD subjects,
found incident psychiatric disorders in 13.2%, but remitted psychiatric disorders in 7.5%. The
commonest psychiatric symptom was depression. A study by Hubers et al(214), found incident
suicidality in 7% of presymptomatic HD subjects over a 2 year follow-up, although they excluded
any subjects who had suicidal ideation at baseline.
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1.7 Neuropsychiatric Symptoms in Other Disorders
1.7.1 Apathy
Measurement and Cognitive Processes Leading to Apathy
Apathy is a reduction in goal-directed behaviour(215), it is a feature of many neurological and
psychiatric disorders(216–218). It is measured using a variety of different scales, such as the
apathy evaluation scale(215), apathy scale(219), Lille apathy rating scale(220) and subsections
of the problem behaviours assessment for HD(221) and the neuropsychiatric inventory(222). A
number of different tasks have been used in apathetic populations; in particular deficits in execu-
tive function have been linked to apathy in a number of different disorders including Parkinson’s
disease(223–225), Alzheimer’s disease(226–228), fronto-temporal dementia(229, 230), vascular
dementia(231) and schizophrenia(232, 233). In keeping with this, planning and changing re-
sponse are important components of goal-directed behaviour and are themselves heavily depen-
dent on executive function. However, there is also extensive literature on tasks of reward and
motivation in apathetic behaviour: with evidence for reduced reward sensitivity(234, 235), im-
paired facial emotion recognition and reduced effort for equivalent reward(235–237).
Neuroanatomy
Apathy has been reported following following focal lesions to a number of sites; these have
predominantly been located in the the frontal lobes, limbic system and basal ganglia. A meta-
analysis of the clinical consequences of basal ganglia damage (primarily secondary to ischaemia,
haemorrhage and hypoxia) demonstrated that a reduction in goal-directed behaviour was seen
in 13%, with the vast majority involving the caudate(238), this has been confirmed by further
reports(239, 240). Globus pallidus lesions can also cause apathy(234, 241, 242). Cortical le-
sions are also frequently reported to cause apathy: lesions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
are well-recognised to result in apathetic behaviour(243–246), as are anterior cingulate cortex
lesions(247). Damage to the thalamus and subthalamic nucleus has also been shown to result
apathetic behavioural syndromes(248–250). A number of groups have looked for neuroanatomi-
cal correlates of impaired goal-directed behaviour in diseases associated with apathy; this work
has to a large extent been in keeping with the studies involving focal lesions. The regions in-
volved are again localised to cortico-striatal networks. The anterior cingulate cortex is atrophied
or hypofunctional in apathetic patients with Alzheimer’s disease(251–253), fronto-temporal de-
mentia (251, 254), and Parkinson’s disease(255). The orbito-frontal cortex is also heavily linked
to apathetic behaviour: demonstrating atrophy or hypoperfusion in associations with apathy
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in Alzheimer’s disease(256–258), fronto-temporal dementia(251, 259), Parkinson’s disease(260,
261) and progressive supranuclear palsy(251) whilst the caudate has been implicated in apathy
in a number of disease states including both ‘cortical’ and ‘subcortical’ dementias (260–264).
Insular changes are widely reported in association with apathy (in Parkinson’s disease (265,
266), Alzheimer’s disease (251), and fronto-temporal dementia (259)). Finally, changes in both
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (atrophy and hypoperfusion) (in Alzheimer’s disease (257, 267);
fronto-temporal dementia (254, 268), and Parkinson’s disease (260)) and thalamus (Parkinson’s
disease (260); and fronto-temporal dementia (259)) have been linked with apathy.
1.7.2 Impulsivity and Disinhibition
Measurement and Cognitive Processes
Impulsivity (or disinhibition(269)) is acting rashly or without forethought, and covers a wide
variety of actions that are “poorly conceived, prematurely expressed, unduly risky, or inappro-
priate to the situation and that often result in undesirable outcomes”(270). Although it often
leads to adverse outcomes, on occasion it can be advantageous (for example acting quickly to
seize an opportunity), high impulsivity is also associated with improved performance on some
neuropsychological tasks (271). It is a feature of many neuropsychiatric disorders including most
addictions, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), borderline personality disorder and
bipolar(272, 272, 273); it also occurs in relation to dopaminergic treatment in Parkinson’s dis-
ease(274). Impulsivity is now widely recognised to be a heterogenous construct, with separate
cognitive processes leading to impulsive behaviour(270, 275, 276). Furthermore, there are a
number of questionnaires and also task measures of impulsivity behaviour, which have minimal
overlap(277, 278). The processes known to be involved are inter-temporal (delay) discounting
(valuing an immediate reward over a larger delayed reward), motor inhibition (the ability to in-
hibit a pre-potent response), risk-taking, reflection impulsivity or cognitive impulsivity (deciding
before all information is known)(270, 275, 276, 279).
Neuroanatomy
Impulsive behaviour following brain injury is well described, the case of Phineas Gage, has been
discussed extensively, and recent work showed probable involvement of the ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex(280), whilst many further studies have reported impulsive behaviour following
lesions to this region and the adjacent orbito-frontal cortex, particularly in association with
increased delay discounting(281–283). Lesions in this region have also been associated with
impaired future perspective on the iowa gambling task(98), and cognitive impulsivity – acting
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too quickly on the matching familiar figures test(284). Furthermore, lesions to this region has
shown altered reward value and risk taking, but no change in inhibition(285, 286). Lesions of the
inferior frontal gyrus have been shown to cause motor impulsivity with impaired performance
on tasks such as the Go Nogo and stop signal reaction task(287, 288). Impulsive behaviour and
reduced motor inhibition have been demonstrated following subthalamic nucleus lesions(289,
289, 290). Insular involvement has been demonstrated in impulsive behaviour(281, 291), with
no alteration of betting with increasing risk, on a gambling task(281), but intriguingly, reduced
delay discounting(283). Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, caudate and putamen lesions have also
been reported to cause impulsive behaviour(238, 291–293). This is replicated in imaging studies
in disease populations, with reduced fMRI signal during rewarded trials in striatum and cin-
gulate cortex seen in addiction and adhd populations (294–297). Studies of inhibitory tasks in
fMRI show reduced signal during inhibition focally in the striatum, ventral and ventro-lateral
prefrontal cortex, and in a distributed fronto-parietal network (298–302), in bipolar disorder, ad-
diction and ADHD, although other groups have found the converse(303). Inter-temporal choice
tasks in an addicted population has shown increased signal in the cingulate and ventro-lateral
prefrontal cortex(304).
1.7.3 Irritability and Aggressive Behaviour
Measurement and Cognitive Processes
Snaith(339) defines irritability as a “state characterised by reduced control over temper which
usually results in irascible verbal or behavioural outbursts, although the mood may be present
without observed manifestation. It may be experienced as brief episodes, in particular circum-
stances, or it may be prolonged and generalised. The experience of irritability is always unpleas-
ant for the individual and overt manifestation lacks the cathartic effect of justified outbursts of
anger.” Aggression is the outward expression of this anger, and can be either verbal, directed
at inanimate objects, or directed at other people. There are a number of questionnaires to as-
sess aggression and irritability; such as the Snaith irritability scale(340), Buss-Durkee hostility
inventory(341) and the life history of aggression questionnaire(342). Task-based assessments of
irritability and aggression have either been based on those developed for impulsivity, and refer-
ence the concept of impulsive aggression(343), or are based on measuring aggressive behavioural
responses to provocation(344, 345). These responses can either be ‘stealing’ points from an
opponent in game play, or administering mild shocks or auditory aversive stimuli to an unseen
(fictional opponent). Motor inhibition (measured by the stop signal task or go nogo task) is
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impaired in psychopaths, and deficits have also been found on delay discounting tasks, the Iowa
gambling task, set-shifting tasks and facial emotion recognition tasks in aggressive and irritable
populations(343, 346–350).
Neuroanatomy
The experience of anger in healthy controls has been localised to a number of regions: the
amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbito-frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula
and temporal poles(351–356), whilst imminent threat activates the peri-aqueductal grey(357).
Lesions of the hypothalamus, orbito-frontal cortex, frontal poles and ventro-medial prefrontal
cortex have been associated with violent or aggressive behaviour(284, 347, 348, 358–362). Whilst
basal ganglia lesions appear to lead to aggressive behaviour on rare occasions(238): in the largest
case series, none were reported. Reduced volume, hypoperfusion or reduced activation has been
noted of the antero-medial temporal regions, amygdala and hippocampus in patient populations
with irritable or aggressive behaviour(363–370), although other groups have found increased
amygdala signal during threat or aversive stimuli(371, 372). Atrophy or hypoperfusion of the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, orbito-frontal cortex and cingulate cortex has also been linked
with aggressive behaviour(371, 373–376), in populations with high levels of aggression.
1.7.4 Depressed Mood and Major Depressive Disorder
Measurement and Cognitive Processes
Theoretical work regarding depression, has most recently been influenced by the ideas of Beck(295,
305), who describes the concepts of negative schemata: sufferers re-interpret events in a nega-
tive light and ignore any positive interpretations of stimuli or actions. This is supported by the
major endophenotypes underlying major depressive disorder: reduced reward value (anhedonia),
negative salience (sadness and guilt), altered motor activity (psychomotor retardation or agita-
tion), in addition to the ‘neurovegetative’ domains of altered sleep and appetite(306). Formal
psychiatric diagnosis according to DSM criteria(154) is the gold standard measure of depression,
and can be aided by using instruments such as the mini international neuropsychiatric inter-
view(307), but a range of other scales are available to score depressive symptomatology such
as the hospital anxiety and depression score(308). Cognitive assessment of patients with major
depressive disorder has demonstrated impairment on executive function tasks(309, 310). How-
ever, tasks to specifically assess depressive symptomatology have also been developed, showing
deficits in disengaging from negative stimuli and a cognitive bias towards negative stimuli(311,
312), reward deficit(313, 314), altered reward and effort processing using novel(315, 315) and
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established tasks, such as the progressive ratio(316).
Neuroanatomy
Case reports of depression following focal brain injury are comparatively less common than those
relating to impulsive, aggressive or apathetic behaviour, but the lack of publications may reflect
the common assumption that depression following brain injury is an expected consequence,
either of illness in general, or the social or cognitive consequences of brain injury. However
depression has been reported following injuries to the frontal pole(317, 318), left prefrontal
cortex(319) and caudate(238); whilst deep brain stimulation to the anterior cingulate cortex
and lateral habernula has been reported to alleviate depression(320, 321). The default mode
network (DMN), is active at rest, where it is thought to be associated with ‘inwardly directed’
thought and subserves the medial prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, insula, thalamus, amygdala
and hippocampus(322). The DMN is recognised to be overactive in major depressive disorder
(323, 324)and is thought to reflect rumination: excessive rumination scores have been shown to
correlate with increased activity of the DMN in major depression (322, 324, 325). Functional
imaging studies of major depressive disorder using a regional analysis during emotional stim-
uli have shown reduced activity in a number of regions during reward (cingulate, orbitofrontal
cortex, ventral striatum(326–330)) and increased activity during loss, or in response to sad
stimuli (anterior cingulate, medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala(329, 331–333)). Volumetric and
resting state perfusion studies have shown atrophy and reduced perfusion in limbic and frontal
regions (orbito-frontal cortex, prefrontal cortex, amygdala, thalamus and hippocampi(334–338)).
1.8 Synthesis and Aims of this Work
Huntington’s disease affects many of the brain regions involved in neuropsychiatric disturbance
outlined in this review. However, the cognitive psychology and imaging studies of neuropsy-
chiatric symptoms in HD to date have been largely negative or inconsistent. This may reflect
methodological differences, but it also may reflect a heterogeneity of cognitive processes con-
tributing to the expression of these symptoms. This body of work maps the different neuropsy-
chological processes that may contribute to the generation of depressed mood, apathy, impulsive
behaviour and irritability in HD using a battery of tasks that probe separable cognitive processes.
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Chapter 2
Materials and Methods
2.1 Introduction
This chapter describes patient recruitment, inclusion criteria, and an overview of neuropsychi-
atric assessments and protocols that are common to all chapters; specific methodological issues
for each chapter will be described in those chapters and not duplicated here.
2.2 Recruitment Strategy, Ethics and Consent
The vast majority of genetically confirmed HD patients are already enrolled in the multi-centre,
Europe-wide observational study REGISTRY (MREC number 10/WSE04/7), which became the
worldwide study ENROLL (MREC number 13/WA/0192) in 2014. Those able to attend clinic
are reviewed on a regular basis (at least yearly) to address any new or current problems asso-
ciated with HD. As such, they are regularly offered the opportunity to participate in different
studies (consent is specifically sought about being contacted for other studies when being en-
tered into REGISTRY and ENROLL). In the course of normal clinical attendances, patients
were offered the opportunity to participate in the study. Additionally, patients (identified as
eligible by clinicians working at these sites) who previously expressed an interest in participat-
ing in further research were approached directly by letter and telephone follow-up. Patients
not already part of ENROLL or REGISTRY, but who were identified by the clinical team as
being interested in research, were approached in person at a routine clinical appointment by the
clinical team, and informed about the study. We recruited from the Cardiff HD clinic, which has
between 250 and 300 patients at any one time. The study was approved by the Research Ethics
Committee for Wales (13/WA/0300) and all subjects gave informed consent before participating.
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If patients expressed an interest, then they were given the patient information sheet and allowed
as much time as they required to consider if they would like to enter the study (in practice,
participants were given at least 24 hours before being contacted by a member of the study
team). Control participants were recruited from family members of subjects (gene negative
siblings/parents or spouses), approached at the same consultation or asked directly by the par-
ticipating patient (if approached outside of the direct clinical contact situation) and offered a
flyer for the study. Again if they expressed an interest they were given a patient information
sheet and as much time as they require, to consider participation more fully before being con-
tacted again by one of the research team (by letter, telephone or in person). Family members
were specifically sought as controls in this situation as they have the same social milieu and
are exposed to similar stresses as patients, but do not have the disease. We also recruited from
word of mouth and poster advertising within Cardiff University and University Hospital Wales,
in order to increase our control cohort.
Consent for participation (patients and volunteer controls) was taken when the participant ar-
rived for the first day of assessments. Participants were given the opportunity to clarify out-
standing areas of uncertainty or ask any further questions regarding the study if they so wished
before consent was taken. The consent form specified that a mix of situational, observational and
computer based tasks were to be used. As much detail as possible was given, but participants
were informed that some parts of the tests required their initial ignorance of the purpose of the
test and the reasons behind it, although this was explained to them after completing the battery
of assessments.
2.3 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
We recruited patients aged 18 or over at study commencement, with a positive genetic test for
the HD repeat expansion (CAG repeat length 36 or greater) confirmed either through formal
review of laboratory results, or through correspondence with a previous treating clinician, we
did not include anyone diagnosed on family history and symptoms alone, owing to the existence
in South Wales of a known population of patients with DRPLA (Dentato-rubro-pallido-luysian
Atrophy), and another cohort of patients carrying the c9orf72 mutation, which is also recognised
as a HD phenocopy. We recruited patients who were felt able to perform the tasks, namely
at any stage of the disease from pre-symptomatic to moderate stages; we did not exclude any
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individuals based solely on UHDRS (Unified HD rating scale) and TFC (Total Functional Ca-
pacity). As we planned to image our cohort, we excluded anyone with severe chorea (chorea
score in UHDRS >20), pregnant women, patients with severe claustrophobia, any patient with
non-MRI compatible implants, and finally any participant with a neurological disease or brain
injury other than HD. Control participants had to satisfy the inclusion/exclusion criteria, apart
from the genetic testing for HD. Control participants either had no family history of HD or other
movement disorders, or (if the control participant was genetically related to one of the patients)
a confirmatory negative genetic test for HD.
2.4 Duration of Subjects Participation
Study participants were consented to participate for a total of 3 years maximum, in order to take
part in a subsequent imaging study. The initial testing battery could be performed in one visit
and took approximately 4 hours to complete in total, but subjects were offered the opportunity
to take separate sessions on different days, completed over the course of 1 week if participants
preferred.
2.5 Demographic Variables and Testing Process
All patients had an up to date medication history and motor examination (medication history
was taken on the day, a motor examination using the UHDRS protocol was performed, if one
had not been performed within the last 3 months). Full scale IQ was calculated accordingly
to the formula derived by Crawford(377) using age, social class and years of education. This
approach was chosen, as previous work has shown that reading tests are vulnerable to the cog-
nitive decline in HD when the disease becomes motor-symptomatic (378). Dopaminergic and
Serotonergic drugs were converted to Olanzapine and Fluoxetine equivalents using figures from
meta-analyses (379, 380) and the WHO recommended daily dose (in the case of Tetrabenazine)
in order to standardise and correct for these variables. Demographic variables, motor examina-
tion and questionnaires were performed before the tasks, to avoid task performance prejudicing
motor and conventional psychiatric assessment. Prior to all of the neuropsychological tasks,
subjects were asked to do a timed-tapping experiment and response time to a visual stimulus, in
order to control to gain a baseline assessment and control for the motor features of the disease
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during statistical analysis. Subjects were tested in a quiet room free from external distractions.
Task order was randomised in order to avoid order effects. Breaks were encouraged ad libitum
throughout the testing process. Subjects were asked to place themselves at a comfortable dis-
tance from the laptop screen before starting the computer-based tasks. All tasks were coded
and run using the E-prime 2.0 software package (except where indicated), and performed on a
Lenovo thinkpad laptop computer.
2.6 Recruitment and Demographics Analysis
We recruited 53 patients, there were 26 females among the patients. 26 controls were recruited:
13 from word of mouth advertising and 13 from gene-negative family members, 17 in this group
were female. The patient group were slightly older (53.92 compared with 46.85 years of age), but
this was not statistically significant. The patients had a slightly lower premorbid IQ (calculated
using Crawford’s method: as outlined above), as well as being on higher levels of Olanzapine
and Fluoxetine equivalents. The total motor score was unsurprisingly markedly higher in the
HD group (mean 36.58 compared with 1.48).
2.7 Data Analysis
Group comparisons comparing HD patients and controls were performed using t-tests if the
groups were normally distributed (Histogram appraisal, and test of skew <0.5) or Wilcoxon
rank sum tests if they were not. Linear regression was used to look at which particular tasks
predicted psychiatric symptoms, with a forced entry approach, adding potential confounding
variables to the model as independent variables. Post-hoc tests for assumptions underlying mul-
tiple linear regression were performed – Shapiro test on residuals for normality, Goldfeld-Quandt
test and Durbin-Watson test to ensure the results were reliable. For any regression analyses not
satisfying these tests, the dependent variable was appraised using histograms and an appropri-
ate distribution chosen (Poisson for non-negative, positively skewed integer data: evidence of
overdispersion was corrected for using negative binomial models) or logistic regression for bi-
nary variables. Psychometric characteristics of the novel tasks were assessed using Cronbach’s
alpha and Kuder Richardson 20 tests for internal consistency, and correlation with established
measures in our whole cohort (HD cases and controls) for construct validity. Any data sets with
missing variables were excluded in a pair wise fashion from any analyses. Further details of
specific analyses are included in the results chapters.
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2.8 Tasks, Questionnaires and Cognitive Assessments
Participants undertook a series of objective computerised tasks using a laptop computer. To
avoid order effects, although the clinical examination, demographic variables and questionnaires
were completed before the task battery, task sequence was randomised. Before starting the bat-
tery of assessments, all subjects completed a simple reaction time game and a timed tapping
assessment, firstly as baseline measures of motor ability (as this was relevant on some tasks) and
secondly to ensure that they could complete at least some of the task battery before commencing.
This is an overview of the task battery: in depth accounts of the methods of individual tasks
and relevant outcome measures are described in the individual results chapters. Psychometric
data is included for novel assessments.
2.8.1 Balloon Analogue Risk Task
Subjects are instructed that the goal of the task is to win as much money as possible by pumping
up some balloons. They are told that the larger they pump a balloon, then the more points they
will win, but at some point the balloon will ‘pop’. If the balloon ‘pops’, they lose the points
from that trial (381). This task was designed to measure impulsive behaviour, but measures of
punishment, reward and risk-taking have been derived for the apathy and impulsivity chapters.
2.8.2 Extra-dimensional Set Shift Task
This is a standard task of ability to change response set: a measure of executive function, known
to be impaired in motor-manifest HD, that changes with disease progression (164, 382). It is
used in the apathy, impulsivity and depression chapters.
2.8.3 Frustrative Non-Reward
This task is based on an animal task(383), where animals expect to receive a reward and are
then denied one: which has been shown to lead to behavioural aggression in animals. This task
is used in the irritability chapter.
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2.8.4 Iowa Gambling Task
Subjects are told the goal of the task is to win as much money as possible. They are told that
they can select from 4 different decks of cards. Every time they choose a card the subject will
win money, however, sometimes they will be told they have lost money too. They are told the
aim of the game is to win as much money as possible by learning which decks perform more
poorly over time (more money is lost than won), and avoiding these decks (99). This task is
used in the apathy, impulsivity and irritability chapters.
2.8.5 Klo˝ppel task
This task is a variant of that developed by Klo˝ppel (130), designed to evoke frustration. It is
used in the impulsivity chapter.
2.8.6 Maze Task
This is a novel task, designed by the author. Subjects are told they will be placed in a series
of situations – 15 in total. They are told they must decide what they want to do next in that
particular situation. It is designed to be a measure of option generation and selection. Cron-
bach’s alpha was 0.7 (95% Confidence Intervals 0.64-0.76) and the correlation with phonemic
verbal fluency (as a measure of novel concept generation) was strong: correlation coefficient -0.60
p=3.89x10-6. Longer response times on Maze, correlated with lower phonemic verbal fluency
scores. It is used in the apathy chapter.
2.8.7 Monetary Choice Questionnaire
This is a 27 item questionnaire, which assesses subjects willingness to accept a delay in receiving
money, in return for a larger sum of money over an immediate, lower reward (384).
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2.8.8 Optimistic Influence Test
This task was designed for this study by the author, as an assessment of depressive cognition.
Subjects are shown a race and asked whether they feel they can influence the result by boosting
the speed of the slower runner. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.59 (95% Confidence Intervals 0.41-0.77),
whilst there was a trend level negative correlation with the negative urgency score, and trend
level positive correlation with the positive urgency score from the UPPS P (correlation coeffi-
cients -0.21 and 0.22 p=0.078, 0.070 respectively). This suggests that more optimistic responses
were associated with more optimistic behaviour under conditions inducing positive affect, and
less pessimistic behaviour under conditions inducing negative affect. This task is used in the
depression chapter.
2.8.9 Persistence Task
This task was developed for this study by the author. It measures sensitivity to punishment.
Subjects are told that they must race against another car. The other car is always faster. The
outcome measure is latency to terminating the task by the participant. Cronbach’s alpha was
0.81 (95% Confidence Intervals 0.74-0.88), whilst a logistic mixed model of inaccuracy following
punishment on the BART showed there was a significant interaction between Persistence score
and stimulus value consistent with impaired response to large punishment (Pseudo R2 0.053,
interaction estimate 1.24x10−3, p=0.00079). It is employed in the apathy chapter.
2.8.10 Phonemic Verbal Fluency
This task is a standard test of executive function, known to be sensitive to cognitive decline in
HD(385). It is used in the apathy, impulsivity and depression chapters.
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2.8.11 Probabilistic Selection Learning Task
This is a visual association learning task (386). It is used in the apathy chapter.
2.8.12 Progressive Ratio
This task is based on the animal protocol (387): subjects are asked to increase effort on succes-
sive trials to gain a fixed value reward. It is used in the apathy and depression chapters.
2.8.13 Reward Ratio
This task measures whether subjects modify their reaction time in a situation where they receive
a reward compared with no reward, and whether they will work harder for higher rewards. It
was based on the cued reward reaction time task developed by Roshan Cools(388). Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.65 (95% Confidence Intervals 0.50-0.81), whilst there was a non-significant correla-
tion with the Progressive Ratio breakpoint (an established measure of reward value and effort)
correlation coefficient -0.06, p=0.12. It is employed in the apathy and depression chapters.
2.8.14 Tower Task
This task was based on the point subtraction aggression paradigm(344). Subjects can steal
points from an opponent in response to provocation. It is used in the irritability chapter.
2.8.15 Stop-Signal Response Task
This is a test of behavioural inhibition (motor impulsivity: the ability to inhibit a prepotent
response) (389).
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2.8.16 Ultimatum Game
This is an economic decision making game. Subjects are told that there is a sum of money to
be divided between two people and are asked about what offer they would make, and what is
the value of the lowest offer they would accept. The outcome is influenced by notions of fair-
ness, social cognition and rational choice(390, 391). It is used in the impulsivity and irritability
chapters.
2.9 Questionnaires
In order to validate the assessments we used previously well-validated measures of the behavioural
symptoms in HD as our current gold standard assessments. In order to ensure maximum relia-
bility and reproducibility, we used at least 2 assessments of every domain of behavioural change
that we tested. We specifically used a range of instruments that included self and carer-ratings
as well as clinician judgement, and employed symptom-specific scales as well as instruments that
rate behavioural change over a number of different symptom complexes.
Formal psychiatric diagnoses (present and past) were assessed using the MINI. This is a well-
validated, structured interview for non-psychiatrists, that scores participants according to DSM-
IV criteria for psychiatric illness(307).
We used the short form problem behaviours assessment for HD(165, 211, 221). The best val-
idated symptoms scale in HD. This clinician administered, semi-structured interview rates a
particular behavioural change or psychiatric symptom over the last month based on patient and
carer report, and scores each symptom for frequency and severity, each on a 4 point scale. The
final score for any particular symptom is the combined severity x frequency. Thus the max-
imum score is 16 for any particular symptom, and the minimum, 0. The symptoms assessed
are – depressed mood, suicidal ideation, anxiety, irritability, aggression, apathy, perseveration,
obsessive-compulsive behaviours, delusions, hallucinations, and disorientation.
The apathy evaluation scale (clinician)(215) was used as a specific apathy measure – subjects
are asked a series of questions about their motivation, lifestyle, work and behaviour – they are
then scored by the clinician from 1-4 on each question, based on their responses and carer/next
of kin responses. The minimum score is 18, the maximum is 76.
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The Snaith irritability scale (340)was used to assess irritable behaviour – this is a self report
questionnaire, comprising 18 questions, each response is scored from 0-3 based on frequency or
perceived severity of the behaviour. The range is 0-54.
The Barrett impulsivity Scale (BIS-11)(392) was used for impulsive behaviour, this self-report
measure asked 30 questions, each rated from 1-4 (from ‘rarely/never’ to ‘almost always’) and
uses the responses to generate an overall score out of 120, along with sub-scores for attention,
non-planning and motor impulsivity.
The UPPS-P (393) comprises 56 self-rated questions each scored from 1-4. Scores are then
generated for 5 different areas associated with impulsive behaviour: negative urgency, positive
urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance and sensation seeking.
The behavioural inhibition scale behavioural activation scale (394), is a 24 question self-report
measure that generates sub-scores for behavioural inhibition (range 6-24), drive (range 4-16),
fun-seeking (range 4-16), and reward responsiveness (range 4-20).
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Chapter 3
Apathy
3.1 Introduction
Apathy is defined by Levy and Czernecki(395) as “a quantifiable reduction in goal-directed be-
haviour” and occurs commonly in many diseases affecting different parts of the brain: cortex
(Fronto-temporal dementia (FTD) and Alzheimer’s disease(217, 229, 268, 396)), white matter
(subcortical vascular disease(397, 398)) and basal ganglia (Parkinson’s disease(218, 399, 400),
Huntington’s disease(196, 211, 401). Imaging and lesion studies have shown apathetic behaviour
as a consequence of damage to each of these structures, albeit with a focus on the basal ganglia
and medial frontal structures(238, 252, 263, 402–406)
Huntington’s disease (HD), is caused by a CAG repeat expansion in the Huntingtin gene on
chromosome 4. It leads to progressive neuro-degeneration, primarily of medium spiny neurons,
although also cortical regions and white matter(37, 58, 166). It leads to progressive motor,
cognitive and psychiatric dysfunction over a 20-30 year period. Apathy is a core symptom of
HD, affecting up to 80% of patients(196, 211), and has significant, deleterious effects on quality
of life and everyday functioning(407–409). Apathy is evident in HD patients before the mo-
tor onset of symptoms(210), and progresses with advancing disease(166). The PHAROS study
found higher rates among gene-carriers versus non-carriers blinded to their genetic status(210),
demonstrating that apathy is not simply a psychological reaction to a genetic diagnosis of HD,
developing symptoms or being at risk of HD. However, the neurobiology of apathy in HD re-
mains obscure: human structural imaging studies have not found consistent correlations with
apathy: some studies have proved negative(410–412); Delmaire et al(402), found an association
between apathy score and reduced fractional anisotropy in the rectus gyrus; Martinez-Horta
(628) demonstrated a correlation of apathy with both amygdala atrophy, and reduced amygdala
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perfusion; whilst Baake et al(413), showed a correlation of apathy with reduced thalamic volume.
Task-based functional MRI studies have not found associations between apathy and functional
activation changes using reward-based, working memory or set shifting tasks(414–416). One
resting state functional imaging study found higher apathy was associated with increased func-
tional connectivity in a network involving the caudate, parahippocampal gyrus, orbitofrontal
cortex and cingulate cortex, although the precise mechanism by which this leads to apathetic
behaviour remains obscure(417). A trial of a dopaminergic agent did not improve apathy in
HD(418), suggesting it is not primarily mediated through reward-based, or dopaminergic mech-
anisms. None of these studies demonstrate significant overlap between the neural structures
found to correlate with apathetic behaviour. This may reflect methodological differences, a dif-
fuse network dysfunction (dysfunction of different nodes within a single network that governs
goal-directed behaviour), or alternatively the processes that contribute to apathetic behaviour
may be heterogenous, and subserved by disparate neural structures and networks.
Theoretical work by Le Heron et al, Ernst and Paulus, and Levy, Dubois and Czernecki(216,
395, 419, 420) concerning goal-directed behaviour and decision-making, emphasise the parallel
and sequential contributory processes (option generation and selection, planning, evaluation,
learning and updating, willingness to exert and maintain effort) underlying these processes. De-
spite this, the focus of most work in apathy has been on reward value, motivation and executive
function. Several groups have attempted to map deficits in goal-directed behaviour in FTD and
PD, more comprehensively(230, 254, 421). However, these studies either used a case-control
approach, (comparing performance between patients and healthy controls, without using task
performance to predict apathetic behaviour), selected a more limited group of tasks, or omitted
a gold-standard assessment of apathy, thus limiting conclusions regarding the neuropsychology
of apathy. There has been no comprehensive evaluation of the precise cognitive mechanisms
underlying apathy in HD. We developed a battery of novel and established tasks to comprehen-
sively probe specific aspects of goal-directed behaviour, hypothesising that apathy in HD will
show a distinctive profile of deficits.
32
3.2 Materials and Methods
3.2.1 Participants
As outlined in materials and methods, fifty-three HD gene positive (>36 CAG repeats) patients
were recruited from the Cardiff University HD clinic. Disease severity ranged from presymp-
tomatic to moderately symptomatic based on their total motor scores (TMS) on the unified
HD rating scale (UHDRS)(422). Twenty-six age-matched controls were recruited from family
members not at risk for HD and healthy volunteers recruited through advertising.
3.2.2 General Procedures and Questionnaires
Gold standard apathy assessments were the Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES) and the apathy
subscore of the short form Problem Behaviours Assessment for HD (PBA apathy), which are
well-verified, robust assessments for apathy in HD and other diseases(166, 211, 215). We used
the Behavioural Inhibition Scale Behavioural Activation Scale (BISBAS)(394) as a measure of
reward and impulsivity. All general procedures and questionnaires were completed prior to start-
ing the tasks.
3.2.3 Computer tasks
The battery comprised pre-existing and novel(*) tasks covered processes hypothesised to con-
tribute to goal-directed behaviour: option generation, option selection, planning, evaluation,
effort and learning.
Persistence* (Outcome Evaluation to social aversive stimuli):
Participants saw two cars on the screen. They operated one by tapping the ‘S’ key (faster tap-
ping increased the speed) and were told that they would race against their opponent in the other
car other over two races. They were told to press ‘Q’ at any point if they wished to quit the
game. The distances travelled were displayed above the respective cars and every time either
car passed a checkpoint, a chequered flag was displayed (yellow for the subject, red for their
opponent) followed by the checkpoint number. The game was programmed so that the “oppo-
nent” was consistently faster. Each race ended when the opponent finished: the first after forty
checkpoints, and the second after eighty checkpoints. If subjects asked “does this race have an
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end?” they were told “yes it does end”. Other queries received the response: “all I can tell you,
is keep tapping on the spacebar to go, or press Q if you wish to quit”. The outcome measure
was the time spent in the task (maximum 10 minutes).
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Figure 3.1: Persistence Task
  
As outlined, participants tapped ‘S’ on the keyboard repeatedly to increase the ‘distance travelled’ shown above each car. 
Every time either car passed a checkpoint (every 100 units travelled) a checkered flag (on a red background if the opponent 
passed the checkpoint, or a yellow background for the participant) would be displayed followed by the relevant update screen. 
As can be seen in the first image the instruction ‘press S to go, press Q to quit is permanently displayed’ throughout the task. 
The on-screen S was changed to Spacebar for the task used in the experiment.
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Maze* (Option Generation and Selection):
Subjects were presented with fifteen different scenarios (for example “you are alone next to a red
house”) and asked to verbalise “what you would do next” as quickly as possible. The investigator
read each scenario to the participant and responded for the participant, as soon as they started
to give an answer. The outcome measure was the mean verbal response time. The scenarios are
described in Appendix B.
Phonemic Verbal Fluency (PVF) (423) (Executive Function)
Subjects were told they had a minute to think of as many words beginning with one letter as
they could, there were three trials (for words beginning with F, A and S respectively). The
outcome variable was the total number of novel words generated across all trial
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)(99) (Outcome Evaluation)
This task was coded in Pebl(424). Subjects were asked to draw cards from four packs: they were
informed that every card would win money, but sometimes they would lose money too. The aim
of the task was to work out which packs lost more money, than they earned (“bad packs”) and
avoid these packs. The outcome variable was the avoidance of a high-win, higher-loss pack in
the final twenty-five selections (the most reliable outcome metric(425)).
Extra-dimensional Set-Shift Task (EDSST) (Executive Function)
This task was a modified version of a reversal learning task(426). Subjects were asked to choose
between two houses, to find gold coins. They were told the rule for which house was correct
would change after a certain number of correct selections. The dimensions were ‘orange’ versus
‘blue’ house and ‘cat’ or ‘no cat’. The rule changed after seven correct answers in a row and
cycled from ‘orange house’ to ‘cat’ to ‘blue house’ to ‘no cat’. When twenty switches were com-
pleted, the game ended. Failure to learn the rule after twenty trials terminated the task. The
number of set shifts was the outcome measure.
Probabilistic Selection Learning Task (PSLT) (386) (Learning and Updating).
Subjects were asked to learn which stimulus from a pair was correct most often. Three pairs
were shown, each with different probabilistic contingencies (Pair AB: A is correct on 80% of
trials, B is correct on 20% of trials; Pair CD: C is correct on 70% of trials, B is correct on 30%
of trials; Pair EF: E is correct on 60% of trials, B is correct on 40% of trials). The original task
separated the outcome into positive and negative learning scores, we totalled the scores to give
a general measure of visual associative learning.
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Reward Ratio (Outcome evaluation of reward value and effort).
This was a simplified cued reaction time (RT) task(388). Participants were instructed “press
spacebar as quickly as possible when you see ‘PPPP”. They were told there was a practice level
of thirty trials, followed by a rewarded task to win points and that faster tapping scored higher.
RT < 0.7 x baseline RT scored 10; RT 0.7-1.0 x baseline RT scored 5; RTs slower than baseline
scored zero. The task ended when three-hundred points were scored. The outcome measure was
a ratio of RT in the rewarded versus unrewarded conditions.
Progressive Ratio (Outcome evaluation of reward value and effort).
This task measured effort for a fixed reward(387). Participants were instructed to compete for a
prize by opening boxes; winning meant they could move to the next level. They were told that
as the game progressed, the prize would arrive later, requiring them to search for longer to win
and move to the next level, and that although the game did end, they would not be informed
about the total number of levels. There were eighteen levels in total, for the first nine levels, the
winning box arrived within the first five boxes opened, whilst on the second half of the game the
winning box was discovered in the last five boxes opened (there were 18 levels). Pressing “Q”
allowed them to advance to the next level without winning. The outcome measure was levels
reached without pressing “Q” (breakpoint).
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (381) (Generalised Linear Mixed Model (GLMM)
Task)
Subjects were instructed to inflate a series of balloons to earn money, which they could bank at
will, but that over-inflation could pop the balloon resulting in loss of any money not banked.
Subjects encountered three different coloured balloons, each with a different minimum and max-
imum value for number of pumps before it popped (two and eight, two and thirty two and two
and one hundred and twenty eight in the first thirty trials; two and sixteen, eight and thirty-two
and sixteen and sixty-four in the final sixty trials). Each pump gained the subject 5 cents (‘trial
points’), but also increased the risk of loss. The actual number of pumps before a ‘pop’ randomly
varied on each trial between the minimum and maximum value.
3.2.4 Statistical Analysis and Modelling
All statistical analyses were completed in R(427). Dopaminergic and serotonergic drugs were
converted to olanzapine and fluoxetine equivalents derived from meta-analyses(379, 380) or WHO
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standard daily dose calculations (for tetrabenazine(428)- taken by one participant only). Pre-
morbid IQ was calculated using Crawford’s method(377); we used a demographic method rather
than a reading test such as the NART, as prior evidence in the HD population(378, 429, 430)
showed that whilst reading ability was preserved prior to motor onset, this declined in associa-
tion with cognitive deterioration and disease progression thereafter, whilst demographic methods
were much less affected by disease progression(378, 429, 430). Variables were analysed for nor-
mality: group comparisons employed t-test, or the Wilcoxon signed rank test as appropriate.
Linear regression was used to look for task predictors of apathy, initially alone, and subsequently
including potential confounding variables (age, premorbid IQ, drug doses, depression and mo-
tor impairments) in the HD group. The Bonferroni correction was set at 0.00555 for the task
battery, which contained nine tests. The PSLT, Maze, letter fluency and set shifting tasks were
performed on a sub-cohort of HD participants (final thirty-seven recruited for the probabilistic
selection learning task and final twenty-four recruited for the others) as the tasks were developed
later in the testing process; all controls completed the full battery.
Extraction of Behavioural Parameters from the BART
Exploitation of Reward
We created a parameter for exploitation of reward: VE = VG/VO (value-gained/maximum value
on offer for each trial – i.e. the randomly generated ‘pop’ point for that trial) and compared
models, with fixed effects of PBA Apathy, PBA Depression, BISBAS subscores, case status (HD
versus control), medication (Olanzapine and Fluoxetine) and IQ. As an a priori plan, any rele-
vant variables were included as fixed effects in subsequent models.
Inaccuracy, Excess and Deficient Performance
Each balloon had an optimum number of pumps, which participants learnt by experimentation
throughout the task. Making pumps beyond the optimum, led to expected loss (risk of loss
x value of loss) exceeding expected gain (chance of gain x value of gain). We calculated the
number of pumps above or below this value and expressed these as a proportion of the opti-
mum, to create a parameter for excessive responses (expected loss exceeds expected reward),
and deficient responses (optimum value is not maximised). Finally we calculated total variation
from the optimum (pumps above or below optimum divided by optimum) to calculate overall
inaccuracy.
Task Performance
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The outcome of the task is based on total money accrued. We created a parameter - ‘reactivity’
to compare post-loss (following a popped balloon – lost money) trials with post-reward trials
to explore the effect of loss on performance. Final models were compared with and without the
addition of potential confounding variables (PBA depression, Olanzapine and Fluoxetine doses,
age, gender and TMS).
As participants were not explicitly told the maximum value or risk of ‘pop’ on the BART, we
expected performance to improve over time: the “trial” variable acted as a measure of learning.
GLMM Modelling of Behaviour: BART data
We created random effects generalised linear mixed models using the glmmTMB(431) function
in R(427), to explore the effect of relevant variables on performance within the task. The models
used binomial distributions for logistic data, and Poisson distributions for count or count-derived
data. The random effect term specified by-subject variation, and a zero-inflation correction was
included. We added relevant clinical variables (case status, PBA apathy score, and trial) to mod-
els initially in isolation, then subsequently added them as separate fixed effects, before looking at
models of interactions between variables. Models were compared by weighted Akaike information
criterion (AIC) values using bbmle(432), to see which model best fit the data, and provided the
most parsimonious explanation as described by Burnham and Anderson, and Bolker et al(433,
434). Briefly, the closer the weight of each model’s AIC to 1, the better it explains variation
in the data. Models using the AES score failed to converge (AES was essentially completely
non-orthogonal with case status), thus PBA apathy score was used.
3.3 Results
There were no significant differences of age or gender between the HD group and controls. The
HD group had higher scores on the PBA Apathy, AES, TMS, and drug doses, and lower pre-
morbid IQ. Persistence, Maze and PVF demonstrated the strongest predictive relationships with
apathy, and best discriminated between groups (Tables 3.1 & 3.2).
Tests for the assumptions underlying multiple linear regression were all met (Shapiro’s test of
normality on the residuals was non-significant, as was the Durbin-Watson test for autocorrela-
tion and Goldfeld-Quandt test for heteroscedasticity).
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Table 3.1: Demographics
HD Controls
Age 53.92 (33-82) 46.85 (20-75)
IQ 103.53 (88.75-125.27) 109.73 (89.79-128.51) *
Gender 26/53 female 17/26 female
PBA Apathy 5.04 (0-16) 0.5 (0-4) ***
Apathy Evaluation Scale 38.48 (18-72) 18.85 (18-26) ***
PBA Depression 3.08 (0-12) 1.81 (0-9)
Olanzapine dose (mg) 1.98 (0-41.25) 0 ***
Fluoxetine dose (mg) 21.85 (0-146.5) 2.4 (0-22.2) ***
CAG Repeat Length 42.5 (38-50) -
Total Motor Score 36.58 (0-89) 1.48 (0-6) ***
* 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
Table 3.2: Task Comparisons
Task Cohens d PBA Apathy R2 AES R2
Maze 1.42 0.41 0.32
PVF 1.22 0.26 0.24
Persistence 0.72 0.33 0.25
PSLT 0.73 0.12 0.14
IGT 0.55 0.022 0.077
EDSST 0.38 0.25 0.26
BAS Reward 0.34 0.0063 -0.018
Progressive Ratio 0.31 -0.0020 0.0082
Reward Ratio 0.09 -0.0019 -0.024
Adjusted R2 from simple regression analysis, Cohen’s d
from group comparisons
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3.3.1 Individual Task Performance
Persistence Task
Higher scores indicate decreased sensitivity to aversive stimuli (failure on the race) . The HD
group showed significantly higher scores on this task compared to controls (means HD=1621s,
Control=1049s; p=0.0051), and higher scores significantly predicted apathy on the AES (ad-
justed R2=0.25, p=0.00021) and PBA apathy (adjusted R2=0.33, p=0.000018). When con-
founders were included in the model, this effect remained and the significance survived the
Bonferroni correction on both the AES (p=0.0029) and the PBA Apathy (p=0.00032) (Table
3.1, Figures 3.2 & 3.3). In HD, decreased sensitivity to aversive stimulus predicts apathy.
Maze Task
Faster reaction times demonstrate better task-performance (faster idea generation). HD reaction
times were almost twice those of controls (means 7792, 4408 ms, p=6.87 x10-7). Slower reaction
times had a highly significant predictive relationship with apathy measured by the AES (adjusted
R2=0.35, p=0.0019) and PBA apathy (adjusted R2=0.43, p=0.00036) (Table 3.2, Figures 3.2 &
3.3). However, the addition of confounders meant the relationship was no longer significant.
PVF
The HD group was markedly impaired compared with controls, generating markedly lower scores
(means 33.24 & 45.46; p=0.00017). Regression showed lower scores predicted increasing apathy
(AES: adjusted R2=0.24, p=0.0083; PBA apathy: adjusted R2=0.26)(Table 3.3, Figures 3.2 &
3.3). However, when the potential confounders were included, significance was lost.
41
Figure 3.2: Group Comparisons
  
A B
C
Group comparisons for largest R2 
regressions: Persistence (outcome 
evaluation of social aversive stimuli: 
longer duration = decreased sensitivity 
to aversive stimuli); Maze (option 
generation and selection: slower 
reaction = prolonged idea generation 
time); and Phonemic Verbal Fluency 
(executive function: fewer novel word 
exemplars = worse generative 
executive function)
Means 262.38 & 404.44, W = 836, p=0.0051 Means 4408.92 & 8054.06, W=589, p=6.87 x10-7
Means 45.46 & 29.29,W=144, p=0.00067
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Figure 3.3: Prediction of Apathy by Task Performance
  
E
Increasing apathy is predicted by increasing insensitivity to social loss (A&B), 
slower idea generation (C&D), and poorer executive function (E&F).
B
CA
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Table 3.3: Persistence
Dependent variable:
PBA Apathy AES
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) −0.29 0.81 21.59 0.000016
Persistence 0.013 0.000018 0.040 0.00021
R2 0.34 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.25
F Statistic (df = 1; 44) 23.07∗∗∗ 16.37∗∗∗
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) −3.67 0.55 31.10 0.16
Persistence 0.011 0.00032 0.033 0.0029
Age 0.077 0.17 0.25 0.21
IQ −0.020 0.68 −0.27 0.12
TMS 0.031 0.30 0.20 0.07
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.10 0.38 0.34 0.41
Fluoxetine Equivalent 0.0034 0.88 0.027 0.74
PBA Depression 0.11 0.47 −0.073 0.90
R2 0.49 0.51
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.42
F Statistic (df = 7; 36) 4.98∗∗∗ 5.42∗∗∗
Note: Regression Significance ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
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Table 3.4: Maze
Dependent variable:
PBA Apathy AES
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) −2.37 0.24 14.97 0.042
Maze 0.00094 0.00036 0.0028 0.0019
R2 0.43 0.35
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.32
F Statistic (df = 1; 23) 17.50∗∗∗ 12.27∗∗∗
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) −0.31 0.97 49.29 0.08
Maze 0.001 0.055 0.001 0.39
Age −0.055 0.49 −0.19 0.49
IQ −0.0031 0.97 −0.23 0.33
TMS 0.084 0.029 0.38 0.0049
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.90 0.047 3.83 0.015
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0051 0.86 0.041 0.66
PBA Depression −0.0068 0.98 −0.53 0.52
R2 0.696 0.702
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.572
F Statistic (df = 7; 16) 5.235∗∗∗ 5.392∗∗∗
Note: Regression Significance ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
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Table 3.5: Phonemic Verbal Fluency
Dependent variable:
PBA Apathy AES
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 11.26 0.000065 56.04 0.00000015
PVF −0.22 0.0069 −0.68 0.0083
R2 0.29 0.28
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.24
F Statistic (df = 1; 22) 8.89∗∗ 8.40∗∗
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.24 0.66 50.57 0.037
PVF −0.14 0.095 −0.24 0.32
Age 0.014 0.84 −0.16 0.47
IQ 0.018 0.81 −0.12 0.60
TMS 0.073 0.093 0.37 0.010
Olanzapine Equivalent 1.045 0.019 3.94 0.0055
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.010 0.74 −0.014 0.88
PBA Depression −0.096 0.71 −0.45 0.56
R2 0.69 0.73
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.61
F Statistic (df = 7; 15) 4.80∗∗ 5.92∗∗∗
Note: Regression Significance ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
PVF - Phonemic Verbal Fluency
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IGT
Higher scores are associated with impaired outcome evaluation. HD participants performed
significantly worse than controls (means 3.73 and 5.78 respectively, p=0.037). Impaired perfor-
mance was only predictive of AES score, and this effect was not maintained with the inclusion
of confounding variables (Table 3.6, Figures 3.4 & 3.5)
PSLT
The outcome variable was percentage-correct: higher scores demonstrated better learning. The
HD group had a smaller mean than the control group (54.89% versus 67.43%, p = 0.012). Simple
linear regression analyses demonstrated an initial association with both apathy measures, but
this difference did not surpass the Bonferroni correction and did not survive when confounding
variables were included (Table 3.7, Figures 3.4 & 3.5).
EDSST
Higher scores indicate more set-switches achieved and hence better executive function. HD pa-
tients made fewer set switches compared with controls, (6.08 vs 9.31) but this finding was not
significant (p = 0.18). Within the HD group, lower completed set shifts was associated with
higher apathy scores, but this relationship failed to maintain significance after inclusion of the
confounders in the regression(Table 3.8, Figures 3.4 & 3.5).
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Figure 3.4: Group Comparisons
  
A B
C Group comparisons for small to 
medium R2 regressions: Iowa 
Gambling Task (outcome evaluation: 
lower ‘A’ count = better discrimination 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ decks); 
Probabilistic Selection Learning Task 
(learning and updating: higher 
percentage correct = better learning); 
and Extra-Dimensional Set Shifting 
Task (executive function: more set 
shifts = better cognitive flexibility).
 Means 3.73 & 5.78, W = 758.5, p=0.037 Means 67.43 & 54.89, W = 227.5, p=0.012
Means 9.31 & 6.08, W=255 , p=0.18
A B
C
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Figure 3.5: Prediction of Apathy by Task Performance
  
E
Increasing apathy is predicted by increasing insensitivity to outcome (A&B), poorer 
learning (C&D), and worse executive function (E&F).
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Table 3.6: Iowa Gambling Task
Dependent variable:
PBA Apathy AES
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.28 0.0056 30.73 0.00000000089
IGT 0.23 0.16 1.22 0.036
R2 0.044 0.098
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.077
F Statistic (df = 1; 43) 2.0031 4.68∗
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) −1.34 0.85 36.98 0.14
IGT 0.20 0.27 0.78 0.21
Age 0.030 0.61 0.099 0.62
IQ 0.0045 0.94 −0.19 0.36
TMS 0.054 0.12 0.25 0.040
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.17 0.17 0.59 0.18
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.012 0.63 −0.022 0.81
PBA Depression 0.16 0.41 0.17 0.81
R2 0.28 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.23
F Statistic (df = 7; 35) 1.91 2.84∗
Note: Regression Significance ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
IGT - Iowa Gambling Task
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Table 3.7: Probabilistic Selection Learning Task
Dependent variable:
PBA Apathy AES
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 11.15 0.0016 60.50 0.0000060
PSLT −0.12 0.037 −0.45 0.026
R2 0.15 0.17
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.14
F Statistic (df = 1; 27) 4.79∗ 5.53∗
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.75 0.49 56.61 0.021
PSLT −0.014 0.78 −0.11 0.54
Age 0.0036 0.95 0.036 0.86
IQ −0.039 0.52 −0.30 0.13
TMS 0.080 0.033 0.35 0.0069
Olanzapine Equivalent 1.059 0.0019 2.90 0.0077
Fluoxetine Equivalent 0.0098 0.97 0.037 0.69
PBA Depression 0.14 0.55 −0.052 0.95
R2 0.58 0.64
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.51
F Statistic (df = 7; 20) 4.019∗∗ 4.97∗∗∗
Note: Regression Significance ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
PSLT -
Probabilistic Selection Learning Task
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Table 3.8: Extra-dimensional Set Shift Task
Dependent variable:
PBA Apathy AES
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 7.57 0.0000014 45.080 0.000000000029
EDSST −0.38 0.0061 −1.28 0.0051
R2 0.28 0.29
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.26
F Statistic (df = 1; 23) 9.13∗∗ 9.58∗∗
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 5.84 0.48 56.59 0.034
EDSST −0.074 0.63 −0.25 0.59
Age 0.014 0.86 −0.11 0.65
IQ −0.051 0.53 −0.26 0.28
TMS 0.10 0.022 0.39 0.0049
Olanzapine Equivalent 1.19 0.017 4.15 0.0066
Fluoxetine Equivalent 0.010 0.74 0.065 0.48
PBA Depression −0.081 0.77 −0.58 0.49
R2 0.62 0.69
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.56
F Statistic (df = 7; 16) 3.73∗ 5.17∗∗∗
Note: Regression Significance ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
EDSST -
Extra-dimensional Set Shift Task
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Measures of Reward and Effort: BAS Reward, Progressive Ratio, Reward Ratio
task
The BAS Reward score was slightly lower (showing reduced sensitivity to reward) in HD com-
pared with controls (17.5, 16.5, p= 0.049), but this did not surpass Bonferroni, and was not
predictive of apathy in the models. Neither of the other measures (Progressive Ratio, Reward
Ratio) showed group differences or predicted apathy in the Poisson GLMs (Tables 3.9, 3.10,
3.11, Figures 3.6 & 3.7). Negative Binomial GLMs were used when the assumptions underlying
linear regression were not met, as stated in the tables.
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Figure 3.6: Group Comparisons
  
A B
C Group comparisons for small R2 
regressions: Reward Ratio (outcome 
evaluation of reward value and effort: 
lower ratio indicates faster reaction 
time in rewarded condition); 
Progressive Ratio (outcome 
evaluation of reward value and effort: 
higher breakpoint = more work for 
fixed reward); and BAS Reward 
(higher scores indicate higher self-
reported reward value).
 Means 0.98 & 1.00, W = 494, p=0.86 Means 13.29 & 11.11, W=438.5, p=0.2411
Means 17.54 & 16.51, W = 484.5, p=0.049
A B
C
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Figure 3.7: Prediction of Apathy by Task Performance
  
E
Regressions all non-significant. Graphs suggest increasing apathy is predicted by 
slowing reaction time in rewarded conditions(A&B), reduced effort for a fixed 
reward (C&D), and lower self-reported reward value (E&F).
B
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Table 3.9: BAS Reward
Dependent variable:
PBA Apathy AES
negative OLS
binomial
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.28 0.026 41.99 0.0017
BAS Reward −0.043 0.41 −0.24 0.75
R2 0.0020
Adjusted R2 −0.018
F Statistic 0.10 (df = 1; 49)
Log Likelihood −136.026
Akaike Inf. Crit. 276.051
Pseudo R2 0.0097
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.22 0.20 80.51 0.0077
BAS Reward −0.081 0.17 −0.89 0.20
Age 0.0047 0.77 0.0082 0.97
IQ −0.018 0.29 −0.40 0.041
TMS 0.031 ).00037 0.357 0.00094
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.055 0.097 0.60 0.12
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0072 0.33 −0.01670.84
PBA Depression −0.0048 0.92 −0.28 0.61
R2 0.41
Adjusted R2 0.31
F Statistic 4.14∗∗∗ (df = 7; 41)
Log Likelihood −121.36
Akaike Inf. Crit. 258.71
Pseudo R2 0.23
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
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Table 3.10: Reward Ratio
Dependent variable:
PBA Apathy AES
OLS negative
binomial
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 7.20 0.052 3.67 <2x10−16
Reward Ratio −3.46 0.34 −0.14 0.70
R2 0.026
Adjusted R2 −0.0019
F Statistic 0.93 (df = 1; 35)
Log Likelihood −149.83
Akaike Inf. Crit. 303.65
Pseudo R2 0.0042
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.4 0.63 4.078 1.12x10−7
Reward Ratio −0.37 0.92 0.098 0.75
Age 0.061 0.42 0.0060 0.33
IQ −0.051 0.42 −0.012 0.024
TMS 0.050 0.21 0.0081 0.014
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.14 0.32 0.013 0.21
Fluoxetine Equivalent 0.0023 0.93 0.00063 0.77
PBA Depression −0.047 0.82 −0.0085 0.62
R2 0.27
Adjusted R2 0.087
F Statistic 1.48 (df = 7; 28)
Log Likelihood −134.62
Akaike Inf. Crit. 285.24
Pseudo R2 0.45
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
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Table 3.11: Progressive Ratio
Dependent variable:
PBA Apathy AES
negative OLS
binomial
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 1.70 3.44x10−16 40.39 2.78x10−12
Progressive Ratio −0.019 0.48 −0.36 0.25
R2 0.031
Adjusted R2 0.0082
F Statistic 1.36 (df = 1; 42)
Log Likelihood −113.61
Akaike Inf. Crit. 231.21
Pseudo R2 0.0097
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 1.32 0.54 59.025 0.014
Progressive Ratio 0.0027 0.93 −0.15 0.62
Age −0.00069 0.97 −0.067 0.77
IQ −0.011 0.57 −0.29 0.15
TMS 0.031 0.0083 0.33 0.013
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.065 0.093 0.71 0.098
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0077 0.39 −0.027 0.77
PBA Depression 0.024 0.69 0.075 0.91
R2 0.38
Adjusted R2 0.25
F Statistic 2.99∗ (df = 7; 34)
Log Likelihood −100.93
Akaike Inf. Crit. 217.85
Pseudo R2 0.20
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.005
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3.3.2 Generalised Linear Mixed Models of Behaviour – Balloon Ana-
logue Risk Task
Exploitation of Reward
We compared models with fixed effects of case status, PBA depression, PBA apathy, IQ, med-
ication, and BISBAS subscores. The best model (weight 0.559), showed a positive effect of
IQ (p=0.011) on reward exploitation. Notably, IQ was lower in the HD group compared with
controls: IQ was included as a fixed effect in all subsequent models. The model of case status
demonstrated a trend-level effect of reduced exploitation of reward(AIC 8357.8, Estimate -0.29,
Standard Error 0.15, Z Score -1.94, p=0.052), none of the other models approached a significant
effect (Tables 3.12 & 3.13, Figure 3.8).
Excessive Responding
Model comparison yielded 2 models with almost equivalent weights – PBA apathy score, case
and IQ as fixed effects (weight 0.305), and a second model that also included a fixed effect of
trial (weight 0.223). Both models showed a negative effect of case (HD subjects had less exces-
sive responding than controls: p= 0.038 in both models), but higher apathy scores resulted in
more excessive responding (p= 0.012 in both models), there was no significant effect of trial.
Including the BISBAS sub scores (reward, drive, fun-seeking, and inhibition) as fixed effects did
not improve the Apathy/Case/IQ model. Repeating the modelling comparison without the ran-
dom effects term, showed the best model (weight 0.971) now included the behavioural inhibition
score, which had a negative association with excessive responses (p=9.02x10−5), but the effect
of apathy (p=3.85x10−9) and case (p=1.85x10−7) on excessive responding was unchanged: the
random effects term accounts for individual variation in risk-taking (Tables 3.14 - 3.19, Figure
3.8).
Deficient Responding and Inaccuracy
Model comparisons demonstrated that both deficient responding and inaccuracy were best ex-
plained by models including trial as a fixed effect in isolation. Deficient and inaccurate respond-
ing reduced with increasing trial (p=9.9x10−10, and 4.88x10−8 respectively) and increasing IQ
(p=0.0090 and 0.0051 respectively)(Tables 3.20 - 3.23, Figure 3.8). Apathy did not have a
significant effect in any of the models that included it as a variable.
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Figure 3.8: Generalised Linear Mixed Models - Initial Parameters
  
Figure A shows increasing 
ability to maximise reward 
with increasing IQ, Figures 
B&C demonstrate increasing 
excessive responses, with 
increasing apathy. Figure C 
has y-axis limits truncated to 
demonstrate the regression 
line slope more clearly. 
Figures D&E show declining 
deficient (D) and inaccurate 
(E) responses with increasing 
trial.
A B C
ED
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Table 3.12: Exploitation of Reward: Model Selection
dAIC df weight
Model Exploit IQ 0.0 4 0.559
Model Exploit Case 2.5 4 0.162
Model Exploit Depression 4.7 4 0.054
Model Exploit Olanzapine 5.0 4 0.046
Model Exploit BAS Reward 5.1 4 0.044
Model Exploit BAS Funseeking 6.0 4 0.029
Model Exploit BIS 6.0 4 0.028
Model Exploit Fluoxetine 6.1 4 0.027
Model Exploit Apathy 6.1 4 0.026
Model Exploit BAS Drive 6.1 4 0.026
’BAS Reward’ - Behavioural Activation Scale- Reward Subscale,
’BAS Funseeking’ - Behavioural Activation Scale- Funseeking Subscale,
’BAS Drive’ - Behavioural Activation Scale- Drive Subscale,
’BIS’ - Behavioural Inhibition Scale
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Table 3.13: Model Exploit IQ
Random Effects: Variance: 0.31 Std.Dev: 0.56
Estimate Std. Error Z Value P Value CI Lower CI Upper
(Intercept) -1.43 0.72 -1.99 0.046 -2.83 -0.024
IQ 0.017 0.0067 2.54 0.011 0.0039 0.030
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Table 3.14: Excessive Responding: Model Selection
dAIC df weight
Model Excess Case+Apathy 0.0 6 0.305
Model Excess Case+Apathy+Trial 0.6 7 0.223
Model Excess Case:Apathy 0.9 7 0.196
Model Excess Apathy 2.2 5 0.099
Model Excess Case:Apathy:Trial 2.6 11 0.082
Model Excess Trial 3.5 5 0.053
Model Excess Case 4.0 5 0.041
’+’ denotes additional fixed effect, ’ : ’ denotes interaction
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Table 3.15: Model Excess Pump Case+Apathy
Random Effects: Variance: 0.77 Std.Dev: 0.89
Estimate Std. Error Z Value P Value CI Lower CI Upper
(Intercept) -3.37 0.22 -15.53 <2x10−16 -3.79 -2.94
Case -0.66 0.32 -2.078 0.038 -1.28 -0.037
PBA Apathy 0.093 0.037 2.51 0.012 0.020 0.17
IQ 0.22 0.13 1.62 0.10 -0.045 0.48
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Table 3.16: Model Excess Pump Case+Apathy+Trial
Random Effects: Variance: 0.77 Std.Dev: 0.89
Estimate Std. Error Z Value P Value CI Lower CI Upper
(Intercept) -3.49 0.24 -14.43 <2x10−16 -3.97 -3.019
Case -0.66 0.32 -2.078 0.038 -1.28 -0.037
PBA Apathy 0.093 0.037 2.51 0.012 0.020 0.17
Trial 0.0026 0.0022 1.17 0.24 -0.0018 0.0070
IQ 0.22 0.13 1.62 0.10 -0.044 0.48
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Table 3.17: Excessive Responding BISBAS: Model Selection
dAIC df weight
Model Excess Case+Apathy 0.0 6 0.620
Model Excess Case+Apathy+BIS 3.3 6 0.116
Model Excess Case+Apathy+BAS Reward 3.5 6 0.109
Model Excess Case+Apathy+BAS Drive 4.1 6 0.079
Model Excess Case+Apathy+BAS Funseeking 4.2 6 0.076
’BAS Reward’ - Behavioural Activation Scale- Reward Subscale,
’BAS Funseeking’ - Behavioural Activation Scale- Funseeking Subscale,
’BAS Drive’ - Behavioural Activation Scale- Drive Subscale,
’BIS’ - Behavioural Inhibition Scale
’+’ denotes additional fixed effect, ’ : ’ denotes interaction
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Table 3.18: Excessive Responding BISBAS: Model Selection: No Random Effect Term
dAIC df weight
Model NoRandom Case+Apathy+BIS 0.0 4 0.971
Model NoRandom Case+Apathy+BAS Reward 5.1 4 0.0710
Model NoRandom Case+Apathy 12.7 3 0.0016
Model NoRandom Case+Apathy+BAS Drive 14.6 4 <0.001
Model NoRandom Case+Apathy+BAS Funseeking 14.8 4 <0.001
’BAS Reward’ - Behavioural Activation Scale- Reward Subscale,
’BAS Funseeking’ - Behavioural Activation Scale- Funseeking Subscale,
’BAS Drive’ - Behavioural Activation Scale- Drive Subscale,
’BIS’ - Behavioural Inhibition Scale
’+’ denotes additional fixed effect, ’ : ’ denotes interaction
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Table 3.19: Model NoRandom Case+Apathy+BIS
Estimate Std. Error Z Value P Value CI Lower CI Upper
(Intercept) -1.25 0.11 -11.64 <2x10−16 -1.46 -1.039
PBA Apathy 0.046 0.0079 5.89 3.85x10−9 0.031 0.062
Case -0.37 0.071 -5.21 1.85x10−7 -0.51 -0.23
BIS -0.018 0.0045 -3.92 9.02x10−5 -0.027 -0.0088
’BIS’ - Behavioural Inhibition Scale
68
Table 3.20: Deficient Responding: Model Selection
dAIC df weight
Model Deficient Trial 0.0 5 0.639
Model Deficient Apathy+Case+Trial 1.2 7 0.350
Model Deficient Apathy:Case:Trial 8.2 11 0.011
Model Deficient Case 36.1 5 <0.001
Model Deficient Apathy+Case 36.7 6 <0.001
Model Deficient Apathy 37.2 5 <0.001
Model Deficient Apathy:Case 38.6 7 <0.001
’+’ denotes additional fixed effect, ’ : ’ denotes interaction
69
Table 3.21: Model Deficient Trial
Random Effects: Variance: 0.065 Std.Dev: 0.26
Estimate Std. Error Z Value P Value CI Lower CI Upper
(Intercept) -0.64 0.048 -13.43 <2x10−16 -0.73 -0.55
Trial -0.0045 0.00073 -6.11 9.9x10−10 -0.0059 -0.0030
IQ -0.093 0.036 -2.61 0.0090 -0.16 -0.023
70
Table 3.22: Inaccuracy: Model Selection
dAIC df weight
Model Inaccuracy Trial 0.0 5 0.6889
Model Inaccuracy Apathy+Case+Trial 1.7 7 0.3017
Model Inaccuracy Apathy:Case:Trial 8.6 11 0.0095
Model Inaccuracy Case 27.5 5 <0.001
Model Inaccuracy Apathy+Case 29.5 6 <0.001
Model Inaccuracy Apathy 29.5 5 <0.001
Model Inaccuracy Apathy:Case 31.4 7 <0.001
’+’ denotes additional fixed effect, ’ : ’ denotes interaction
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Table 3.23: Model Inaccuracy Trial
Random Effects: Variance: 0.01675 Std.Dev: 0.1294
Estimate Std. Error Z Value P Value CI Lower CI Upper
(Intercept) -0.54 0.038 -14.20 <2x10−16 -0.62 -0.47
Trial -0.0038 0.00069 -5.46 4.88x10−8 -0.0051 -0.0024
IQ -0.066 0.024 -2.80 0.0051 -0.11 -0.020
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Task Performance
We compared models looking at the effects of apathy, post-reward/post-loss and trial on task
performance (trial points scored) in HD subjects and controls. Comparing case models with
individual fixed effects, multiple fixed effects, and interactions, demonstrated the best model to
be the most complex interaction model (apathy:reactivity:trial - weight 1.0). This model showed
a positive effect of apathy on trial points (apathetic individuals scored more points, p=0.021),
a positive interaction of post-loss trial and apathy (apathetic individuals scored more points on
post-punishment trials, p<2x10−16), a negative interaction of apathy and trial (increased apa-
thy resulted in deteriorating performance over time, p= 3.72x10−14) and a negative interaction
between apathy, reactivity and trial (increasing apathy resulted in deteriorating performance
over time on post-punishment trials, p=1.56 x10−13).
To explore this deterioration in performance, we looked at models of pop probability: the best
model (weight 0.5003) had fixed effects of reactivity, apathy and IQ. The probability of pop
increased with apathy (p= 0.016) and on post-loss trials (p= 0.0007).
There were only low levels of apathy in the control group, nevertheless, including apathy im-
proved the model (weight 1.0). However, the apathy in the control group was clearly different
to that in HD: on post loss trials, performance improved over time in the control group with
increased apathy (Tables 3.24 - 3.29, Figure 3.9).
Comparing models using likelihood ratio tests, none of the Task Performance models were im-
proved by adding age, drug doses, TMS or PBA depression scores.
73
Figure 3.9: Generalised Linear Mixed Models – Task Performance and Pop Probability
  
D
Figures A&B show improved 
performance in all groups post 
reward, but deterioration post-
loss in HD with higher levels of 
apathy (PBA apathy >4), 
compared with low apathy HD 
and controls. Figures C&D show 
increasing apathy in HD leads to 
increased risk of loss (popped 
probability), whilst the converse 
is true of controls. Figures B&D 
have truncated y-axes to 
demonstrate regression line 
slope more clearly. 
C
BA
D
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Table 3.24: Task Performance: Model Selection
dAIC df weight
Model Performance Apathy:Reactivity:Trial 0.0 11 1
Model Performance Apathy+Reactivity+Trial 340.3 7 <0.001
Model Performance Trial 347.9 5 <0.001
Model Performance Apathy:Reactivity 1289.2 7 <0.001
Model Performance Apathy:Reactivity 1293.2 6 <0.001
Model Performance Reactivity 1294.8 5 <0.001
Model Performance Apathy 1311.1 5 <0.001
’+’ denotes additional fixed effect, ’ : ’ denotes interaction
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Table 3.26: Popped: Model Selection
dAIC df weight
Model Popped Apathy+Reactivity 0.0 6 0.5003
Model Popped Apathy+Reactivity+Trial 1.9 7 0.1971
Model Popped Apathy:Reactivity 1.9 7 0.1906
Model Popped Reactivity 3.4 5 0.0897
Model Popped Apathy:Reactivity:Trial 6.7 11 0.0175
Model Popped Apathy 9.4 5 0.0045
Model Popped Trial 14.9 5 <0.001
’+’ denotes additional fixed effect, ’ : ’ denotes interaction
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Table 3.27: Model Popped Apathy+Reactivity
Random Effects: Variance: 0.39 Std.Dev: 0.62
Estimate Std. Error Z Value P Value CI Lower CI Upper
(Intercept) -3.53 1.0027 -3.53 0.00042 -5.50 -1.57
PBA Apathy 0.056 0.023 2.40 0.016 0.010 0.10
Reactivity 0.25 0.075 3.39 0.00070 0.11 0.40
IQ 0.020 0.0095 2.11 0.035 0.0015 0.039
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Table 3.28: Task Performance Controls: Model Selection
dAIC df weight
Model PerformanceControl Apathy:Reactivity:Trial 0.0 11 1
Model PerformanceControl Reactivity:Trial 46.4 7 <0.001
Model PerformanceControl Reactivity+Trial 278.3 6 <0.001
Model PerformanceControl Apathy+Reactivity+Trial 280.2 7 <0.001
Model PerformanceControl Trial 341.8 5 <0.001
Model PerformanceControl Apathy:Reactivity 915.3 7 <0.001
Model PerformanceControl Reactivity 936.7 5 <0.001
Model PerformanceControl Apathy+Reactivity 938.6 6 <0.001
Model PerformanceControl Apathy 1040.3 5 <0.001
’+’ denotes additional fixed effect, ’ : ’ denotes interaction
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Table 3.29: Task Performance Controls, No PBA Apathy: Model Selection
dAIC df weight
Model PerformanceControl Reactivity:Trial 0.0 7 1
Model PerformanceControl Reactivity+Trial 231.9 6 <0.001
Model PerformanceControl Trial 295.4 5 <0.001
Model PerformanceControl Reactivity 890.3 5 <0.001
’+’ denotes additional fixed effect, ’ : ’ denotes interaction
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3.3.3 Exploratory Analyses
Performance on the Maze task predicted PVF and EDSST performance, and Persistence perfor-
mance predicted IGT performance.
To assess validity of the reward based measures, we compared scores on the BAS reward, Pro-
gressive Ratio and Reward Ratio tasks using GLMs (assumptions underlying linear regression
were not met) in the control group. Higher breakpoint on progressive ratio and faster reac-
tion time on the reward ratio task were significantly associated (AIC 183.54, estimate -0.88, p
= 0.012), higher breakpoint was also associated with higher scores on the BAS reward (AIC
185.73, estimate 0.038, p = 0.0438), but there was no association between the Reward Ratio and
BAS reward score (AIC 141.71, estimate -0.068, p = 0.72).
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Table 3.31: Maze and Executive Function
Dependent variable:
EDSST PVF
negative negative
binomial binomial
Estimate P Value Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.54 9.03x10−9 4.14 <2x10−16
Maze −0.00025 0.0015 −0.00010 1.38x10−5
Log Likelihood −67.33 −89.42
Akaike Inf. Crit. 138.67 182.85
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.42
PVF=Phonemic Verbal Fluency, EDSST = Extra Dimensional Set Shift Task
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3.4 Discussion
Our main finding was that decreased sensitivity to aversive stimuli was associated with apathy
in HD. Furthermore, deficits in reward sensitivity or altered reward-effort calculations were not
predictive of apathy in HD. To our knowledge, this is the first conclusive demonstration that
apathy is associated with impaired responses to aversive stimuli in any disease. This deficit
was seen on tasks of competitive failure (Persistence), and monetary loss (BART): increasing
apathy was associated with more popped balloons, increased excessive responding and poorer
performance on BART over time, post-loss. The Persistence deficit is unlikely to be explained by
impaired memory for instructions, or executive function (such as attention) as the instructions
are displayed on screen at all times, and no association with executive function tasks was seen.
Furthermore adding IQ to the regression models and GLMMs did not change the effects of apa-
thy. Risk-taking in the BART was accounted for by the random effects: the altered performance
of apathetic individuals with HD was not related to impulsivity. Confounding variables (age,
medication, TMS and depression score) did not improve the GLMMs.
Altered response to aversive stimuli has been found in other neurological diseases(254, 421,
435, 436) and also HD(88, 437). However, the prior work in HD did not investigate the associ-
ation of altered responses to aversive stimuli with apathy. Ersche and co-workers(629) showed
insensitivity in learning from punishment, but not reward in cocaine addiction. In FTD, Perry
et al(435) showed an association between impaired responses to aversive stimuli and atrophy in
the insula and amygdala, and also an association between disinhibited behaviour and ventral
putamen atrophy; disinhibition also correlated with apathy scores. However, they did not link
apathy with changes in response to aversive stimuli(435, 436). A comparison of FTD(254), and
PD(421) on a multi-component task of initiation, planning and motivation: found differences
between the FTD group and controls, but did not look for predictors of apathy within the FTD
group, whilst the study in PD did not find group differences or consistent associations between
their task and gold-standard apathy measures. Lansdall et al(230) used a battery of tasks assess-
ing reward, risk-taking and impulsivity in patients with various fronto-temporal degenerations,
but did not include gold standard assessments of apathy, or look for altered responses to aversive
stimuli. Thus our study is the first to show deficits in response to aversive stimuli leading to
apathy.
Several neuropsychological processes might contribute to the deficit found in aversive stimu-
lus response: impaired recognition of aversive stimuli, differential learning from loss and reward,
reduced loss aversion, or inability to change behaviour following the stimulus. HD patients
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show impaired recognition of negative emotions(96, 166, 438, 439), which is associated with
changes in the insula(96), as do patients with FTD(440–442). This deficit in FTD is part of
a more widespread deficit in aversive stimulus sensitivity(435). Frank(386) showed that differ-
ences in learning from loss and reward in PD are driven by dopamine, a process mediated by
the intra-basal ganglia indirect (inhibitory - NoGo) and direct (excitatory – Go) pathways re-
spectively(443). However, the direct and indirect pathways in HD are both impaired: deficits
in excitatory and inhibitory processing in HD are best explained by impaired co-ordination of
bilaterally damaged pathways, consistent with medium spiny neuron injury(444). Furthermore
a randomised controlled trial of a dopaminergic agent in HD did not improve apathy(418). Loss
aversion(445), (where potential loss is a more significant behavioural influence than an equiv-
alent potential reward(446)) has been shown to be mediated by the amygdala (where apathy
correlates with grey matter atrophy in HD(447)), striatum, thalamus and insula(281, 448–451).
Furthermore in HD, dorsal striatal damage has been shown to mediate a deficit in learning
from loss(88). Set shifting is impaired in HD, even from very early stages(164, 382, 452), how-
ever scores on the EDSST did not correlate with performance on the Persistence task, nor did
our other measure of executive function: phonemic verbal fluency. This evidence suggests the
aversive-stimulus deficit is mediated either by impaired recognition of loss (insular dysfunction),
impaired learning from loss (dorsal striatal damage) or altered loss aversion (amygdala, insula
or striatum). The previous imaging studies of apathy in HD have demonstrated associations be-
tween apathy and amygdala atrophy, thalamic atrophy and altered connectivity in a distributed
network involving the caudate; all these regions are potential loci where dysfunction in learning
from, or responding to, aversive stimuli could be mediated.
The lack of contribution of reward related processes to apathy in HD is likely to be robust:
we used three different assessments – self-report of reward value, and two tasks mediating re-
ward and effort, both shown to correlate with apathy in other disease states (453, 454). None
showed significant differences on group (after Bonferroni) comparison, or correlation with ap-
athy scores. This disparity (relatively preserved reward and impaired sensitivity to aversive
stimuli) has been seen in other diseases such as FTD(435). There are some suggestions that
reward-related processing in HD is impaired: Palminteri found deficits on the reward aspect of
their task in symptomatic HD participants(88); one conference abstract reported a deficit on
a progressive ratio task(455); and there is fMRI evidence of ventral striatum hypoactivity in
HD during reward (but no behavioural deficit)(437). We were concerned that our tasks did not
sufficiently test reward and effort related processes, however the exploratory comparisons in the
control group showed predictive ability of one measure from another, for all but the BAS reward
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score and reward ratio task. Furthermore, our GLMMs demonstrated a trend level effect for
reduced levels of exploitation of reward, and less excessive responding in the HD group compared
with controls.
In keeping with previous work(456, 457), we found executive function measures predicted apathy
in HD, however correction for multiple confounding variables meant this effect was lost; which
may reflect lack of power in our study on these measures. The Maze task demonstrated slower
RT was associated with increasing apathy in HD. However, this association was not maintained
in the multiple linear regression models. As with our executive function findings, this may be a
function of sample size, or the contribution to apathetic behaviour in HD may not be as major
as that relating to aversive stimuli. We considered whether this task might be merely testing
executive function: lower PVF scores and EDSST scores strongly correlated with slower RT
on the Maze task. PVF and Maze are both concerned with idea generation, and may share a
common mechanism, whilst shifting response set contributes to PVF(458, 459).
In interpreting the results of this study, it is important to consider the strengths and limi-
tations of the work. We demonstrated an association between reduced sensitivity to aversive
stimuli and apathy, both on performance in a single task measuring response to social stim-
uli, and across a range of outcomes (popped balloons, trial points, excessive responses) using
different statistical technique on a second task of monetary reward and loss. Inclusion of poten-
tial confounding variables in the models in both tasks did not change the results. Our results
demonstrating minimal deficits in response to rewarding stimuli, are likely to be robust; we used
three different measures, and demonstrated significant relationships between the reward/effort
measures in the control cohort. A smaller sample of our cohort completed the PSLT and option-
selection/executive function battery (Maze Task, PVF, EDSST). This lack of power may explain
the lack of association between executive function and apathy found by other groups(456), how-
ever, the earlier work did not correct for all the confounders we included in our model, so may
represent a type II error. The lack of clear effect of executive function processes on apathy does
not invalidate our main finding of a disparity between reward and aversive stimuli underlying
apathy in HD, nor the confirmation of the hypothesis that goal-directed behaviour is separa-
ble into different component processes. We chose to use a demographic method rather than a
reading test such as the NART to assess premorbid IQ, as prior evidence in the HD popula-
tion(378, 429, 430) showed that whilst reading ability was preserved prior to motor onset, this
declined in association with cognitive deterioration and disease progression thereafter, whilst
demographic methods were much less affected by disease progression. Akinesia can mimic ap-
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athy, but our analyses specifically included a measure of motor score related to disease (TMS
from the UHDRS). Finally, our study included three clinical trial patients randomised into a
placebo-controlled drug trial of Pridopidine, a dopamine stabilising agent. Exclusion of their
data did not affect the findings.
In summary, we have demonstrated that goal-directed behaviour, is potentially separable into
component processes, which opens up new avenues for the neurobiological investigation of deficits
in this cognitive domain. Specifically, we have shown an association between apathy and im-
paired sensitivity to aversive stimuli in HD. Our computerised battery performed well in relation
to standard clinical tests and has considerable translational potential for animal models and as
a surrogate marker for treatment trials.
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Chapter 4
Impulsivity
4.1 Introduction
Impulsivity encompasses “actions that are poorly conceived, prematurely expressed, unduly
risky, or inappropriate to the situation and that often result in undesirable outcomes”(460). It
is a behaviour that is seen in many different neurological and psychiatric disorders: Parkinson’s
disease(274), Huntington’s disease(461), fronto-temporal dementia(230, 436), obsessive compul-
sive disorder(462), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder(463) and addiction(272, 464). These
disorders all share a pathological focus on cortico-striatal circuits, the frontal lobes, or basal
ganglia. Here we focus on Huntington’s disease (HD) which is a progressive neurodegenerative
disorder caused by a repeat expansion of the Huntington gene carried on chromosome 4). HD
affects the dorsal striatum in its earliest stages(37, 58, 59, 61), but progresses to involve wider
areas of cortex and white matter with advancing disease. Patients with HD exhibit a wide range
of behavioural abnormalities(206, 211, 465), including behaviours classically associated with im-
pulsivity such as impulsive aggression, addiction and hypersexual behaviour(181, 186, 187, 206,
466–468).
Research on impulsivity initially treated it as a unitary concept, however it has become appar-
ent that in fact, multiple neuropsychological processes and neurobiological changes contribute to
produce this behaviour(270, 275, 276). There is ongoing debate about exactly which processes
contribute to impulsive behaviour, and what the best assessment to measure impulsivity is, both
in humans and in animal models. There are a number of different questionnaires, which aim to
cover different dimensions of impulsivity; the Barrett Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11), Behavioural
Inhibition Scale Behavioural Activation Scale (BISBAS), and the Urgency, Perseverance Premed-
itation Sensation Seeking Scale (UPPSP) (392–394). The majority of this type of assessment
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have been compiled by creating large banks of questions, trialling them in large cohorts from the
general population, and then using factor analysis to divide the question bank into different sub-
dimensions of impulsivity, and exclude non-contributory questions(392–394). The questionnaires
are then further validated by comparison with other impulsivity scales(394) or between control
populations and groups with high levels of impulsive behaviour(392). The BIS-11 has subscales
of attention, motor and non-planning. It has been widely used in clinical populations and shown
significant discriminatory ability and reliability(392, 469). The UPPSP was originally compiled
by Whiteside and Lynam, with an additional component added by Cyders in 2007. It assesses
5 domains “Negative Urgency”, “Positive Urgency”, “Lack of Premeditation”, “Lack of Perse-
verance” and “Sensation Seeking”(393, 470). The BISBAS is based on a theoretical model of
approach-avoidance behaviour, and has one inhibitory subscale and three activation subscales:
“Fun-Seeking”, “Reward Responsiveness” and “Drive”(394). There are other questionnaires
more focussed on personality-traits such as the Eysenck Venturesomeness-Impulsiveness(471),
in addition to questionnaires which focus on one aspect of impulsivity such as the Sensation
Seeking Scale(472).
Questionnaire assessments of impulsivity are reliant on self-report, thus are vulnerable to sub-
jects lack of insight, social desirability bias (answering in a way, that subjects perceive to be
more socially desirable) and finally, if there has been a measurable change in impulsivity (for
example secondary to a brain injury), then it is not clear if subjects modify their responses to
account for the change, or answer based on their prior, long-standing preferences/behaviour.
Furthermore, compilation of the questionnaires is vulnerable to compiler’s biases about what
constitutes impulsive behaviour, potentially over-valuing some components, whilst undervaluing
or excluding others. However,the questionnaires have high test-retest reliability, suggesting that
they measure a personality trait, rather than a transient mood state(473, 474), and have been
shown to reliably discriminate between groups with high and low impulsivity(469, 475).
In addition to questionnaires, a number of different tasks have been developed, which measure
impulsivity and can be used in both humans and animal models. These are based on distinct neu-
ropsychological mechanisms: delay discounting (valuing immediate rewards over larger, delayed
ones), measured by the Kirby monetary choice questionnaire(384) or delay discounting task(476);
motor disinhibition (acting prematurely, not inhibiting a response correctly), measured by the
continuous performance task(477), stop signal task(389) or go nogo task(478); risk-taking (mak-
ing higher risk choices) assessed by the Cambridge gambling task(291) or balloon analogue risk
task(381); and a less well-defined spectrum of decision-making impairments, such as acting before
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all information is known (measured by the ‘Beads’ task(479) or information-sampling task(480)),
or failing to recognise future outcomes – assessed using the Iowa gambling task(481). The tasks
circumvent the problems of insight and social desirability seen in the questionnaires. These
also allow direct translational assessments between animal models of disease (including lesion
or pharmacological manipulations) and humans suffering from the disease. However, they may
reflect a ‘state’ rather than ‘trait’ assessment, and hence have lower test-retest reliability over
time than questionnaire assessments(474).
Furthermore, the individual tasks show little correlation with each other, as they measure sep-
arable neuropsychological processes, and none of the tasks to date in different populations have
shown strong associations with the questionniares, making it difficult to definitively measure
impulsive behaviour(277, 278).
In HD, a number of these measures have been employed, to assess levels of impulsivity in HD
compared to controls. Impairments on the Iowa gambling task have been found in HD patients
compared with controls(482, 483), although the impairment did not correlate with disinhibi-
tion measured by the Frontal Systems Behavioural Scale. A larger, recent study found deficits
in manifest, but not premanifest individuals with HD(484). Whilst other studies of the Iowa
gambling task in HD have been negative, albeit these studies had comparatively small patient
cohorts(485). Deficits on the Stroop and go nogo tasks have also been seen widely in HD(136,
166, 171, 478), although both of these tasks involve an element of task switching/response se-
lection known to be impaired in HD(164, 382)), rather than measuring pure motor inhibition
or ‘stopping’. The only study to date of the stop signal reaction task in HD (496) did not
find a difference between cases and controls, albeit the sample was premanifest. There are no
published papers studying delay discounting in HD, a conference abstract suggested no evidence
of difference in a small sample(486). A study of the Cambridge gambling task suggests intact
decision making under risk, but impaired response inhibition(487). To our knowledge, there are
no studies using the balloon analogue risk task in HD. One study used the BISBAS and BIS in
HD, finding higher levels of impulsivity on the BIS, but not the BISBAS.
Further to this, HD patients take a wide variety of medication known to influence impulsive
behaviour, and none of the above works corrected for this.
A number of unanswered questions arise from this work:
1) Is there a specific inhibitory deficit, or have the previous studies mis-identified a problem with
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task switching?
2) Is there evidence of risk-taking behaviour?
3) Which task provides the most sensitive measure of impulsivity in HD, and hence which brain
regions are most likely to be involved in leading to this behaviour?
4) What is the best questionnaire measure of impulsive behaviour in HD, and are deficits on
self-report measures limited by insight?
4.2 Materials and Methods
4.2.1 Participants
As described in methods, we recruited 53 patients with a genetic diagnosis of HD (CAG repeat
length >36) from the Cardiff University HD clinic, ranging in severity from the premanifest to
moderately-symptomatic in the manifest stage. Patients were classified as premanifest based on
a total motor score (TMS)<11(166) and diagnostic confidence <4, from the Unified Hunting-
ton’s disease Rating Scale(422) (UHDRS). 26 control participants were recruited from family
members not at risk of HD, local advertising.
Participants completed questionnaires and tasks as outlined below.
4.2.2 Questionnaires
Urgency Premeditation Perseverance Sensation Positive Scale (UPPS-P)(393, 470)
This 59 item questionnaire was developed from a factor analysis of previous impulsivity scales.
Each item is scored, from 1-4 on a Likert scale (1 = “Agree Strongly”, 4 = “Disagree Strongly”).
The final totals for each sub-score indicate higher levels of the particular quality, hence some of
the items are reverse-scored. An initial 4 factor scale was developed, before additional work(393),
suggested an additional 5th factor. This is a self-report measure and hence is reliant on par-
ticipant insight. The 5 factors covered are ‘Negative urgency’: acting rashly under conditions
of negative affect- “I have trouble controlling my impulses”, ‘Lack of premeditation’: acting
without forethought - “I am a cautious person”, ‘Lack of perseverance’: stopping before a task
is completed- “I generally like to see things through to the end”, ‘Sensation Seeking’: valuing
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novel experience and risk- “I quite enjoy taking risks”; and ‘Positive urgency’: acting rashly
under conditions of positive affect- “When I am very happy, I can’t seem to stop myself from
doing things that can have bad consequences”. It has been widely used and subject to extensive
validation(488).
Behavioural Inhibition Scale Behavioural Activation Scale (BISBAS)(394)
This questionnaire was originally developed to test Gray’s theories(489, 490) underlying moti-
vated or goal-directed behaviour, namely that personality types have a behavioural activating
system (BAS, which drives movement or activity towards rewards) and a behavioural inhibitory
system (BIS, drives behaviours that avoid loss or punishment), and that human behaviour is gov-
erned by a balance between the two. Gray proposed that individuals have different personalities,
and different activity levels of each of the competing systems, and relative activity would change
depending on the circumstances. Impulsive behaviour could hence occur as a consequence of a
lack of inhibitory activity, or BAS overactivity. The questionnaire is a 24 item instrument, which
generates sub-scores for ‘Behavioural Inhibition’ (BInS): sensitivity to punishment/aversive out-
comes - “I worry about making mistakes”); ‘Drive’ (BAS Drive): a measure of motivation - “I
go out of my way to get things I want”; ‘Fun Seeking’ (BAS Fun Seeking): valuing novelty-
”I crave excitement and new sensations”; and Reward Responsiveness (BAS Reward): value
of reward - “It would excite me to win a contest”) Each item is Likert scored from 1(strong
agreement) to 4(strong disagreement). The authors performed a factor analysis to validate the
original questionnaire, which has been replicated in a number of other populations(491, 492).
Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11)
This questionnaire has 30 items, scored using Likert scores from 1 (rarely/never) to 4 (almost
always). It has been in use for 50 years, and is now on its eleventh version. An exploratory and
confirmatory factor analysis in 3 different populations(392) has validated 3 subscales: Attention
(BIS Att) which measures reduced attention (“I don’t pay attention”), Motor (BIS Motor) which
measures impaired self-control (“I am self-controlled” - reverse scored item) and Non-Planning
(BIS Non Plan) which measures lack of planning or forethought (“I plan trips well ahead of
time”). Higher sub-scores indicate higher levels of the behaviour.
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Monetary Choice Questionnaire(384)
This is a measure of delay discounting: temporally distant rewards being viewed less favourably
than immediate ones. It consists of 27 items, each offering a choice between an immediate,
smaller reward, and a delayed larger one. The outcome measure is kD – a measure of the slope
of the hyperbolic discounting curve. KD was calculated using an automated scoring system(493,
494).
4.2.3 Tasks
Stop Signal Reaction Task (SSRT)(389)
The stop signal reaction task assesses motor inhibition. Subjects were given the following in-
structions “Press the left keyboard button (Z)when you see a square and press the right button
when you see a circle. React as quickly as you can. Sometimes shortly after you see a circle or
square you will hear a ‘beep’. If you hear the ‘beep’ do not respond. There will be an initial
practice level followed by 3 test levels”. The outcome measure was the stop signal response time:
a measure of the reaction time for inhibitory responses measured in milliseconds. Longer reac-
tion times are indicative of slower inhibitory neural circuits and hence higher motor impulsivity.
Balloon Analogue Risk Task(381)
Subjects were told “You will now play a game, where you pump up balloons to earn money. The
larger the balloon gets the more money you will earn. If the balloon gets too big it will pop
and you will lose the money. If you feel the balloon is as large as you want it to be, press the
‘bank’ button and your money will be added to your bank.” There were three different colours
of balloon, which could pop at any point between a maximum and minimum value (2-8, 2-32
and 2-128 in the first thirty trials, 2-16, 8-32 and 16-64 in the final sixty trials). Subjects did not
know which was the higher value balloon, but learned this information by trial and error as the
task progressed. Every pump gained the subject 5 cents, but increased the risk of popping the
balloon and losing all money from that trial. There were 90 trials in total. The outcome measure
was the average pump (as described by the original authors), as a measure of risk-taking.
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Iowa Gambling Task
This task was originally designed to measure learning from implicit aversive stimuli, in a cohort
of patients with ventro-medial prefrontal cortex lesions(99)but has been shown to be impaired in
patients with focal lesions in other sites(495). Subjects were told “You will see 4 decks of cards
when you start the game. You must choose cards from each deck. Every time you pick a card
you will win money. Some times after you have chosen a card and won money, you will then lose
money too. You must keep playing until the game stops. The most important thing to note is
this: some decks are ‘bad’ decks where over time, you will win more than you lose. The object
of the game is to win as much money as possible by avoiding the ‘bad’ decks”. Subjects made
100 selections. Decks ‘A’ and ‘B’ were high win ($100) but very high loss, whilst ‘C’ and ‘D’
were low win ($50) but even smaller losses. Over time ‘C’ and ‘D’ were the good decks. A meta
analysis identified the number of cards chosen from deck ‘A’ as being the most reliable outcome
measure of the task(425). We used the version from the online Pebl software package(424).
Executive Function Measures
We used two measures of executive function known to be abnormal in HD(136, 164, 382): the
phonemic verbal fluency (PVF)(in which subjects were asked to generate as many novel word
exemplars beginning with a specific letter as they could in 1 minute, this was performed for the
letters F, A and S(423)), and an extra-dimensional set-shifting task modified from a reversal
learning task, which necessitated extra-dimensional set shifts between colour and location of a
stimulus(426). These tasks were employed to assess the effect of executive function on impulsiv-
ity task performance.
Statistical Analysis
All analyses were conducted in R, a widely available online statistical software package(427).
Before deciding on our analysis technique, we reviewed the distributions of our data, which
conformed to a Poisson distribution, on all variables except SSRT, which had a Gamma distri-
bution, and the executive function measures which were Gaussian. We compared performance
96
between controls, pre-manifest and manifest individuals (symptomatic onset was delineated as
a score of ‘4’ on the UHDRS diagnostic confidence score or a TMS >10, based on the TRACK-
HD data(166). Dopaminergic and serotonergic drug doses were converted to olanzapine and
fluoxetine equivalents based on meta-analyses(379, 380). IQ was calculated using Crawford’s
method(377), as reading test estimates of IQ deteriorate in the symptomatic HD population(378,
429, 430). We used generalised linear models (GLMs), as the assumptions underlying ANOVAs
were not met (Goldfeld-Quandt test was significant, demonstrating heterogeneity of variance).
For each variable, we initially created a GLM looking at the effect of disease group in isolation,
then added potential confounding variables to each model (age, IQ, gender, Olanzapine dose,
Fluoxetine dose). For all analyses, we treated disease status as an ordered variable with 3 as-
cending levels of effect (control subjects (lowest), premanifest HD subjects (middle) and manifest
HD subjects (highest)). We did not add TMS to the models, as disease status was calculated
in part from the TMS value. We corrected for the family wise error rate (using the Bonferroni
correction) of disease status on tasks and the questionnaire subscales in the GLMs. We used
Tukey post-hoc tests to study the relationships between levels of disease status in the GLMs.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Demographics
The premanifest group was smaller than both the control and manifest group. The manifest
group was older than both the premanifest and control groups: the Tukey test of the GLM showed
significant differences between the manifest group and controls (p <0.001) and premanifest group
(p <0.001). IQ was lower in both HD groups, but there were no significant group differences on
post-hoc testing. No significant differences were found for gender balance or Olanzapine dose
equivalent across disease categories, although there was a significant difference between manifest
and premanifest groups for Olanzapine dose equivalent on Tukey post-hoc testing (p=0.00081),
but Fluoxetine dose equivalent was higher in both manifest and premanifest groups compared
with controls (p <0.001 in both groups), the manifest group had slightly lower Fluoxetine dose
equivalents than the premanifest group (p=0.0237). As expected TMS scores were higher in
both HD groups than controls (p <0.001 for both comparisons), and the premanifest group also
had higher scores than controls (p <0.001).
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Table 4.1: Demographics
Controls Premanifest Manifest
N 26 12 41
Age 46.85 (20-75) 41.92 (34-51) 57.44 (33-82) ***
IQ 109.73 (89.79-128.51) 103.11 (88.75-119.57) 103.66 (90.73-125.27) *
Gender 17/26 female 8/12 female 18/41 female
Olanzapine dose (mg) 0 0.62 (0-7.5) 2.39 (0-41.25)
Fluoxetine dose (mg) 2.4 (0-22.2) 24.92 (0-95.4) 20.93 (0-146.5) ***
CAG Repeat Length - 41.33 (38-46) 42.85 (40-50)
Total Motor Score 1.48 (0-6) 4 (0-9) 46.12 (12-89) ***
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.005
98
4.3.2 Tasks
Iowa Gambling Task
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a measure of decision making under ambiguity, subjects select
cards from 4 different decks labelled A, B, C and D which have different rewards and losses over
time. A recent meta-analysis showed that the most reliable outcome measure was the number of
cards selected from deck A in the last 25 trials(425). Comparison of cases and controls using a
Wilcoxon test showed higher mean selections in the cases (5.78 & 3.73), a difference which was
significant (p = 0.037). The GLM showed a highly significant, positive effect of disease status
on task performance (p = 1.87x10−5). Post-hoc testing showed significantly higher scores for
manifest compared with premanifest (p = 0.0224) and control (p <0.001). Adding confounders
to the model did not change the direction of the relationship or the significance(Table 4.2, Figure
4.1).
Stop Signal Reaction Task
The stop signal reaction task (SSRT) is a measure of motor inhibition. The outcome variable is
stop signal reaction time: slower (i.e. longer) reaction times indicate slower cognitive ‘stop’ pro-
cesses and hence poorer motor inhibition. Group comparisons between cases and controls showed
much slower stop reaction times in HD participants compared with controls (means 496.25 &
304.42, p = 0.0004537). Disease status in the GLM had a highly significant, positive effect on
SSRT (p = 4.63x10−5). Post-hoc testing showed slower SSRT in the manifest group compared
with premanifest subjects(p < 0.001), and premanifest subjects were slower than controls at
trend level (p = 0.068). Addition of confounders to the GLM did not change the direction or
significance of the relationship; given the strong motor element of the task we also added ‘Go’
stimulus reaction time to the model, and the significant effect of disease status on SSRT was
still retained(Table 4.3, Figure 4.1).
Delay Discounting
The Monetary Choice Questionnaire was used to measure delay discounting (a preference for
smaller, immediate rewards over larger, delayed ones). The outcome variable was the kD –
the slope of the hyperbolic discounting curve(493, 494). Higher kD values indicate a stronger
preference for immediate reward. Group comparisons using the Wilcoxon test showed no differ-
ences between kD values in cases compared with controls (means 0.08 and 0.06 respectively, p =
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0.9622). The GLM looking at disease status in isolation, did not find a significant relationship
between disease status and kD. Adding confounding variables to the model did not change this
relationship(Table 4.4, Figure 4.1).
Balloon Analogue Risk Task
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task was used as a measure of risk taking behaviour, the originators
of the task used the average pump on unexploded balloons and showed an association of this
measure with existing measures of sensation seeking and impulsive behaviour(381). Group com-
parisons between cases and controls showed lower average pump values (means 10.61 and 12.55
respectively, p = 0.039). The effect of disease status on BART average pump was significant (p
= 0.018): post-hoc testing (Tukey) showed that this was significant for the comparison of man-
ifest group and controls: more affected subjects had lower BART average pump scores. Adding
confounders to the GLM meant that the significance was lost of the effect of disease status on
task performance(p=0.06)(Table 4.5, Figure 4.1).
Executive Function Measures: Effect on Impulsivity Task Performance
Phonemic verbal fluency task performance differed between groups: HD cases had lower scores
than controls (p= 7.05x10−5). A GLM demonstrated a significant effect of disease status on
PVF score: increasing disease stage was associated with lower PVF score (Pseudo R2 0.30,
Estimate -13.05, p=5.61x10−5). Adding confounders to this model did not alter the direction or
significance of this relationship (Pseudo R2 0.49, Estimate -1.13, p=0.0025). GLMs predicting
SSRT and IGT task performance from PVF scores did not show any significant relationships.
Adding PVF scores to the confounders in GLMS of disease status on IGT and SSRT performance
did not alter the direction or significance of the relationships.
Extra-dimensional set shift task (EDSST) performance did not differ between groups (p=0.17).
However a GLM showed a significant effect of disease status on task performance: fewer set shifts
were completed with increasing disease stage (Pseudo R2 0.10, Estimate -3.75, p=0.041). Adding
confounders to this model meant the significance was lost. GLMs showed EDSST performance
predicted both IGT performance (Pseudo R2 0.19 Estimate -0.059, p=0.0026) and SSRT (Pseudo
R2 0.22 Estimate 7.31x10−5, p=0.028). Adding EDSST scores as an additional confounding
variable in models of disease status did not affect the direction or significance of the relationship
between disease status and SSRT (Pseudo R2 0.45 Estimate 73.50, p=0.023), but did affect the
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significance of the relationship between disease status and IGT performance (Pseudo R2 0.22
Estimate -0.018, p=0.90).
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Figure 4.1: Tasks
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Table 4.2: Iowa Gambling Task
Dependent variable:
IGT ’A’ Count
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 1.51 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.37 0.000019
Observations 71
Log Likelihood −212.43
Akaike Inf. Crit. 430.85
Dependent variable:
IGT ’A’ Count
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.012 0.00089
Disease Status 0.28 0.0043
Age 0.012 0.0036
Gender (Male) 0.23 0.040
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.023 0.051
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0032 0.28
IQ −0.011 0.036
Observations 67
Log Likelihood −187.76
Akaike Inf. Crit. 391.51
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.0125
Tukey Test - Manifest>Premanifest p=0.022, Manifest>Control p<0.001
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Table 4.3: Stop Signal Reaction Task
Dependent variable:
SSRT
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 5.97 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.41 4.63x10−5
Observations 68
Log Likelihood −445.33
Akaike Inf. Crit. 896.66
Dependent variable:
SSRT
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 5.46 1.76x10−14
Disease Status 0.26 0.0038
Age 0.00047 0.90
Gender (Male) 0.019 0.85
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.020 0.095
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0028 0.25
’Go’ Reaction Time 0.00092 6.47x10−5
IQ −0.0017 0.72
Observations 64
Log Likelihood −405.49
Akaike Inf. Crit. 829.00
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.0125
Tukey Test - Manifest>Control p<0.001
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Table 4.4: Delay Discounting
Dependent variable:
kD
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) −1.57 6.64x10−8
Disease Status 0.19 0.59
Observations 72
Log Likelihood −5.38
Akaike Inf. Crit. 16.76
Dependent variable:
kD
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) −0.39 0.89
Disease Status 0.015 0.97
Age 0.0095 0.60
Gender (Male) 0.33 0.50
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.021 0.70
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0029 0.83
IQ −0.017 0.48
Observations 68
Log Likelihood −5.18
Akaike Inf. Crit. 26.35
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.0125
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Table 4.5: Balloon Analogue Risk Task
Dependent variable:
BART Average Pump
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.43 <2x10−16
Disease Status −0.13 0.0183
Observations 72
Log Likelihood −Inf.00
Akaike Inf. Crit. Inf.00
Dependent variable:
BART Average Pump
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 1.10 0.0073
Disease Status −0.12 0.060
Age −0.00021 0.94
Gender (Male) 0.18 0.018
Olanzapine Equivalent −0.015 0.12
Fluoxetine Equivalent 0.0046 0.011
IQ 0.011 0.0012
Observations 68
Log Likelihood −Inf.00
Akaike Inf. Crit. Inf.00
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.0125
Tukey Test - Manifest>Control p=0.046
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4.3.3 Questionnaires
UPPS P
Negative Urgency
Negative urgency is the tendency to act rashly under conditions of negative affect. Higher scores
indicate a higher propensity to this behaviour. Case control comparison showed a significantly
higher score among cases using the Wilcoxon test (means 30.37, 24.19, p = 0.018). Disease status
in the GLM strongly predicted higher levels of negative urgency (p = 6.4x10−6). Post-hoc tests
showed significantly higher scores for both the premanifest and manifest groups compared with
controls (p < 0.001 for both comparisons), but no difference between premanifest and manifest
groups. Addition of confounders to the model did not result in the relationship becoming non-
significant(Table 4.6, Figure 4.2).
Lack of Premeditation
Lack of premeditation is to act without forethought. Higher scores indicate higher propensity to
display this behaviour. Comparison of cases and controls using the Wilcoxon test showed higher
scores among HD subjects (means 21.25, 19.46, p = 0.045). However, disease status in the GLM
did not show a significant relationship with Lack of Premeditation(Table 4.7, Figure 4.2).
Lack of Perseverance
Lack of perseverance is an inability to remain focussed on a task. Higher scores demonstrate a
higher propensity for this behaviour. Comparison of cases and controls using the Wilcoxon test
showed significantly higher scores in the HD group (means 21.55 17.85, p = 0.035). There was a
significant positive effect of disease status on Lack of Perseverance score (p = 8.01 x10−5). Post-
hoc testing demonstrated a significant difference for manifest and controls only (p <0.001). Addi-
tion of confounders to the model did not result in the relationship becoming non-significant(Table
4.8, Figure 4.2).
Sensation Seeking
Sensation seeking is the tendency to search out new and exciting experiences. Higher scores on
the questionnaire reflect a higher tendency to display this behaviour. There were no differences
between cases and controls, and no significant effect of disease status in the GLM on sensation-
seeking scores(Table 4.9, Figure 4.2).
Positive Urgency
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Positive urgency is the propensity to act rashly under conditions of positive affect: higher scores
on the questionnaire reflect a stronger tendency to exhibit this behaviour. Cases had much
lower scores than controls (means 38.88, 49.08, p = 0.00035). Disease status in the GLM had a
highly significant, negative effect on positive urgency score (p = 2.11x10−11). Post-hoc testing
demonstrated lower scores of both premanifest (p = 0.0058) and manifest groups (p < 0.001)
compared with controls, but no significant difference between the manifest and premanifest
groups. Addition of confounders to the GLM did not change the significance or direction of this
relationship(Table 4.10, Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: UPPS P
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Table 4.6: UPPS P: Negative Urgency
Dependent variable:
UPPS P Negative Urgency
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.34 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.16 6.4x10−6
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −366.49
Akaike Inf. Crit. 738.98
Dependent variable:
UPPS P: Negative Urgency
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.23 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.10 0.015
Age 0.0032 0.070
Gender (Male) −0.23 2x10−6
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.0045 0.35
Fluoxetine Equivalent 0.00070 0.52
IQ −0.0093 0.000015
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −326.15
Akaike Inf. Crit. 668.29
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.01
Tukey Test - Manifest>Control p<0.0001, Premanifest>Control p=0.00057
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Table 4.7: UPPS P: Lack Premeditation
Dependent variable:
UPPS P Lack Premeditation
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.022 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.067 0.090
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −302.39
Akaike Inf. Crit. 610.79
Dependent variable:
UPPS P Lack Premeditation
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.15 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.012 0.81
Age −0.00070 0.72
Gender (Male) −0.060 0.27
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.019 0.00048
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0015 0.26
IQ −0.010 0.000063
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −273.25
Akaike Inf. Crit. 56250973000
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.01
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Table 4.8: UPPS P: Lack Persistence
Dependent variable:
UPPS P Lack Persistence
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.98 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.16 0.000080
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −288.43
Akaike Inf. Crit. 582.85
Dependent variable:
UPPS P Lack Persistence
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.0012 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.12 0.017
Age −0.0013 0.52
Gender (Male) −0.066 0.23
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.0047 0.42
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.00062 0.64
IQ −0.0088 0.00051
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −266.79
Akaike Inf. Crit. 549.58
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.01
Tukey Test - Manifest>Control p<0.001
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Table 4.9: UPPS P: Sensation Seeking
Dependent variable:
UPPS P Sensation Seeking
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.32 <2x10−16
Disease Status −0.011 0.74
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −369.49
Akaike Inf. Crit. 744.98
Dependent variable:
UPPS P Sensation Seeking
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.14 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.015 0.72
Age −0.0080 1.3x10−6
Gender (Male) 0.23 1.1x10−6
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.017 0.00055
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.00096 0.41
IQ 0.0044 0.039
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −310.58
Akaike Inf. Crit. 637.15
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.01
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Table 4.10: UPPS P: Positive Urgency
Dependent variable:
UPPS P Positive Urgency
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.75 <2x10−16
Disease Status −0.18 <2.11x10−11
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −394.48
Akaike Inf. Crit. 794.95
Dependent variable:
UPPS P Positive Urgency
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.23 <2x10−16
Disease Status −0.094 0.0040
Age −0.0027 0.043
Gender (Male) 0.030 0.43
Olanzapine Equivalent −0.017 0.0040
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0018 0.065
IQ 0.0065 0.00014
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −355.12
Akaike Inf. Crit. 726.24
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.01
Tukey Test - Manifest<Control p<0.001, Premanifest<Control p<0.0064
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Barratt Impulsivity Scale
Attention
Higher scores on this subscale indicate inability to concentrate or focus on activities. Case-
control comparison using the Wilcoxon test showed a higher score among HD cases (mean 17.71,
14.69, p = 0.012). Disease status in the GLM predicted higher scores (p = 0.0011). Post-hoc
testing showed a significant relationship between the manifest group and controls alone (p =
0.003). Addition of confounders to the model led to loss of the significance (p = 0.051)(Table
4.11, Figure 4.3).
Motor
Higher scores on this subscale indicate a higher level of acting without thinking. There was
no significant difference between cases and controls using the Wilcoxon test, but disease status
in the GLM was a significant predictor of higher Motor scores (p = 0.012), post-hoc testing
showed a significant difference between manifest subjects and controls, but no other significant
group comparisons. Addition of confounders to the model did not result in loss of this significant
relationship(Table 4.12, Figure 4.3).
Non-Planning
Higher scores on this subscale are associated with a lack of future planning. There were signifi-
cantly higher scores among cases compared with controls using the Wilcoxon test (means 26.35,
22.15, p = 0.030). Disease status was predictive of higher scores in the GLM (p = 0.0014). Post-
hoc testing showed significantly higher scores in both manifest (p = 0.0042) and premanifest (p
= 0.014) groups compared with controls. There were no other significant relationships. However,
addition of confounders to the GLM resulted in loss of the significance of the relationship(Table
4.13, Figure 4.3).
Total Score
This is a total of the three subscales. Cases had higher scores compared with controls (means
66.42, 59.27; Wilcoxon test p = 0.034). Disease status was strongly predictive of higher total
score (p = 0.00036). Post-hoc testing showed significantly higher scores of both manifest (p =
0.0012) and premanifest (p = 0.023) groups than controls, although there were no other signif-
icant comparisons. Adding confounders to the model did not result in a loss of this significant
relationship(Table 4.14, Figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3: BIS-11
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Table 4.11: BIS-11 Attention
Dependent variable:
BIS Attention
(Intercept) 2.80 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.15 0.0011
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −259.80
Akaike Inf. Crit. 525.61
Dependent variable:
BIS Attention
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.39 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.11 0.051
Age −0.0068 0.0024
Gender (Male) −0.019 0.76
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.0083 0.17
Fluoxetine Equivalent 0.00068 0.64
IQ −0.012 0.000014
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −225.45
Akaike Inf. Crit. 466.90
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.013
Tukey Test - Manifest>Control p=0.003
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Table 4.12: BIS-11 Motor
Dependent variable:
BIS Motor
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.16 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.093 0.012
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −268.68
Akaike Inf. Crit. 543.36
Dependent variable:
BIS-11 Motor
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.068 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.099 0.026
Age −0.0046 0.011
Gender (Male) −0.046 0.37
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.013 0.018
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0017 0.18
IQ −0.0061 0.0082
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −244.53
Akaike Inf. Crit. 505.06
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.013
Tukey Test - Manifest>Control p=0.031
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Table 4.13: BIS-11 Non-Planning
Dependent variable:
BIS Non-Planning
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.22 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.12 0.0014
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −308.40
Akaike Inf. Crit. 622.81
Dependent variable:
BIS Non-Planning
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 5.03 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.060 0.18
Age −0.0044 0.015
Gender (Male) −0.066 0.18
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.010 0.043
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.00069 0.57
IQ −0.015 8.22x10−11
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −266.85
Akaike Inf. Crit. 549.69
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.013
Tukey Test - Manifest>Control p=0.0039, Premanifest>Control p=0.013
119
Table 4.14: BIS-11 Total
Dependent variable:
Total Score
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.16 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.080 0.00036
Observations 79
Log Likelihood −569.12
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,144.24
Dependent variable:
Total Score
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 5.77 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.06087 0.026
Age −0.0062 2.35x10−8
Gender (Male) −0.018 0.56
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.0086 0.0056
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.000030 0.97
IQ −0.012 <2x10−16
Observations 74
Log Likelihood −419.34
Akaike Inf. Crit. 854.67
alpha level: 0.05
Tukey Test - Manifest>Control p<0.001, Premanifest>Control p=0.024
120
Behavioural Inhibition Scale Behavioural Activation Scale
Behavioural Activation Scale –Drive
The subscale measures subjects readiness to work hard for reward. There were no differences
between groups, and disease status in the GLMs was not predictive of scores(Table 4.15, Figure
4.4).
Behavioural Activation Scale – Fun Seeking
The subscale measures subjects enjoyment of novel experiences. There were no differences be-
tween groups, and disease status in the GLMs was not predictive of subscale scores (Table 4.16,
Figure 4.4).
Behavioural Activation Scale – Reward Responsiveness
This subscale measures how much subjects value or enjoy rewarding experience. Cases scored
slightly lower compared with controls (means 16.51 & 17.54, Wilcoxon p value = 0.049). How-
ever disease status was not predictive of scores with, or without confounding variables (Table
4.17, Figure 4.4).
Behavioural Inhibition Scale
Higher scores indicate higher sensitivity to negative experiences. Group comparisons of cases
and controls showed lower scores among cases (means 22.38 & 19.31, Wilcoxon test p value =
0.02). Disease status in the GLM was negatively associated with behavioural inhibition scores
(p = 0.0069). Post hoc testing revealed significantly lower score in the manifest group compared
with controls (p = 0.018), but there were no other significant comparisons. Addition of con-
founders to the model did not change the significance of the result (Table 4.18, Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: BISBAS
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Table 4.15: BISBAS: BAS Drive
Dependent variable:
BAS Drive
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.20 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.057 0.36
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −207.041
Akaike Inf. Crit. 420.082
Dependent variable:
BAS Drive
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.91 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.083 0.28
Age −0.0053 0.088
Gender (Male) 0.045 0.60
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.020 0.018
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0026 0.20
IQ −0.0045 0.24
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −188.46
Akaike Inf. Crit. 392.93
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.0125
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Table 4.16: BISBAS: BAS Fun Seeking
Dependent variable:
BAS Fun Seeking
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.28 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.087 0.13
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −195.29
Akaike Inf. Crit. 396.59
Dependent variable:
BAS Fun Seeking
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.99 <6.84x10−13
Disease Status 0.12 0.075
Age −0.0047 0.10
Gender (Male) 0.047 0.55
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.013 0.13
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0022 0.26
IQ −0.0046 0.20
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −180.66
Akaike Inf. Crit. 377.33
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.0125
124
Table 4.17: BAS Reward
Dependent variable:
BAS Reward
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.82 <2x10−16
Disease Status −0.035 0.42
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −201.065
Akaike Inf. Crit. 408.13
Dependent variable:
BAS Reward
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.17 <2x10−16
Disease Status 0.0069 0.90
Age −0.0040 0.065
Gender (Male) −0.079 0.19
Olanzapine Equivalent −0.0000017 0.99
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.00024 0.88
IQ −0.0012 0.67
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −188.69
Akaike Inf. Crit. 393.37
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.0125
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Table 4.18: BISBAS: Behavioural Inhibition Scale
Dependent variable:
BIS
(Intercept) 3.011 <2x10−16
Disease Status −0.11 0.0069
Observations 77
Log Likelihood −260.67
Akaike Inf. Crit. 527.35
Dependent variable:
BIS
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.0041 <2x10−16
Disease Status −0.11 0.026
Age 0.00017 0.93
Gender (Male) −0.24 0.000021
Olanzapine Equivalent −0.012 0.065
Fluoxetine Equivalent 0.0031 0.023
IQ 0.00046 0.85
Observations 73
Log Likelihood −230.57
Akaike Inf. Crit. 477.14
Bonferroni corrected alpha level: 0.0125
Tukey Test - Manifest>Control p=0.018
126
4.3.4 Task Predictors of Impulsivity Scores in HD group
SSRT
Initial GLMs did not show any associations with questionnaire impulsivity measures. Adding
‘Go’ signal reaction time to the GLM (in order to account for generalised motor slowing) demon-
strated a positive association with BIS Total score (p = 0.00659) and a negative association with
the Positive Urgency score in the UPPSP (p = 0.00135), although only the association with Pos-
itive Urgency remained significant after applying the Bonferroni correction(0.005).
IGT
GLMs showed that higher IGT scores were predictive of the Barratt Impulsivity Scale total
score (p = 0.000108), and had a negative association with the positive urgency subscore of the
UPPSP (p = 0.00143) both of which remained significant after Bonferroni correction. There were
positive associations of the IGT with Lack of Premeditation, Lack of Persistence and Negative
Urgency from the UPPSP and the Inhibitory subscale from the BISBAS that did not satisfy the
Bonferroni correction(0.005).
Executive function prediction of IGT scores
A GLM studying the effect of PVF score on IGT performance did not demonstrate any significant
effect, but the effect of the EDSST was significant (p = 0.0026) in a negative direction: more
set switches was associated with reduced disadvantageous choices on the IGT.
4.4 Discussion
We have shown higher levels of impulsive behaviour on selected measures in HD, compared to
controls, that progresses with disease. Of the tasks, the SSRT had the largest effect size, and was
significant even after including ‘Go’ signal reaction time in the model. The IGT was also signifi-
cant and had a medium effect size. No differences were seen for the delay discounting measure or
the BART. HD patients scored more highly on a number of the impulsivity self-report measures,
even after correction for confounders: the ‘Negative Urgency’ and ‘Lack Persistence’ subscales
from UPPSP, and the total score (and ‘Motor’ subscore) from the Barratt Impulsivity scale. HD
Patients had lower scores on the inhibitory subscale from the BISBAS (suggesting higher levels
of impulsivity) and lower scores on the ‘Positive Urgency’ subscale from the UPPSP. However,
after correcting for the family-wise error rate using the Bonferroni method, the only self-report
measures to remain significant were the reduced levels of Positive Urgency and the total score on
the Barratt Impulsivity Scale. Taken together these findings suggest that HD patients are more
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impulsive than controls, but only on selected measures. They have problems with decision mak-
ing – they were more likely to make disadvantageous choices, and they had problems inhibiting
a pre-potent response, compared with control subjects. Furthermore, on a number of self-report
measures they score differently to controls, suggesting at least some level of insight into their
behavioural change. The higher scores on the total score from the Barratt Impulsivity Scale are
consistent with higher ‘trait’ impulsivity, whilst the disparity between the ‘Negative Urgency’
and ‘Positive Urgency’ subscales suggests that impulsive behaviour may be either induced or
inhibited dependent on the underlying mood state in subjects with HD. Although other groups
have shown stronger associations between one type of urgency, and selected behaviours than the
other (for example binge-eating in bulimia is predicted by negative, but not positive urgency),
to our knowledge this is the first study that has shown opposite associations in the same patient
group.
The SSRT is a well-established and widely used test of inhibition, but has not been used in
manifest HD subjects to date. Importantly, the fact that HD patients perform worse on this
measure supports the work found in human HD subjects using the Go Nogo task, and confirms
that inhibition of motor responses is the neuropsychological process that is impaired, rather
than a set shifting or response selection deficit (persistent ’Go’ responses might have reflected
an inability of HD participants to shift response set and select the ’Nogo’ action) , which are
well known to occur very early in the disease course of HD(164, 382, 452). The deficit was
seen, even after correcting for medication, gender, IQ and reaction time on the ‘Go’ trials. This
suggests that despite a generalised slowing of reaction time, the inhibitory process is dispropor-
tionately slowed. Prior work in human HD subjects in a premanifest group(496), did not find
a difference on the task compared with controls, but did see changes in attentional networks
(inferior parietal and temporal regions) and the inhibition network (cingulate, inferior frontal
regions/insula, and the supplementary motor area) during failed inhibition. Successful inhibition
was associated with a reducing level of activation in the attentional network with proximity to
diagnosis. Disease progression of HD may simply cause a deterioration in these responses to
the point where inhibition fails. Early work on the neurobiology of motor inhibition suggested
the right inferior frontal cortex as a core region involved in inhibition(287), however behavioural
processes are likely to be subserved by multiple regions connected in a network: single brain
regions are likely to be necessary, but not sufficient for cognitive processes, and later work has
shown a wider range of regions to be involved(289, 497) – encompassing a fronto-basal ganglia
network. Later work(498, 499) has not supported the earlier idea of a specific ‘inhibitory’ cir-
cuit, but instead suggests that a distributed network (anterior insula, anterior cingulate, frontal
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operculum) is responsible for recognising and responding to infrequent stimuli, that is activated
both for inhibitory tasks and tasks of attention. Although other workers, using more precise de-
lineation of the right inferior frontal region have shown a more selective dissection of attentional
and inhibitory processes(500). Cortical atrophy in these regions is known in HD, and has been
correlated with performance on the Stroop task, which involves an inhibitory component(142,
501).
In our study, the HD patient group were more impaired than controls on the IGT. Post-hoc
comparisons demonstrated that the difference was due to the significant disparity between the
manifest and control groups in the confounder model, albeit in the model comparing disease
status and IGT performance in isolation, the post-hoc comparison between manifest and pre-
manifest was also significant. Notably our data show that IGT performance was also impaired
by increasing age, male gender and lower IQ. Published comparisons between HD subjects and
healthy controls have generally found IGT differences,(482–484) although none of these studies
have clarified what the underlying neuropsychological process mediating the impaired perfor-
mance might be, and not all groups have found this difference(485). We used the outcome
measure shown to be the most reliable (number of selections from the A deck in the final 25
selections), from a meta-analysis of IGT studies(425). This may account for the clear difference
between groups seen in our study, compared with published work(485) in which performance
was analysed over the whole task. The IGT was originally designed to measure decision mak-
ing under ambiguity in patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions(99), however as the
task-originators have acknowledged, impaired performance on the task may be caused by deficits
in punishment sensitivity (as seen in our work on apathy), learning, ‘future blindness’ (an in-
sensitivity to the future outcomes of their decisions), or sensation-seeking/enjoyment of risk.
IGT performance has been shown to be impaired in groups with high levels of impulsivity(502,
503). In patients with ventro-medial prefrontal cortex lesions, this deficit appears to be caused
by ‘future blindness’ - an insensitivity to future consequences(481). Brand and co-workers have
also shown that decisions in early trials are taken under ambiguity, whilst in later trials decision-
making is ‘under risk’(504). This is supported by Xu et al’s finding that performance on later
trials correlates with BART performance(505). In our cohort, the BART did not correlate with
the IGT outcome, nor did performance on the PVF, but impaired performance was associated
with a set-switching deficit. Taken together, this suggests that the impairment seen in HD on
the IGT is not part of general executive dysfunction or altered risk-sensitivity, but may be part
of HD patients’ known set shifting deficit. This is supported by Galvez’s work(487) showing
normal performance by HD patients on the ‘decision making under risk’ part of the Cambridge
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gambling task, and also Holl’s finding of no association between IGT performance in HD patients
and verbal fluency(485). Thus HD patients may fail to learn the contingencies of different decks
(high win/higher loss for decks A & B, low win/markedly lower loss for decks C & D), have a
‘pure’ shifting deficit meaning they perseverate on the initially most rewarding decks, reward
hypersensitivity or punishment insensitivity; all of which could account for the association be-
tween set-shifting and IGT performance.
We did not find differences between our HD group and healthy controls on the delay-discounting
measure. This is in marked contrast to findings in HD animal models(506, 507), where animals
carrying the HD gene all demonstrate steeper discounting than wild type animals. Immediately
available rewards activate the ventral striatum, anterior cingulum, amygdala and orbitofrontal
cortex, whilst intertemporal choice activates dorso-lateral PFC, and anterior insula(508–511).
These areas are recognised to be affected by HD(108, 166, 415, 437, 512) however, the ventral
prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum tend to be affected relatively later in the disease pro-
cess(18, 58, 79) and hence may be comparatively preserved in our presymptomatic and early
manifest cohort, whilst animal models have very high repeat lengths and advanced disease. Al-
ternatively, our findings could be explained by dual degeneration: both of the valuation network
activated by immediate reward, and the inter-temporal choice regions meaning that HD patients
are unable to value immediate reward over delayed, or calculate expected value. Our study also
did not find altered risk behaviour on the BART, although the initial model suggested a relative
risk aversion in the HD population: HD patients had a lower average pump value compared with
controls, however it did not surpass Bonferroni with the addition of confounders to the model.
This is in keeping with Galvez et al’s work, who did not find increased risky-decision making
on the Cambridge gambling task(487). Notably the model showed that increased IQ, higher
fluoxetine dose and male gender all increased risky decision making. Of particular note is that
fluoxetine increased risky-decision making, given the wealth of literature on lower serotonergic
tone leading to impulsive behaviour (reviewed by Dalley and Roiser, and Pattij and Vander-
schuren(513, 514)), this was somewhat surprising, although the fluoxetine may be acting as a
risk marker for low serotonergic tone, rather than increasing central nervous system serotonin
to normal.
We found a marked disparity between scores on the self-report measures. Firstly, we noted
differences between HD patients and controls across a range of instruments (Barratt impulsivity
total score; ‘positive urgency’, ‘negative urgency’ and ‘lack of persistence’ from the UPPS P; and
the inhibition score from the BISBAS). This suggests that HD patients have some insight into
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that fact that their behaviour differs from healthy controls, although whether this difference is
correct in size and direction is difficult to ascertain without an objective scoring measure. The
majority of these differences did not surpass the Bonferroni and correction for confounders – only
the Barratt impulsivity total score, and ‘positive urgency’ from the UPPS P did so. Notably, HD
patients scored much lower than controls on the ‘positive urgency’, showing a reduced propensity
to act rashly under conditions of positive affect, whilst ‘negative urgency’ showed a trend effect
in the opposite direction (the HD group scored more highly on this measure). Negative and
positive urgency have been associated with a number of measures of alcohol misuse, which has
been widely recognised to be a frequent problem in HD(186, 187). The BISBAS subscores did
not surpass Bonferroni after correction for confounders, suggesting that this instrument is not
useful for measuring impulsive behaviour in HD.
As we discussed, the self-report measures and tasks are often poorly correlated, and may mea-
sure different aspects of impulsivity(277, 278, 515). Nonetheless our exploratory models within
the HD sample showed that IGT scores predicted a number of the self-report measures (UPPS
P: ‘positive urgency’ (negative association), ‘negative urgency’ and ‘lack of persistence’; Barratt
impulsivity score; and a negative association with the inhibitory score on the BISBAS), all of
which surpassed Bonferroni. A major hypothesis regarding the validity of tasks and self-report
measures for measuring impulsivity is that the tasks measure ‘state’ - short-lived, emotion-based
and highly variable; whilst the self-report instruments measure ‘trait’ - long term personality
components(276, 279, 514). The IGT is clearly a complex instrument, and can be affected by
alterations in a number of different neuropsychological processes: it may be that some of these
are ‘trait’ whilst others are more reflective of a ‘state’. The only association with SSRT was a
negative association with ‘positive urgency’.
In conclusion, we have shown that the failure of inhibition previously seen in HD is robust
and not altered by reaction time, medication, age or gender. The IGT is also affected by dis-
ease progression in HD, an effect not explained by confounders, which is mediated in part by
a set-switching deficit. There is no evidence to suggest altered temporal discounting or risk-
sensitivity in HD. This is in keeping with the known dorso-ventral progression of HD pathology.
The Barratt impulsivity score is the most robust self-report measure.
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Chapter 5
Irritability and Aggression
5.1 Introduction
Irritability is defined as “a temporary psychological state characterised by impatience, intoler-
ance and poorly controlled anger . . . . . expressed outwardly towards others or inwardly towards
the self.” Some researchers also include aggression (behaviour that is intended to harm another
individual(516))and components of impulse control(130, 340) within the definition of irritability.
Irritability is common in Huntington’s disease(HD). Typically it occurs before motor onset of
the disease and initially progresses with the disease course before plateauing (in frequency and
intensity), or even declining(209, 211, 212, 465) later in the illness. Factor analyses suggest that
in HD, irritability and aggression are part of the same neuropsychiatric construct(211, 401, 517).
Morbidity in neurodegenerative disease is most reliably assessed by deteriorating function, or
worsening quality of life. Irritability and aggression in HD have significant, deleterious conse-
quences for HD patients: although these symptoms do not directly cause physical symptoms,
this behaviour is responsible for significant deteriorations in quality of life(518) for patients and
family members, and is predictive of nursing home admission(519).
There is some converging evidence about the neurobiological basis of aggression and irritabil-
ity. Aggression in animals has been studied both pharmacologically and using focal lesions;
work in cat and rodent models, has shown defensive rage is mediated via the medial hypotha-
lamus and periaqueductal grey. These areas receive input from the amygdala, hippocampus,
prefrontal cortex and cingulate cortex which may modulate expression of these symptoms. Fur-
thermore, this behaviour may be provoked by reduced serotonergic tone (see Gregg and Siegel for
reviews(520, 521)). Irritability and aggression occur in many psychiatric disorders such as bor-
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derline personality disorder, bipolar disorder, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, depression
and anxiety(301, 522–525). In contrast to the animal literature, there is less published evidence
concerning the contribution of the hypothalamus and periaqueductal grey to irritable and aggres-
sive behaviour in humans, though several studies have shown altered activity in healthy subjects
exposed to threat or lesions in these regions in clinical groups prone to aggressive behaviour
(357, 358, 526, 527). However, there is extensive evidence to suggest involvement of the amyg-
dala and medial temporal structures such as the hippocampus (352, 371, 528); orbito-frontal,
anterior cingulate and ventro-medial pre-frontal cortex(355, 361, 529–532); striatum(533–535);
and thalamus(352). There are also a wealth of studies showing low serotonergic tone makes a
major contribution to irritable and aggressive behaviour: there are low serotonin levels in sub-
jects prone to aggressive behaviour(536–538); subjects undergoing tryptophan depletion (which
reduces central serotonergic tone) have increased aggressive responses on behavioural probes of
aggression (539–541), whilst drugs which increase serotonergic tone improve aggressive behaviour
in some patient groups(542, 543). There is also some evidence to suggest dopaminergic(534) and
cholinergic(544) involvement in irritable and aggressive behaviour.
Several behavioural paradigms have been developed to measure aggression, such as tasks mea-
suring the level of punishment (monetary loss, electric shocks) meted out to a competitor, which
have been shown to correlate with questionnaire-based assessments of aggression(344, 545). Neu-
ropsychological studies have also shown irritable and aggressive behaviour or personality traits
are associated with deficits on tasks of ventro-medial prefrontal cortex function(343, 546), in-
creased impulsivity (both motor inhibition(547–549) and delay discounting(550, 551) and in-
creased sensitivity to unfairness(552).
Despite the impact on quality of life and the socio-economic burden of irritability in HD, com-
paratively little is known about the neuropsychological and neurobiological basis of irritability in
the illness. One study compared emotional responses between patients with HD and controls, on
a range of scenarios and pictures designed to induce fear, happiness and disgust. The HD group
had lower self-reported fear ratings and higher self-reported anger ratings to the fear inducing
scenes and scenarios, but irritability was not measured(553). Deficits in social cognition are com-
mon in HD (177-180), and consequent misinterpretation of other peoples’ motives or behaviour
could conceivably provoke anger or irritation. However, a recent study showed that irritability
was not associated with deficits on tests of social cognition(177). A post-mortem study has
shown a correlation between globus pallidus atrophy in HD and level of irritability measured
in life(554). One study using functional imaging(555), suggested irritability in HD correlates
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with increased signal during anger induction in HD subjects in the pulvinar; self-report of irri-
tability correlates with increased amygdala activity, and reduced orbito-frontal activity during
a frustrating task (although this study did not correlate the imaging changes with an objective
irritability measure(130)); and a structural imaging study has shown correlations between irri-
tability and reduced structural integrity in white matter throughout the left hemisphere(556).
Furthermore, there are some treatment guidelines to suggest benefit from serotonergic and anti-
psychotic medications(557). However, in contrast to the wider psychiatric literature concerning
irritability and aggression, these studies do not tell us what the alterations in cognitive processes
are, that lead to irritability and aggression in HD.
This study aims to address this deficit by using a task-based approach to probe response to
provocation (using both self-report measures, and objective, behavioural measures of aggression
and frustration), insensitivity to future consequences, sensitivity to unfairness and impulsive
behaviour in order to delineate which processes best predict irritable and aggressive behaviour.
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Patient Recruitment and Consent
As described in materials and methods, 53 patients were recruited through the South Wales
HD service. All participants had a confirmed genetic diagnosis of HD (CAG repeat length
>36). Participants were recruited at all stages of disease from pre-symptomatic to moderately
symptomatic. Control participants were recruited from family members not at risk of HD and
local advertising within Cardiff University.
5.2.2 Gold Standard Assessments of Irritability in HD
Problem Behaviours Assessment (Short form)(165, 211, 221)
This is a clinician scored assessment designed for HD, which is used to rate a range of different
neuropsychiatric symptoms over the preceding 4 weeks. Each item is scored on severity (0-4)
and frequency (0-4) to produce a compound score (0-16). It includes subscores for aggression
(verbally expressed anger, threats or violent behaviour; PBA Aggression) and irritability (how
easily the subject loses their temper; PBA Irritability). The assessing clinician interviews the
patient and anyone with primary caring responsibility for the subject, to avoid problems with
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lack of insight/voluntary concealment.
Snaith Irritability Scale(339, 340)(Snaith)
This is a self-report measure. It consists of 18 questions (e.g. “I lose my temper and shout
or snap at others”) scored on a Likert scale from 0-3. The final score is a summation of the
responses for each sub-item: maximum score 54.
5.2.3 Tasks
Impulsivity Measures
Ultimatum Game(390)
This task is an economic decision-making task. Subjects are told. “There is a sum of £50 to
be divided between you and another player. You are the divider, who makes the decision about
how much of the sum to offer to the other player. The receiving player then chooses whether
to accept the offered sum, or reject it. If the offer is rejected both players get nothing. You
will then be asked what is the lowest offer you would accept.” Subjects were duly asked how
they would divide the money between themselves and the second player, and what the lowest
offer they would accept would total. The outcome measures were: 1) the ‘offer’ made to the
second player, 2) the lowest offer they would accept and 3) the difference between the offer
made by the subject, and the lowest offer they would accept. If this task is performed purely
based economic self-interest, the lowest offer subjects would accept is £1 (as £1 is more than
they would receive if the offer is rejected: where both players receive £0). However, previous
work has shown that if the disparity between amounts is very large, most subjects will reject the
offer, demonstrating that an assessment of fairness is also included in responses on this task(390).
Stop Signal Reaction Task
We used the Verbruggen(389) stop signal reaction task, which assesses motor inhibition as de-
scribed in Chapter 4. The outcome measure was the stop signal response time (SSRT): a measure
of the reaction time for the neural inhibitory response. Longer reaction times are indicative of
slower inhibitory neural circuits and hence higher motor impulsivity.
Monetary Choice Questionnaire(384)
This is a 27 item questionnaire described in Chapter 4. The outcome measure was the slope of
the hyperbolic discounting function (kD) – a constant which varies between individuals. Higher
preference for immediate over delayed reward (indicating higher impulsivity) results in higher
kD values. In this work, kD was calculated using an automated scoring system(493, 494).
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Computerised Provocation Measures
Klo¨ppel Task(130)
Subjects were told that the task was an assessment of visual perception, and that they had to
compete to win points. They were then told “In the first part of the experiment you will be
playing alone, in the second half you will be joined by a second player. In the second part of
the task, both players have to be correct in order for you to win points. You will be asked to
respond after you have viewed both squares, responses before this will not be logged.” On each
trial, subjects viewed a fixation cross followed by 2 squares presented sequentially in the centre
of the screen. They were shown one square, then a second square and asked to say which was
larger, the first or the second. They then had a feedback screen saying whether or not they were
correct. There were 50 trials in each part of the task (100 in total). Subjects were incorrectly
told they were wrong on 14% of trials (experimental verification was used in previously published
work, to find the maximum level of erroneous feedback before which subjects (HD and healthy
controls(130)) would become suspicious that the feedback was incorrect). The squares were very
close in size (28mm, 29mm and 31mm). The first square was displayed for 1000ms, and the
second for a range of 500-2500ms. The response and feedback screens were displayed for 3000ms
each. Subjects won 5 points for correct answers (“Correct! You win 5 points” was displayed on
a yellow background) and lost 2 points (“Incorrect. You lose 2 points” was displayed on a red
background). The second player was added to increase subjects’ levels of irritability: on 14%
of occasions they would be wrong when the subject was correct, thereby losing points for the
subject. We hypothesised that as subjects became more frustrated they would respond prema-
turely more often, and would make repetitive button presses on the response screen. Therefore,
the outcome measures were firstly the absolute number of premature responses (button presses)
made throughout the task, and secondly the absolute number of button presses made during the
response screen.
Tower Task
This was based on the point subtraction aggression protocol(344). Subjects were told they would
play a series of 6 games against 2 opponents (12 games in total). During each game, subjects
were told “You have to compete against an opponent to win points. The first player to 20 points
wins. You will first see a ‘Totals’ screen displaying your score and your opponents score, before
being offered the opportunity to add points to your total or steal points from your opponent.
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When you see an ‘ADD’ screen, press ‘L’ on the keyboard as many times as you can to win
points. When you see a ‘STEAL’ screen press ‘S’ on the keyboard as many times as you can, if
you want to steal points.” Subjects were shown a screen with the totals for themselves and an
opponent (zero at the beginning of each game; ‘TOTALS’ screen), followed by either an ‘ADD’
screen (80% probability) which read “ADD. Press L to win points”, or a ‘STEAL’ screen (20%
probability), which read “STEAL. Press S to steal points.”(each lasting 3000 ms). Subjects
could win up to 5 points on an ADD screen (random number from 1-5), whilst their opponent
would always win either 4 or 5 points, whilst a STEAL screen would result in up to 5 points
being deducted from their opponent (random number from 1-5). After each ADD or STEAL
screen, the TOTALS screen would be displayed with the cumulative points for each player (5000
ms). Each game finished when either the subject or the opponent reached 20 points. The first
opponent never stole from the subject, whilst the second always did (4-5 points on each occa-
sion). The task was designed to be unfair. Outcome measures were the VAS scores, and the
frequency of ‘STEAL’ attempts by the participant.
Frustrative Non-Reward (FNR)
This concept was based on the animal protocol where reward is withdrawn(383). Subjects
were told they had to complete a series of demographic questions ‘to log this session for our
records’(Figure 1). They were then asked a series of questions, to enter name, address (each line
had to be entered separately), gender, mother’s maiden name and name of first pet. Following
the final question “what is your email address”, the computer would display a message stating
“Runtime error. Data not saved. Please re-enter”. Subjects would have to enter their data 4
times before being allowed finish data entry and complete the end of task VAS. Outcome mea-
sures were the VAS scores.
Self-Report of Emotion: Visual Analogue Scales (VAS)
Before and after each provocation task, subjects were asked to rate their emotions over different
domains (happy, sad, frustrated, angry, irritable) between 0-100, where 0 represented ‘not at
all’, whilst 100 represented ‘strongest feeling ever’. The ‘happy’ and ‘sad’ scores were included
to obscure the fact that the tasks were designed to measure irritable feelings. The scores for
“frustrated”, “angry” and “irritable” were totalled to create ‘pre’ and ‘post’ VAS scores for each
task. The ‘net’ value represents VAS ‘post’ score minus VAS ‘pre’ score. Before starting the
task battery, subjects were told by the experimenter - “you will be asked to complete some emo-
tional rating scales before and after some of these tasks to measure your emotions at random
points throughout the experiment”. Before the Klo¨ppel and Tower task , no further explanation
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or warning would be given. Prior to the pre-task VAS for the Frustrative Non Reward task,
subjects were informed they would be completing a series of questions to record demographic
details and ‘log this session for our records’.
Measures of Insensitivity to Future Consequences
Iowa Gambling Task(99, 481) (IGT)
This task was designed (and robustly tested) as a measure of ventromedial prefrontal cortex
function. The task asks subjects to select cards from 4 different packs. They are told they win
money every time they draw a card, but on some trials they will then also lose money; over time
some packs result in higher losses than gains and they must learn to avoid these ‘bad’ packs.
The outcome measure is the number of selections from the highest loss pack in the final 25 trials
of the game: recently shown to be the most reliable outcome measure from this task(425). This
study used the Pebl version of the task(424).
5.2.4 Statistical Analysis
Analyses were run in R, an online statistical software package(427). We compared outcome
measures between cases and controls, in addition to using statistical models to predict our gold-
standard assessments of irritable behaviour (PBA Aggression, PBA Irritability and Snaith). We
used Wilcoxon tests to compare groups, however the comparisons were limited by ties in the
data. Consequently the accuracy of the p values produced could not be relied upon. We therefore
compared cases and controls using logistic models of case status. We initially fitted multiple
linear regression models to compare performance, however, the residuals of the regression models
(with the exception of the Net VAS scores, and SSRT) were not normally distributed (Shapiro
test of the residuals was highly significant) and the distributions of the data conformed to
Poisson distributions; thus the assumptions underlying the regression models were violated.
Generalised Linear Models (GLMs) with a Poisson distribution were used for the majority of
our analyses initially, we tested each of them independently for over-dispersion (using the AER
package in R): all of the tests were significant indicating over-dispersion and hence negative
binomial models were used, with the exceptions of the SSRT model and the Net VAS scores,
which had Gaussian distributions. Dopaminergic and serotonergic drug doses were converted
to Olanzapine and Fluoxetine equivalents based on meta-analyses(379, 380). IQ was calculated
138
using Crawford’s method(377), as reading test estimates of IQ deteriorate in the symptomatic
HD population(378, 429, 430). For each variable, we initially created a GLM looking at the effect
of case status in isolation (cases versus controls), then added potential confounding variables to
each model (age, IQ, gender, Olanzapine dose, Fluoxetine dose, TMS). We then used GLMs
to measure the predictive effect of the behavioural measures on gold standard assessments of
irritable and aggressive behaviour, to create models with and without confounding variables.
Family wise error rate was controlled with the Bonferroni method.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Demographics
The HD population did not differ from controls on age or gender. The HD group had marginally
lower IQ, and higher scores on all the irritability/aggression measures, in addition to higher
TMS, and medication doses.
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Table 5.1: Demographics
HD Controls
Age 53.92 (33-82) 46.85 (20-75)
IQ 103.53 (88.75-125.27) 109.73 (89.79-128.51) *
Gender 26/53 female 17/26 female
PBA Irritability 3.06 (0-12) 0.38 (0-2) **
PBA Aggression 2.04 (0-12) 0.31 (0-4) **
Snaith Irritability Scale 7.51 (0-18) 3.62 (0-10) ***
Olanzapine dose (mg) 1.98 (0-41.25) 0 ***
Fluoxetine dose (mg) 21.85 (0-146.5) 2.4 (0-22.2) ***
CAG Repeat Length 42.5 (38-50) -
Total Motor Score 36.58 (0-89) 1.48 (0-6) ***
* 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
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Self-Report of Emotion: Visual Analogue Scales (VAS)
Anticipatory VAS Scores
The anticipatory VAS scores were taken before subjects started the provocation tasks. Notably
for the FNR, they were measured following an instruction screen describing the need for subjects
to complete some demographic details and security questions, but before beginning answering
the questions (Figure 5.1). The generalised linear models (GLMs) comparing the effect of case
status on pre-task VAS scores showed a consistent effect across all the tasks: the HD group had
higher scores (all p<2x10-16). When potential confounding variables were added to the models,
the only effect that was retained was the pre-task VAS score for the FNR task, which was higher
in the HD group.
Prediction models comparing VAS scores and gold standard irritability aggression measures
in the HD group demonstrated an association between FNR anticipatory VAS scores and all
gold standard irritability and aggression scores (at trend level: p=0.062 with PBA Aggression),
an effect which was retained, or strengthened (the association with PBA Aggression p=0.013)
when confounding variables were included in the model. This association was also seen across all
gold standard assessments for the Klo¨ppel anticipatory VAS scores, albeit the association with
PBA Irritability was at trend level in the model including confounding variables (p=0.095).
The association was less marked for the Tower anticipatory VAS scores, which demonstrated
an association in the initial models, but this effect was lost in the GLMs including confounding
variables, although a trend level (p=0.082) association was seen with the Snaith(Tables 5.2 -
5.5, Figures 5.2 - 5.4).
Post-Task VAS Scores
In the models comparing cases and controls, the HD group had higher post-task VAS scores
across all tasks. However, this effect was lost in the models including confounding variables,
except for the FNR.
The post-task VAS prediction models in the HD group, did not show such consistent effects as
the pre-task VAS prediction models. The FNR model demonstrated a trend-level association be-
tween post-FNR VAS score and the Snaith but neither of the PBA scores in the models including
confounding variables. The post-Tower VAS score did not display any significant association with
gold standard measures in the models including confounders. The post-task Klo¨ppel VAS scores
showed a significant predictive effect on the Snaith, but neither of the PBA measures(Tables 5.6
- 5.9, Figures 5.5 - 5.7).
141
Net VAS Scores
These scores were calculated from VAS post-task score minus VAS anticipatory score, and mea-
sured VAS change over the provocation tasks. The GLMs comparing cases and controls did not
demonstrate any difference between the groups. The GLMs looking at association between Net
VAS scores on each task, did not demonstrate any associations with the gold standard irritability
and aggression measures (Tables 5.6 - 5.9, Figures 5.10 - 5.13).
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Figure 5.1: Frustrative Non-Reward Introductory Screen
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Figure 5.2: Anticipatory VAS Scores- FNR
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Figure 5.3: Anticipatory VAS Scores- Tower
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Figure 5.4: Anticipatory VAS Scores- Klo¨ppel
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Figure 5.5: Post-Task VAS Scores- FNR
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Figure 5.6: Post-Task VAS Scores- Tower
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Figure 5.7: Post-Task VAS Scores- Klo¨ppel
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Figure 5.8: Change in VAS Scores- FNR
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Figure 5.9: Change in VAS Scores- Tower
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Figure 5.10: Change in VAS Scores- Klo¨ppel
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5.3.2 Economic Decision-making and Fairness
Ultimatum Game (UG)
UG Offer
This is the value of the offer made by participants when they were the ‘divider’. No differences
were seen in the GLMs comparing performance between cases and controls. There was no associ-
ation within the HD population between UG offer value and any of the gold standard irritability
and aggression measures (Tables 5.14 & 5.15, Figures 5.11).
UG Receive
This is the value given by participants, when asked ‘what is the lowest offer you would accept’.
In the case-control models, no differences were seen between groups. No associations were seen
between ‘the lowest offer subjects would accept’ in the HD group and any of the irritability and
aggression measures(Tables 5.16 & 5.17, Figures 5.12).
UG Net
This is the value of the offer made in the ‘dividing’ part of the UG, minus the lowest offer
participants would accept. No differences were seen between cases and controls. The net offer
was not predictive of any of the gold standard irritability and aggression measures(Tables 5.18
& 5.19, Figures 5.13).
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Figure 5.11: UG Offer
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Figure 5.12: UG Receive
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Figure 5.13: UG Net
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Table 5.14: UG Offer- Group Comparisons
Dependent variable:
UG Offer
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.066 <2x10−16
Case HD −0.016 0.87
Observations 74
Log Likelihood −267.80
Akaike Inf. Crit. 539.60
Dependent variable:
UG Offer
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.73 2.86x10−7
Case HD 0.16 0.25
Age 0.00031 0.93
IQ 0.0030 0.50
TMS −0.0046 0.11
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.0069 0.54
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0015 0.52
Observations 69
Log Likelihood −250.032
Akaike Inf. Crit. 514.064
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Table 5.16: UG Receive- Group Comparisons
Dependent variable:
UG Receive
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.94 <2x10−16
Case HD 0.10 0.32
Observations 74
Log Likelihood −263.48
Akaike Inf. Crit. 530.96
Dependent variable:
UG Receive
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 3.085 1.47x10−8
Case HD 0.11 0.43
Age −0.00045 0.90
IQ −0.0013 0.78
TMS 0.0017 0.55
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.011 0.36
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0028 0.24
Observations 69
Log Likelihood −240.94
Akaike Inf. Crit. 495.88
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Table 5.18: UG Net- Group Comparisons
Dependent variable:
UG Net
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.58 0.24
Case HD −2.40 0.37
Observations 78
Log Likelihood −298.045
Akaike Inf. Crit. 600.09
Dependent variable:
UG Net
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) −5.96 0.69
Case HD 0.77 0.84
Age 0.011 0.91
IQ 0.077 0.54
TMS −0.12 0.13
Olanzapine Equivalent −0.064 0.84
Fluoxetine Equivalent 0.025 0.70
Observations 72
Log Likelihood −271.60
Akaike Inf. Crit. 557.20
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5.3.3 Impulsivity Measures
Stop Signal Reaction Task
The SSRT is a measure of the speed of inhibitory processes: higher values reflect slower reaction
time and hence worse inhibitory processes. The groups differed in the case-control model, where
the HD group had longer reaction times than controls. However, addition of confounders to the
model resulted in loss of significance of this relationship . SSRT was not predictive of scores on
any of the irritability or aggression measures in the HD population (Tables 5.20 & 5.21, Figures
5.14).
Delay Discounting
The kD reflects temporal discounting: valuing immediate over delayed rewards. Higher kD values
reflect steeper discounting and hence higher impulsivity. There were no differences between cases
and controls. Higher kD values were not predictive of any of the gold standard irritability and
aggression measures(Tables 5.22 & 5.23, Figures 5.15).
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Figure 5.14: Stop Signal Reaction Task
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Figure 5.15: Delay Discounting
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Table 5.20: SSRT- Group Comparisons
Dependent variable:
SSRT
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 304.42 1.89x10−7
Case HD 191.84 0.0053
Observations 68
Log Likelihood −476.33
Akaike Inf. Crit. 956.66
Dependent variable:
SSRT
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 201.84 0.59
Case HD 77.97 0.43
Age 2.61 0.29
IQ −0.21 0.95
TMS 3.24 0.12
Olanzapine Equivalent 16.26 0.045
Fluoxetine Equivalent −1.47 0.37
Observations 63
Log Likelihood −437.51
Akaike Inf. Crit. 889.013
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Table 5.22: Delay Discounting- Group Comparisons
Dependent variable:
kD
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) −2.88 0.00066
Case HD 0.36 0.72
Observations 72
Log Likelihood −17.41
Akaike Inf. Crit. 38.81
Dependent variable:
kD
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 0.11 0.98
Case HD −0.19 0.90
Age 0.019 0.61
IQ −0.037 0.45
TMS 0.0083 0.76
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.039 0.71
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0089 0.74
Observations 67
Log Likelihood −15.63
Akaike Inf. Crit. 45.25
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5.3.4 Provocation Measures
Tower Task
The outcome variable was the number of ‘STEAL’ attempts by participants. Only one partici-
pant did not make any STEAL attempts (premanifest HD participant). All other participants
stole whenever they were offered the opportunity to do so.
Klo¨ppel Premature Responses
This value is the number of responses made prior to the response screen. The HD group made
significantly more premature responses than controls, although the effect was lost after inclusion
of confounding variables in the model. However, the premature response value was not predictive
of the irritability and aggression measures in the models including confounding variables (Tables
5.24 & 5.25, Figures 5.16).
Klo¨ppel Total Responses
This value reflects repeated responses (i.e. repetitive tapping) during the response period of the
task. There were no differences between cases and controls in the case status models. Total re-
sponses was not predictive of any of the gold standard irritability and aggression measures(Tables
5.26 & 5.27, Figures 5.17).
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Figure 5.16: Klo¨ppel Premature Responses
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Figure 5.17: Klo¨ppel Total Responses
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Table 5.24: Klo¨ppel Premature Responses - Group Comparisons
Dependent variable:
Kloppel Premature
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.29 <2x10−16
Case HD 0.74 0.014
Observations 59
Log Likelihood −224.26
Akaike Inf. Crit. 452.52
Dependent variable:
Kloppel Premature
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 5.45 0.00061
Case HD 0.62 0.15
Age 0.0023 0.83
IQ −0.031 0.021
TMS 0.0075 0.41
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.053 0.11
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.016 0.028
Observations 56
Log Likelihood −207.67
Akaike Inf. Crit. 429.34
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Table 5.26: Klo¨ppel Total Responses - Group Comparisons
Dependent variable:
Kloppel Total
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.69 <2x10−16
Case HD −0.083 0.50
Observations 59
Log Likelihood −308.13
Akaike Inf. Crit. 620.25
Dependent variable:
Kloppel Total
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 4.32 <2x10−16
Case HD −0.0035 0.98
Age −0.00029 0.93
IQ 0.0037 0.34
TMS −0.0039 0.15
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.0043 0.65
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0012 0.55
Observations 56
Log Likelihood −270.059
Akaike Inf. Crit. 554.12
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5.3.5 Measures of Insensitivity to Future Consequences
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
The outcome variable is the number of disadvantageous selections in the final 25 trials of the
task. Cases had significantly more disadvantageous selections than controls, however this did
not survive the inclusion of confounders in the model. IGT performance did not predict any of
the irritability or aggression measures (Tables 5.28 & 5.29, Figures 5.18).
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Figure 5.18: Iowa Gambling Task
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Table 5.28: Iowa Gambling Task- Group Comparisons
Dependent variable:
IGT
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 1.32 <2x10−16
Case HD 0.44 0.040
Observations 71
Log Likelihood −188.99
Akaike Inf. Crit. 381.99
Dependent variable:
IGT
Estimate P Value
(Intercept) 2.67 0.010
Case HD 0.039 0.89
Age 0.0084 0.23
IQ −0.017 0.060
TMS 0.010 0.059
Olanzapine Equivalent 0.022 0.29
Fluoxetine Equivalent −0.0043 0.37
Observations 66
Log Likelihood −171.33
Akaike Inf. Crit. 356.65
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5.3.6 Exploratory Models
Generalised Linear Models demonstrated highly significant, positive relationships between all 3
irritability and aggression measures in the HD population, suggesting that these instruments
are all measuring a similar underlying construct (PBA Irritability and PBA Aggression, esti-
mate=1.19, p<2x10-16; PBA Irritability and Snaith, estimate=0.38, p=4.56x10−5; PBA Ag-
gression and Snaith, estimate=1.24, p=3.22x10−5).
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5.4 Discussion
In this work, we have demonstrated that irritable and aggressive behaviour in HD is most
strongly predicted by anticipatory VAS scores following negative affect induction (being asked
to undertake an onerous form-filling task). Anticipatory VAS scores under condition of negative
affect were significantly higher in HD patients compared with healthy controls, and predicted
scores on our gold standard assessments. Post-task scores did not reliably distinguish between
cases and controls, although there were some associations with gold-standard measures in the
HD group. There were no group differences between patients and healthy controls on Net VAS
scores, or associations with the irritability and aggression measures. Measures of impulsivity,
fairness and frontal control showed no differences between cases and controls, and were not pre-
dictive of irritability and aggression in the HD population. The behavioural outputs from the
provocation tasks, did not show any increase in repetitive or premature responding, or ‘punish-
ment’ of a competitor in HD, nor were these variables predictive of irritability and aggression.
Similar VAS scores of negative affect were also used in the study by Klo¨ppel and colleagues(130).
They did not find group differences of VAS scores of negative affect between pre manifest HD
gene carriers and controls, nor did they find an association with the Snaith irritability scale
(although there was a trend level effect). In contrast to our work, the Klo¨ppel study involved
testing VAS scores throughout the task, but not prior to starting. There was no negative affect
induction – subjects were told they would perform a task which ‘examines how the brain re-
sponds when doing tasks and getting feedback’. Furthermore, in this work the pre-manifest HD
group did not differ on gold standard assessments of irritability from the controls. The sample
size (16 premanifest HD subjects and 15 controls) may not have been large enough to demon-
strate an effect, in contrast to our larger cohort. We also included a spectrum of HD subjects
(from premanifest to motor manifest), which is likely to include a higher proportion of subjects
with irritability, given the known progression of irritability early in the disease course(211, 212).
Previous work has shown that HD subjects have higher anger responses during mood induction
than controls(553) however, this study did not look for an association with irritability. Studies
in healthy subjects have shown that mood induction effectively induces irritability in healthy
subjects – in particular dealing with difficult bureaucracy or frustrating social situations(558,
559). There are a number of neurobiological mechanisms that may mediate the effect of increased
susceptibility to negative mood induction. In the work by Klo¨ppel et al(130), there was a lack of
correlation between BOLD signal in the amygdala and negative affect ratings in the HD group,
whilst there was a strong correlation between these variables in the control group, the HD group
also demonstrated reduced functional coupling between the amygdala and orbito-frontal cortex.
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However, the paper does not report an association with gold standard measures of irritability.
Singh-Bains and co-workers(554) showed an association between irritability on a self-designed
questionnaire and atrophy in the globus pallidus. Globus pallidus lesions have not previously
been linked with irritable behaviour in case series and meta-analyses of focal basal ganglia le-
sions, although disinhibition is reported in a small minority(238, 241). The most convincing
neurobiological locus for irritability in HD was found by van den Stock and colleagues(555).
They showed that during anger induction, HD subjects showed markedly increased BOLD sig-
nal in the pulvinar compared with controls, this signal change correlated with scores on the
Snaith irritability scale.
In our study we found VAS ratings of negative emotion strongly predicted gold standard as-
sessments of irritable and aggressive behaviour. The strong associations between self-rating
measures and gold-standard clinical measures is somewhat surprising, as lack of insight (anosog-
nosia) into irritability in HD is widely reported by clinicians and number of previous studies have
found that anosognosia is a significant problem in HD, affecting motor, cognitive and neuropsy-
chiatric symptom domains(560). The mechanism for anosognosia is unclear, but it has been
correlated with impaired executive function(561, 562). Self-assessment of irritability has been
shown to be vulnerable to this problem(563), in addition to other psychiatric symptoms, such as
depression, apathy and disinhibition(206, 563). There are a number of possibilities which might
explain our findings: firstly, it is possible that our cohort had relatively well-preserved executive
function, although this seems unlikely given the advanced disease stage as indicated by the mean
TMS in the HD group of 36.58. Secondly, HD subjects may be able to rate their emotions ac-
curately ‘in the moment’ but because of the widely-recognised impairments in working memory,
struggle to recall these feelings when questioned about them later. This explanation would be
in keeping with the historical nature of the gold-standard assessments, which ask subjects to
rate their behaviour over the preceding weeks or months. Finally, irritable subjects in HD may
not realise that the emotional intensity they experience is different to others, or different to how
they were before irritability developed in them.
Tests of ventro-medial prefrontal cortex function and motor inhibition showed some group dif-
ferences between HD patients and healthy controls, but these differences were (at best) only
retained at trend level after inclusion of confounding variables in the GLMs. Furthermore, they
were not predictive of PBA or Snaith measures of irritability and aggression. The other im-
pulsivity assessment (delay discounting) did not demonstrate any differences between cases and
controls, nor was it predictive of irritable and aggressive behaviour. Impairments in motor inhi-
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bition and on IGT performance are widely recognised in HD(171, 444, 478, 482, 483), which is
consistent with our data. Studies suggesting a contribution of motor impulsivity to aggression
in disease groups (borderline personality disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and
conduct disorder), have compared impulsivity task performance between cases and controls(548,
549), but not correlated task performance with gold-standard irritability measures in the patient
groups. A possible explanation is that impulsivity and aggression co-exist in these disorders,
but the impulsive behaviour does not contribute to the aggression.
In contrast to irritability and aggression in other neuropsychiatric diseases and personality disor-
ders, we did not find higher rates of directed aggression (inflicting punishment on a competitor),
or aggressive behaviour directed at an inanimate object (repetitive button presses on the Klo¨ppel
task). Our aggression task was based on the point subtraction aggression protocol(344), however,
a noted difference was that our task did not allow subjects to choose how much punishment was
meted out to a competitor in the task. Thus we may have lost important nuanced information
about degree of punishment. The lack of excessive or premature responses in the HD group may
reflect motor impairment and bradykinesia known to be seen with disease progression. Finally
we did not see a difference between the HD group and controls in the level of offer they were
prepared to accept in the ultimatum game, although in contrast to others we did note an as-
sociation between lower accepted offers and higher PBA Irritability scores, albeit this was not
supported by an association between the Snaith or PBA Aggression scores.
In conclusion, we have shown that irritability and aggressive behaviour in HD is predicted
by increased sensitivity to negative mood induction, and is not related to impulsivity, impaired
frontal control, excessive sensitivity to unfairness or task-based punishment measures.
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Chapter 6
Depressed Mood and Suicidal
Ideation
6.1 Introduction
The first description of HD by George Huntington in 1872(181) particularly remarks on the
“tendency to insanity, and sometimes that form of insanity which leads to suicide” indicating
an awareness of depression and suicidal ideation forming part of the phenotype from the earliest
accounts.
Estimates of the prevalence of depression in HD vary in epidemiological studies depending on
the instrument used, the sample size, and the population studied. The frequency of symptoms
of depression or major depressive disorder in prevalence studies of the general population have
found rates of between 3% and 12%, with higher risk in women, smokers and people suffering
from a chronic medical condition(564, 565). However, in HD, the evidence is that depression
is more common. Using the neuropsychiatric inventory(222) and the behavioural scale of the
unified Huntington’s disease rating scale (UHDRS (422)), Paulsen and co-workers found symp-
toms of dysphoria or depressed mood in up to 69% in motor-manifest HD patients(465, 566).
Using the Composite International Diagnostic Instrument (567) (CIDI – diagnoses are based on
formal psychiatric criteria from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders(154))
higher rates of depressive symptoms were found in pre-manifest HD gene carriers compared with
non-carriers(209). A meta-analysis(196) found rates of between 33 and 69% in 7 studies, whilst
more recent studies using larger cohorts (of pre-manifest and motor manifest patients) found de-
pressive symptomatology or major depressive disorder in 42-64%(197, 401). Suicide and suicidal
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ideation is also significantly more common in HD with rates of suicidal ideation in up to 20% of
mutation carriers in cross-sectional studies(214, 568). Suicidal ideation is predicted by depres-
sive symptoms, but also agitation and irritability. The frequency of depressive symptoms in HD
varies throughout the disease course, with some studies finding that it occurs more frequently
in the pre-manifest and earlier motor-manifest stages(211, 212). The psychological burden of
knowing that one is at risk of developing, or has symptoms of, an incurable neurodegenerative
disorder, has often been presumed to be the trigger for depressive symptoms in HD families.
However, work comparing rates of psychiatric symptoms in gene carriers and non-gene carriers,
blinded to their own genetic status, has shown that in fact, the risk of neuropsychiatric symp-
toms, is higher in gene carriers(147, 210, 569).
Assessing depressive symptomatology in HD is made more difficult by the criteria for vegetative
symptoms in major depressive disorder(154) – changes in sleep, movement, slowed thinking and
weight are all common in HD, as part of disease progression and are not necessarily related to
depressive symptomatology. Rickards and co-workers(570, 571), compared self report measures
of depressive symptoms, and found that the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS),
and Depression Intensity Scale Circle(DISCS) had good predictive ability of formal diagnosis of
major depressive disorder, whilst the Beck depression inventory performed relatively poorly. A
comparison of the Hamilton and Beck depression scales, showed that the items best predictive
of depression included “guilt” and “loss of interest”, but items relating to agitation or vegeta-
tive symptoms such as sleep and weight change were not strongly predictive of depression in
HD(571). Depressive symptoms also have significant effects on quality of life and function in
HD(198, 572, 573). Despite the frequency, and significant effects on quality of life and functional
decline, little is known about the neurobiology or neuropsychological antecedents of depression
in HD.
In major depressive disorder (MDD), cognitive mechanisms have been investigated in terms
of cognitive biases and cognitive deficits. As a prime example of a cognitive bias, Beck(295) de-
scribes depressive cognition – interpreting experiences in a negative light, with selective attention
to negative stimuli. Standard neuropsychological test batteries in patients with MDD emphasise
the deficits in processing speed, executive function, attention and memory(574–578): a recent
meta-analysis confirmed the central nature of executive function in MDD(309). However, in light
of Beck’s theory of depressive cognition, other groups have used specific tasks to measure some
more specific neuropsychological deficits. Murphy(579) and co-workers demonstrated hypersen-
sitivity to negative feedback in patients with MDD compared with controls. Deficits in tasks
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measuring sensitivity to reward and altered effort in response to reward have also been described
in MDD cohorts, with reports of either reduced reward value, or reduced effort for equivalent
reward in the literature. Specific findings have included reduced effort for equivalent reward
on a progressive ratio task(316), and reduced reward responsiveness in patients with MDD(313,
314). A task mediating reward and effort (the ‘EefRT’ – energy expended for reward task) has
been shown to predict trait anhedonia in healthy controls in addition to demonstrating reduced
effort and impaired processing of reward-related information in patients with MDD(315, 580).
Functional imaging studies of patients with MDD often report deficits in responses to reward,
particularly in the striatum, and orbitofrontal cortex, but also hypoactivity in prefrontal cor-
tex(326–328, 581, 582), however, a recent meta-analysis(583) did not find any consistent areas
of functional changes in these regions, and noted the lack of consistency in prior, less rigorous
meta-analyses.
Depressive symptomatology in HD has shown an association with cognitive decline, with poorer
performance on working memory tasks(584), as well as predicting worse performance on tasks
assessing visuo-motor function, planning and inhibition(585). Imaging studies of depressive
symptomatology in HD have found increased dorso-lateral prefrontal activity during a shift-
ing response set task(414) pathological reductions in raphe integrity(586); reduced fractional
anisotropy (FA) in the corpus callosum(556), in addition to FA reductions in the anterior cin-
gulate cortex, insula and cerebellum(587); and increased functional connectivity, but reduced
structural connectivity in a distributed network involving pre-frontal and limbic regions(417).
The disparity of these findings suggests that either a distributed network or networks are at fault,
depression in HD is a heterogenous entity, or the differences relate to methodological inconsis-
tencies. A major contributor to our lack of understanding of the neurobiology of depression in
HD is a lack of understanding about exactly what cognitive processes contribute to depressive
symptomatology in HD.
This work addresses these inconsistencies, by attempting to map the potential contributors to
depressed mood in HD, namely depressive cognition and negative bias, altered reward valuation,
altered reward-effort calculations and impaired executive function using a battery of novel and
existing tasks.
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6.2 Methods
6.2.1 Participants
As described in materials and methods, 53 participants known to carry a CAG repeat expansion
in the Huntingtin gene on chromosome 4 (>36 repeats) were recruited, along with 26 control
participants from family members either not at risk of HD or with a negative genetic test, and
local advertising in Cardiff university.
6.2.2 Questionnaires
Behavioural Inhibition System, Behavioural Activation System (BISBAS)(394)
This is a self-report Likert-type questionnaire based on the theories of competing neural systems
developed by Gray(489, 490). The BAS Reward was used in this study as a self-report measure of
reward value (to isolate this from reward-effort calculations involved in most behavioural tasks).
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)
This is a short, self report-questionnaire of 7 questions on depressive symptoms such as “I
feel cheerful” and 7 questions on anxiety “I get a sort of frightened feeling as if something
awful is about to happen”, employing a Likert-type scale from 0-3 (not true to very true). It
has previously been shown to have good sensitivity and specificity for depression symptoms
in HD patients when compared to gold standard diagnostic instruments (ICD-10 diagnosis of
depression)(588). It is also used as a standard assessment as part of the Enroll-HD worldwide
observational study of HD(589).
Problem Behaviours Assessment (short form; PBAs)(165, 211)
This is a clinician-scored instrument developed specifically for the neuropsychiatric symptoms in
HD. Information is gathered during a semi-structured clinical interview with both the subject,
and carers. Symptoms are rated for severity and frequency over the previous 4 weeks, and then
these scores are combined to form a product score. The domains of ‘depressed mood’ (PBA
Depression) and ‘suicidal ideation’ (PBA Suicidality) are included in this study.
Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI)(307)
The MINI is a short neuropsychiatric interview covering 16 different neuropsychiatric symptoms.
The interview was administered by a trained clinician (DMcL), and consists of screening ques-
tions followed by sub-questions if the screening criteria for possible neuropsychiatric symptoms
are met: for example one of the screening questions for major depressive disorder is “Have you
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been consistently depressed or down, most of the day, nearly every day, for the past two weeks?”
The MINI uses the DSM IV criteria for psychiatric diagnosis. This study employed the Major
Depressive Episode (‘Major Depression’) and Dysthymia domains, which are scored as either
present or absent.
6.2.3 Tasks
Depressive Cognition and Negative Bias
Optimistic Influence Test - Depressive Cognition
This is a novel task designed by DMcL. Subjects first complete a repetitive tapping assessment
– they are asked to tap as quickly as possible on the space-bar for 10 seconds. Participants are
told they will see a race between two people on the computer, which they can influence with
repetitive tapping on the space-bar key – the faster they tap, the more they can speed up one
of the runners. They are asked to watch the race first without pressing any buttons. Following
the race, they are asked “Do you think you can make the slower runner win?” They are told the
computer accounts for their motor performance (to avoid lower estimates among subjects with
worse motor symptoms, and avoid bias between cases and controls), using the baseline tapping
speed. They are asked to give an estimate on a scale of 0-100, how likely it is that with their
influence, they can make the slower runner win, 0 being ‘definitely not’ and 100 representing
‘absolutely certain’. They then have a chance to help the slower runner, by repetitive tapping
(the slower runner still loses the race), and are then asked again after the race about whether
they thought they could make the slower runner win if given a second chance (again scored from
0-100). This task was designed to test if depression in HD results in lower estimates of their
own ability, and whether this is modified by experience, either on an absolute or relative basis:
outcome measures are the pre-task estimate, post-task estimate and change in estimate (pre-task
estimate – post-task estimate).
Reward and Effort Measures
Progressive Ratio(387)
This task was based on the animal protocol, in which increased effort is required to gain a fixed
reward. Subjects are asked to search through a series of boxes (16 in total), to win points. When
they open the winning box, they can move on to the next level. They are told that early in
the game, the winning box will arrive early in the search, whilst on higher levels, they must
search through more boxes to find the winning box. They are told that they must keep playing
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until the game stops – the number of levels will not be revealed. The final instruction is ‘If you
wish to quit the level you are playing and move on to the next level, you can press ‘Q’ on the
keyboard at any point. If you press ‘Q’, you will not win points, but you will finish the game
more quickly.” There were 18 levels in total, early levels had a winning box within the first 5
boxes, whilst in the second half of the task, the winning box arrived in the final 5 boxes, with
occasional completely empty levels. The outcome variable was the first level on which subjects
chose to quit – higher levels reached before quitting would imply higher effort for fixed reward.
Reward Ratio
This task was based on the cued reinforcement reaction time task(388). Subjects were asked to
respond as quickly as possible when shown a visual stimulus. They were told that there would be
a baseline practice condition of 30 trials, and then the opportunity to win points. Furthermore,
they were told that the quicker they reacted in the rewarded condition, the more points they
would win. There were 30 practice trials, used to derive a baseline reaction time (subjects were
told react as quickly as you can”, feedback was “well done!”, but no points were awarded). In the
rewarded condition, to win points, subjects had to react more quickly than the mean reaction
time in the unrewarded condition – slower reaction times won 0 points, reaction times up to
30% faster than baseline scored 5 points, whilst reaction times shorter (hence faster) than 70%
of baseline reaction time scored 10 points. The outcome measure was the ratio of mean reaction
time in the rewarded condition to mean reaction time in the baseline condition.
Executive Function Measures
Phonemic Verbal Fluency (PVF)
This task required subjects to generate as many words beginning with the same letter as they
could over the course of 1 minute. Proper nouns were not permitted. The task was repeated
three times with a different letter on each occasion (F, A and S). The outcome variable was the
total number of novel words from all three trials.
Extra-Dimensional Set Shift Task (EDSST)
We created a modified version of a reversal learning task(426) chosen for the simplicity of the
instructions and the task. Subjects were shown 2 houses and asked to choose one to search for
gold coins. They were told there was a rule for which house was correct, and that this rule would
change after a certain number of correct selections. The dimensions were colour: ‘orange’ versus
‘blue’ house and presence of a cat or not. The rule changed after 7 correct answers in a row and
cycled from ‘orange house’ to ‘cat’ to ‘blue house’ to ‘no cat’. The task terminated either when
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20 set shifts were made, or if the rule was not learned after 20 trials. The outcome measure was
the number of completed set shifts.
6.2.4 Statistical Analysis
All statistical analyses were conducted in R(427), a widely available statistical package. I first
compared performance between the HD group and controls using two tailed t-tests for normally
distributed data, whilst for non-normally distributed data, we used the Wilcoxon test. We then
compared the predictive power of each outcome variable on our gold standard assessments (PBA
Depression and PBA suicidality, HADS Depression score, and presence of Major Depression or
Dysthymia from the MINI) within the HD population using multiple linear regression or GLM
if the assumptions underlying multiple linear regression were not met (normal distribution of
residuals, homoskedasticity, absence of auto-correlation or multi-collinearity). Logistic outcome
data (Major Depression and Dysthymia from the MINI) used logistic GLMs. Otherwise to decide
on the family and link function, histograms of the data were visualised, and characteristics of
the data appraised before the distribution chosen accordingly: for discrete, non-negative data
that was positively skewed we used Poisson, non-discrete, non-negative data used the Gamma
family. Over-dispersion was corrected for by using negative binomial models (from the R package
MASS(590)) if there was evidence for this (positive dispersion test using AER package(591) in R,
or degrees of freedom markedly lower than residual deviance). We calculated Pseudo R2 using
McFadden’s method (1-residual deviance/null deviance). IQ was calculated from demographic
variables using Crawford’s method(377), as previous analyses have shown reading tests to be
unreliable in the manifest HD population(378, 430). We calculated Olanzapine and Fluoxetine
equivalent doses from meta-analyses(379, 380) to correct for medication effects. We initially
created models comparing the predictive effect of the outcome variable on the gold standard
assessment, before adding potential confounding variables (age, IQ, TMS, medication doses and
PBA apathy score). Family wise error rate was controlled using the Bonferroni correction.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Demographics and Gold Standard Assessments
There were no significant differences between the HD group and controls on age or gender bal-
ance. As expected, HD patients had higher doses of serotonergic and dopaminergic medications,
in addition to higher TMS scores on formal UHDRS examination. HD patients had marginally
lower premorbid IQ scores (means 103.53, 109.73; p=0.019). Comparison of HD patients’ and
controls’ scores on the gold standard assessments (MINI Major depression and Dysthymia, HADS
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Depression score, PBA Depression and PBA Suicidality) only showed significant differences for
the HADS depression score, although Dysthymia and Major depression were both more common
in the HD group, and the HD group had higher mean scores than controls on all of the other
measures.
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Table 6.1: Demographics
HD Controls
Age 53.92 (33-82) 46.85 (20-75)
IQ 103.53 (88.75-125.27) 109.73 (89.79-128.51) *
Gender 26/53 female 17/26 female
PBA Depressed Mood 3.08 (0-12) 1.81 (0-9)
PBA Suicidality 0.37 (0-6) 0.04 (0-1)
HADS Depression 5.82 (0-17) 1.88 (0-9) ***
Major Depressive Episode 10/53 2/26
Dysthymia 8/53 0/26
Olanzapine dose (mg) 1.98 (0-41.25) 0 ***
Fluoxetine dose (mg) 21.85 (0-146.5) 2.4 (0-22.2) ***
CAG Repeat Length 42.5 (38-50) -
Total Motor Score 36.58 (0-89) 1.48 (0-6) ***
* 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001
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6.3.2 Optimistic Influence Task
Pre-Task Estimate of Performance
The HD group had lower pre-task estimates of performance than controls (means 48.07, 67.31,
t-test p value 0.0044). Within the HD cohort, there were effects at trend level: higher pre-task
score predicted PBA suicidality score. The R2 and pseudo R2 values were uniformly low in
the models, with none suggesting an explanatory effect of more than 0.06 of the variation in
the data. Adding confounding variables to the models improved the explanatory power of the
models (0.20-0.52 R2/pseudo R2). However, the trend level association between PBA suicidality
and pre-task estimate of performance was lost in the confounder model.
Post-Task Estimate of Performance
Group comparison again showed lower mean values in the HD group than controls (means 35.3,
43.04), but this difference was not significant. There was a highly significant positive relationship
between post-task estimate of performance and PBA suicidality . The R2 and pseudo R2 values
were uniformly low, explaining 10% or less of variation in the data. The models that included
confounding variables improved the R2 and pseudo R2 values, but the relationship between
PBA suicidality and post-task estimate of performance was lost. There were no other significant
associations between post-task estimate of performance and gold standard measures of mood.
Change in Estimate of Performance
Change in estimate was calculated from pre-task score minus post-task score. The control
group had a larger change in estimate (and in a positive direction) than the HD group (means
11.2, 24.27, p = 0.04). Comparisons within the HD cohort, did not demonstrate any significant
findings. The models had low explanatory scores (R2 and pseudo R2 all less than 0.05). Including
confounding variables again improved the explanation of variation in the data (R2 and pseudo
R2 0.18-0.53), but no significant relationships between mood scores and change in estimate of
performance were revealed in the more complex models.
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Figure 6.1: Pre-Task Estimate of Performance
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Figure 6.2: Post-Task Estimate of Performance
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Figure 6.3: Change in Estimate of Performance
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6.3.3 Reward and Effort Measures
Reward Ratio Task
Smaller values on this task indicate increased effort for reward. No differences in performance
were seen between the HD patient group and healthy controls (p=0.86). Within the HD cohort,
there were negative associations between all the gold-standard mood measures and the reward
ratio, however none of these relationships were significant, furthermore, the explanation of vari-
ation in the data, was poor (R2 and pseudo R2 all less than 0.05). Adding confounding variables
to the models improved the explanation of variation, but did not demonstrate any significant
relationships between task performance and mood assessments, although trend level effects sug-
gested smaller ratios (higher effort for reward) were associated with increased likelihood of major
depression, and increased scores on the PBA suicidality and HADS depression assessments.
Progressive Ratio
A higher breakpoint on the task is associated with increased effort for a fixed reward. The HD
group had lower mean and median breakpoints than controls (means 11.11, 13.29; medians 13,
14.5) but this difference was not significant (p = 0.24). Models within the HD group showed
that higher breakpoint was associated with higher PBA depression score (p=0.045) and at trend
level with presence of major depression (p = 0.065). Non-significant positive associations were
seen with the other gold standard mood assessments. None of the models had R2 or pseudo R2
values greater than 0.11. In the models including confounding variables, a trend level effect was
maintained, associating higher breakpoint with higher scores on the PBA depression, and higher
likelihood of presence of major depression.
BAS Reward
HD patients had lower BAS reward scores than the healthy control group, demonstrating reduced
reward value in the HD population (means 16.51, 17.54, medians 16, 17; p = 0.049). Modelling
of the relationship between BAS reward score and gold-standard mood assessments, showed a
significant (p=0.037) positive relationship between PBA suicidality and BAS reward score. None
of the models provided a good explanation of variation in the data (R2 or pseudo R2 values
all less than 0.07). Adding confounding variables to the models did not show any significant
relationships.
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Figure 6.4: Reward Ratio
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Figure 6.5: Progressive Ratio
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Figure 6.6: BAS Reward
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6.3.4 Executive Function Measures
Phonemic Verbal Fluency (PVF)
Higher scores indicate better task performance and hence better executive function. As de-
scribed in previous chapters HD patient group had markedly lower scores on this task than
healthy controls (means 29.29, 45.46, p = 7.048 x10−5). Modelling of the relationships between
task performance and the gold-standard mood measures within the HD population showed an
association between worse PVF performance and higher levels of PBA suicidality (p=0.016)
and depression measured by the HADS at trend level (p=0.083). The model of PVF and PBA
suicidality showed reasonable explanation of variation (pseudo R2 0.33), but the others did not
(R2 or pseudo R2 all less than 0.05). Owing to strong co-variances between PBA apathy score,
Olanzapine equivalent dose, TMS and PVF, convergence of the GLMs necessitated exclusion of
the variables from the PBA suicidality Poisson GLM. However, no significant associations were
found.
Extra-Dimensional Set Shift Task (EDSST)
As described in previous chapters the HD group made fewer set shifts than healthy controls
(means 6.08, 9.31) but this was not significant (p= 0.17). Within the HD group, better scores
on the EDSST indicated higher scores on all mood measures, except for PBA suicidality, although
none of these relationships approached significance. There were no significant relationships when
confounding variables were added to the models. The explanation of variation in the initial GLMs
was poor (R2 or pseudo R2 0.12 or less).
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Figure 6.7: Phonemic Verbal Fluency
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Figure 6.8: Extra-dimensional Set Shift Task
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6.3.5 Exploratory relationships
To assess validity of the reward based measures, we compared scores on the BAS reward, pro-
gressive ratio and reward ratio tasks using GLMs (assumptions underlying linear regression were
not met). Higher breakpoint on progressive ratio and faster reaction time on the reward ratio
task were significantly associated (pseudo R2 0.077, AIC 183.54, estimate -0.88, p = 0.012),
higher breakpoint was also associated with higher scores on the BAS reward (pseudo R2 0.051,
AIC 185.73, estimate 0.038, p = 0.0438), but there was no association between the reward ratio
and BAS reward score (pseudo R2 0.0084, AIC 141.71, estimate -0.068, p = 0.72).
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6.4 Discussion
In this sample, HD cases had more frequent diagnoses of major depression and dysthymia,
higher scores on the PBA measures and higher HADS depression scores than the control group,
however, the only comparison to reach significance was the HADS depression score. On the
assessment of depressive cognition, HD patients scored significantly lower (suggesting reduced
optimism compared with controls about their potential performance) pre-task. This score only
showed an association with PBA suicidality at trend level, which was not maintained in the
model containing confounding variables. None of the other outcome measures from this task
showed significant differences between cases and controls, although higher scores post-task were
significantly predictive of PBA suicidality in the model without confounding variables. The BAS
reward score, and tasks mediating reward and effort, only showed group differences for the BAS
reward score, with the HD group scoring lower than controls on BAS reward, whilst the models
within the HD group suggested a positive predictive effect of higher BAS reward score on PBA
suicidality. There were trend level (or borderline significant) associations between higher effort
on both the reward ratio task, and progressive ratio task, and higher scores on the gold stan-
dard mood measures, which were not maintained in the models including confounding variables.
The executive function measures showed group differences on the PVF task alone. The poorer
scores on the PVF (suggestive of impaired cognition) were predictive of increased suicidality and
HADS depression score (trend level only), although these associations were not maintained in
the confounder models.
In this study, we did not find differences in the prevalence of depression or suicidality between
HD cases and controls, apart from the HADS depression score. We considered whether this
might reflect a higher risk of depression in the familial controls, as this is well recognised(592),
however, the point prevalence of depression, dysthymia and scores on the dimensional instru-
ments in our control cohort were lower than reported population studies(165, 308, 564, 565, 593),
alternatively, we considered whether the scores might represent an under-estimate of the preva-
lence or severity of depression in the HD group (more depressed subjects, may well be less likely
to volunteer for studies), however the rates of major depression and PBA scores were similar, or
even higher compared with previous reports(165, 197, 214). Notably, several other studies have
shown a lack of difference on mood scores between cases and controls(153, 165). Furthermore a
number of studies following predictive testing have not found a difference between subjects with
a positive predictive test compared with negative one(594–596), although the PHAROS study
(a comparison of motor, cognitive and behavioural measures, in a cohort at risk of HD, blinded
to their own genetic status) did find higher scores on the depressed mood item of the UHDRS
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behavioural score among gene positive compared with gene negative subjects.
The task of depressive cognition demonstrated significantly lower scores in the HD patients
compared with controls. As part of the task, clear instructions were given to participants that
their performance took in to account their baseline tapping speed. This may reflect depressive
cognition in the HD group, however, it may be that the HD group found it more difficult to
ignore their known motor deficit. Furthermore, the only association between any of the gold
standard mood assessments and task performance, was with PBA suicidality; which occurred
in the opposite direction to what we had anticipated: higher estimates of performance both pre
and post task were associated with higher scores on the PBA suicidality item. It is not clear
what underlies this association (which was not sustained in the model including confounding
variables). It is possible that higher estimates of subjects abilities are more likely to lead to
disappointment and low mood, whilst several meta-analyses have shown that extroversion is
linked to suicide attempts, and may explain some of this association(597, 598). Alternatively
poor understanding of the requirements of the task may have limited interpretation in the HD
group. This task has not been independently verified in subjects with depressed mood drawn
from the general population, and hence may not measure what we hypothesised.
Our reward and effort measures only showed differences between HD and control participants
on the BAS reward score, where HD subjects had lower scores than controls. Previous work has
shown deficits in reward based tasks in manifest HD(88), and in ventral striatal activity during
reward anticipation in presymptomatic HD subjects(437). Within the HD group, higher BAS
reward score was predictive of higher PBA suicidality, although this relationship did not survive
the inclusion of confounding variables in the model. This relationship may also be mediated by
the personality trait of extraversion highlighted above, as increased reward responsiveness is as-
sociated with the personality trait of extraversion(599–601). The lack of association between the
reward-effort tasks and gold standard measures of depression is not in keeping with the wider
literature about depressed mood, reward and effort. Treadway and co-workers, have demon-
strated associations between lower effort and diagnosis of depression, as well as anhedonic trait
in healthy controls(315, 580, 602). Moreover there is a large body of literature demonstrating
reduced reward responsiveness in major depressive disorder(603, 604). Our tasks were based on
standardised instruments, previously shown in animal and human studies to be effective mea-
sures of effort and reward. Nonetheless, we compared predictive value between all three related
measures, and found strong relationships, except for BAS reward score and performance on the
reward ratio task. It is possible that some of the other cognitive or psychiatric features of HD are
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acting as confounders in this; for example perseveration may lead to inappropriate persistence
of responses leading to apparently preserved effort for reward.
In our study, impaired performance on one measure of executive function, the PVF, was as-
sociated with higher scores on the PBA suicidality instrument, and a trend to higher scores
on the HADS depression. Wetzel et al(568), did not find an association between symbol digit
modality test scores and suicidality in HD, whilst other large studies of suicidality in HD did
not report cognitive tests in their analyses(214, 605, 606). Deteriorating cognition has been a
predictor of suicide in other neurodegenerative diseases(607–610). Although the epidemiological
work suggests that depression is the major predictor of suicidality in HD, narrative accounts
point to suicide as being a rational response to physiological deterioration caused by HD(611),
which may explain this association.
Notably in the models including confounding variables, apathy was not strongly related to any
of the mood instruments except for the PBA suicidality score. This may reflect the contribution
executive function makes to apathy in HD(456). The distinction between depressed mood and
apathy in HD has previously been clearly drawn(612, 613). Reward deficits are only seen later
in the disease course(88), in keeping with the relative preservation of the ventral striatum and
orbito-frontal cortex. In keeping with this, we did not find links between reward or effort and
either apathy or depression in our study.
Our study does have several limitations. We used demographic instruments to measure pre-
morbid IQ, and some workers have advocated reading tests such as the National Adult Reading
Test (NART)(614), or combined demographic and reading tests(615). However, work in pre-
manifest and motor manifest HD subjects has shown, that whilst in the pre-manifest state,
reading test performance is preserved, with motor onset, it declines, underestimating premorbid
IQ systematically in this group(377, 378, 429, 430). Given our mixed sample of pre-manifest
and manifest individuals, this created a high risk of systematic bias. Therefore we adopted the
demographic method of Crawford. Furthermore, there may have been unknown confounders we
were unable to correct for in our models. The high degree of auto-correlation between the ex-
ecutive function measures, apathy and olanzapine dose precluded their inclusion in the models.
However, despite this, no significant result for the independent variable was found and hence it
is unlikely to influence the conclusions of the study.
In summary, we found differences between HD patients and healthy controls on measures of
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reward value, estimated performance and executive function, however these were only weakly
predictive of scores on the PBA suicidality instrument (and no other depressed mood measure)
within the HD cohort, and none survived inclusion in a model with confounding variables.
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Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
7.1 Overview of the Findings of the Work
To my knowledge this is the first attempt to systematically delineate the cognitive processes
leading to common neuropsychiatric symptoms in HD. I have shown that apathy in HD is as-
sociated with insensitivity to negative stimuli, furthermore, that whilst there is a reward deficit
in HD, it is not as marked as that seen in relation to aversive stimuli, and makes little to no
contribution to apathy in HD. Impulsivity in HD is related to impaired performance on the Iowa
gambling task, suggesting either impairments in future perspective or insensitivity to aversive
stimuli; and also that inhibitory deficits contribute to impulsive behaviour, whilst risk-taking
and inter-temporal discounting do not. Irritability and aggression in HD are related to increased
negative emotional reaction to ‘real-life’ negative stimuli, but not to failure of frontal control,
measures of unfairness or impaired motor inhibition. Finally suicidality in HD is in part linked
to deteriorating cognition, and overestimate of performance, however, measures of reward and
effort do not make a major contribution to mood disorders in HD.
7.2 Strengths of the Work
In this work I have attempted to definitively link task performance and behaviour. I explicitly
sought evidence for differences between cases and controls, and prediction of gold-standard mea-
sures of neuropsychiatric symptoms within our HD cohort by task performance or impairment.
A major problem in some of the published literature, that has been exposed by this work is a
variant of the ecological fallacy: the co-occurrence of high rates of a particular characteristic
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in a group and altered task performance in the same group, does not necessarily imply that
the characteristic is caused by (or even related to) the characteristic in question, despite any
biological plausibility. This issue is particularly pertinent when performance on a particular task
is affected by two or more cognitive processes each of which affect task performance in different
ways. An example of this phenomenon in this thesis is the co-occurrence of a reward deficit and
aversive stimulus insensitivity and their influence on performance in the BART. Applying the
ecological fallacy would have led to a conclusion that as cases were less effective at exploiting
reward than controls, a reward deficit explained the higher levels of apathy seen in the HD
cohort. However the use of a mixed-modelling approach using data from individual trials, al-
lowed the delineation of cognitive processes and revealed the contribution of aversive stimulus
insensitivity to apathy in HD. However, this approach becomes more difficult when there is no
definitive gold-standard assessment for the characteristic in question. In this scenario, strategy
I employed was to map the change in task performance with increasing biological burden of dis-
ease (using controls, presymptomatic HD and manifest HD), and compare performance between
tasks and questionnaire assessments of the characteristic in question, in order to look for overlap.
The ecological fallacy in neuropsychology, can also be seen in the imaging literature, when
changes in cerebral perfusion, task activation or volume within an affected cohort in isolation,
or between cases and controls are presumed to explain neuropsychiatric symptoms or cognitive
deficits. For example in the paper by Massimo et al(254), (that uses a novel task they hypoth-
esise measures apathy, and apathy scores on the Neuropsychiatric Inventory - NPI) in a cohort
of fronto-temporal dementia patients they relate NPI apathy scores to smaller volume in the
grey matter of the orbito-frontal cortex, but then relate task performance to imaging changes in
many more regions. However, there is no assessment in the study of how well the gold-standard
apathy measure is predicted by their novel task and all of these analyses are completed within
a disease cohort, with no controls. Without a control cohort, the grey matter changes cannot
be interpreted – the low apathy cases, may have had a disproportionately bigger orbito-frontal
cortex than controls, for example.
The approach of comparing task performance between groups, and then predicting neuropsychi-
atric scores using models has the advantage of being able to correct for confounding variables.
Other groups have excluded participants with depression from apathy tasks for example, whilst
this approach allows robust correction for any mood disorder. The use of meta-analytic data for
drug dose equivalents (Olanzapine and Fluoxetine) to include in models (rather than exclude
participants on medication) meant that no data were discarded, and the cases were more repre-
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sentative of the wider HD population, very few of whom are not on some form of neuropsychiatric
treatment.
7.3 Extending our Findings to Explore the Neurobiology
I plan to take this work forward using imaging techniques to further delineate the neurobiology.
The published literature to date on neuropsychiatric symptoms in HD has not shown any consis-
tency regarding the networks or anatomical locations involved in the core behavioural symptoms
in HD. This may reflect methodological techniques or the heterogeneity of cognitive processes
underlying these symptoms. The majority of published studies are negative, and there is no
consistency in the anatomical regions involved between the publications that have shown an
effect. Imaging studies (because of the number of statistical tests involved) are very vulnerable
to type I error. The most reliable neuropsychological imaging studies demonstrate a behavioural
deficit on a task (ideally in a double dissociation), that predicts symptomatology reliably, then
go on to demonstrate that neuro-imaging changes associated with task performance predict gold
standard measures of symptoms.
7.4 Rationale for the Statistical Approach
In this work, I have employed a range of statistical techniques: group comparisons using stan-
dard two tailed t-tests or Wilcoxon tests, in addition to modelling techniques – multiple linear
regression, generalised linear models using Poisson distributions, logistic regression and mixed
modelling techniques. Each of these tests have underlying assumptions which must be satisfied
to ensure the validity of the test and consequent reliability of the results. When the assump-
tions underlying linear regression were not met, I plotted the data, and tested whether it met
the assumptions of an alternative distribution; often this would be the Poisson distribution,
non-negative, positively skewed whole numbers. This distribution is most commonly found in
count data, which did represent some of the dependent variables. I used dispersion tests and
changed Poisson models to negative binomial models to account for the excess variance (causing
overdispersion) when these were significant. This approach is robust, but an alternative would
have been to log transform or inverse the dependent variable. I chose not to do this primarily
because of the methodological principle that data should be analysed as they are, rather than
attempting to amend them in some way to make the assumptions underlying statistical tests
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valid. Furthermore, many of the transformations change the nature of what is being measured
and invalidate inferences about the biology. In more practical terms, data transformation often
does not sufficiently change the data to make the test assumptions valid(616). Where I have
used models to study the effect of case (HD compared with controls), instead of Wilcoxon tests,
this is because of ties in the data (equivalent values at the same rank) meaning an exact P value
could not be calculated. Furthermore, discarding information about the numerical differences
between ranks in the Wilcoxon test limits the power to detect a difference.
7.5 Apathy Findings
Our findings regarding apathy are likely to be robust: a disparity between punishment and
reward sensitivity has been shown in other diseases(436) and also in HD(88), but this work is
the first to demonstrate that a deficit in sensitivity to aversive stimulus leads to apathy in any
disease. I found large group effects for the PVF task, and prediction of apathy in simple linear
regression, but the addition of confounders meant the relationship was no longer significant.
There are a number of potential reasons for this; firstly the HD sample size was smaller than
that completing the other tasks; secondly the Stroop, Trails tasks and symbol digit modality
test are more sensitive measures of cognitive decline in HD, and were the tasks that showed an
association with apathy in previous works(165, 166, 213, 456). The letter fluency and set shifting
tasks were chosen for theoretical (there is good evidence that they are impaired in HD(136, 164,
382)) and practical reasons: the executive function tasks known to show deficits in HD were
more difficult to computerise, and in the case of the Stroop, predominantly measured processes
that were partly assessed by other tasks in our battery i.e. inhibition. However, what remains
unclear is whether the executive function tasks measure a cognitive process that directly leads to
apathy, or whether cognitive decline in HD occurs in parallel with apathy. In any future studies
of apathy in HD, it would be helpful to include a specific task of planning such as the towers of
London task, which I did not use in our battery because some groups have found it less sensitive
to executive function in premanifest HD than other measures(136), albeit in manifest HD the
Towers of London task is much more sensitive to decline (382). I did not include a measure of
time perception in our analysis, which is known to be abnormal in HD(617, 618), and may also
contribute to apathy in HD: patients may not act or change action because they are unaware of
the passage of time, and consequently sit in an inactive state without realising how long they
have been there for. The Maze task showed strong association with both the EDSST and par-
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ticularly the PVF in our battery, however the R2 value of these regressions showed that there
remained a significant degree of unexplained variation in the data: clearly the task is reliant on
executive function, but idea generation may have more ‘creative’ processes underlying it too.
7.6 Impulsivity Findings
Our findings regarding impulsivity in HD: deficits in decision making and inhibition, but not
in inter-temporal discounting or measures of risk-taking, have been shown in part by other
groups(136, 171, 478, 483, 486). The literature on inter-temporal discounting and risk-taking
in HD is sparse, with one conference abstract, and one publication regarding the Cambridge
gambling task, but these studies are in agreement with our findings. Previous work on the Iowa
gambling task in HD(482, 483) has shown deficits compared with controls, but this deficit did not
correlate with the disinhibition measure used (the FLOPS – the precursor to the frontal systems
behaviour scale). This measure does include some questions which indicate impulsive behaviour
(e.g. “acts impulsively”), but others which do not (e.g. “neglects personal hygiene”), and hence
may not be the best measure of impulsivity. It is much more difficult to assess impulsivity than
some of the other neuropsychiatric symptoms, given the heterogeneity of cognitive processes
underlying the behaviour, and consequent lack of a gold standard measure. Nonetheless I have
shown progression of impulsivity on some questionnaire measures and tasks in association with
disease progression. Furthermore, I found some association between questionnaire measures and
task performance suggesting at least some degree of overlap of the cognitive processes involved.
The absence of impairment on the inter-temporal choice task is explicable in terms of the struc-
tures affected by HD, as this task predominantly activates ventral striatum and orbito-frontal
cortex(508, 509), which remain relatively preserved until the later stages of HD(81, 142).
7.7 Depression and Suicidality Findings
The most striking finding from our study in mood disorders and suicidal ideation in HD was
the effect of executive function and estimate of performance on suicidal ideation. Impairments
in cognition are noted by HD patients(619), and an awareness of decline could make suicide and
suicidal ideation more likely in HD patients(620). Often suicidal ideation is perceived as a ratio-
nal choice in the face of advancing disease(25) by HD patients. Anecdotally many patients report
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a plan for suicide when the disease advances, which they describe as a ‘comfort’ knowing they
‘have a way out if things get too bad’. The association between suicidal ideation and increased
estimate of performance is unexpected, but a possible explanation mediating this effect is hypo-
mania, which has been seen as part of HD psychopathology(197) Hypomania and agitation is
also associated with increased estimate of performance and increased suicidal ideation(621, 622)
when seen as part of bipolar disorder, which may mediate the association seen in our cohort.
Our measures of reward and effort did not predict mood disorders, or suicidal ideation in HD.
Given the early appearance of depression in HD(211, 212, 566), and the fact that deterioration
in reward related structures occurs relatively late in HD, this is not an unexpected finding. I did
not include an assessment of negative salience or affective bias in our test battery, and future
studies should test this aspect of mood disorder in an HD cohort. However, in light of our
findings relating to insensitivity to aversive stimuli in HD patients, depressed mood may not be
related to negative salience in this cohort. The cognitive process of rumination has been related
to depressed mood and changes in the default mode network(322); this network has been found
to be abnormal in HD(623–625). Future studies could include an assessment of rumination as a
predictor of depression in HD.
7.8 Irritability and Aggression Findings
Our data show that aggression and irritability in HD is primarily driven by anticipatory emo-
tional reactions to real world tasks or irritating situations and is not related to impaired frontal
control, measures of fairness or impulsivity. Previous work in presymptomatic cohorts found
irritability in HD was associated with altered functional connectivity between the amygdala and
medial orbito-frontal cortex(130) and in separate work with alterations in a network involving
the cingulate cortex, thalamus and amygdala(555). The experience of excessive anger has been
strongly linked with amygdala activation in other disorders, and may represent a heightened
response to threat, particularly in impulsive aggression(626, 627). Alterations in emotional in-
terpretation and experience may also play a role in irritability and aggression in HD. I did not
include the emotional faces task in our task battery, but the deficits in emotion recognition (par-
ticularly of negative emotion) are well-described(439). Furthermore, HD patients have altered
emotional responses, with reduced fear and increased anger compared with controls(553). Both
of these deficits could precipitate some of the aggression and irritability seen in HD. A further
intriguing hypothesis was suggested to the author by Hugh Rickards (Reader in Neuropsychia-
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try, Cinical Neurosciences, University of Birmingham); irritability is often provoked in healthy
controls by cognitive overload (too many tasks at once), given the known impairments in dual
tasking caused by HD, cognitive overload may occur much more easily and lead to the increased
irritability seen in HD.
7.9 Future Research Plans
There are a number of different future directions this work could extend to. Firstly validation
of the Persistence task in a larger cohort, with longitudinal assessment could provide a reliable,
objective measure of apathy in HD for use in future clinical trials. There is also translational
potential: a task showing differing sensitivity to aversive and rewarding stimuli could provide
the first valid assessment for apathy in HD animal models. There is clear potential to study
fMRI changes during punishment and reward in HD and controls to delineate the underlying
neurobiology of this deficit. Finally there is the potential to extend the test battery across
disease states.
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Appendix A
Publications and presentations arising from
this thesis.
Publications
1. McLauchlan DJ, Lancaster T, Craufurd D, Linden D and Rosser AE (2018): Spare the Rod?
Insensitivity to Punishment Predicts Apathy in Huntington’s disease. Brain (in submission).
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Presentations and published abstracts
1. McLauchlan DJ and Rosser AE. A Systematic Review Of The Behavioural Symptoms In
Huntington’s Disease: A Cross-Sectional And Longitudinal Approach. MDS Congress June
2013.
2. McLauchlan DJ, Craufurd D, Linden D and Rosser AE. Huntington’s disease patients are
‘stuck in a rut’: objective testing of apathy in Huntington’s disease. EHDN Congress Septem-
ber 2016.
3. McLauchlan DJ, Craufurd D, Linden D and Rosser AE.Limited Insight? Objective Testing
Of Irritability In Huntington’s Disease. EHDN Congress September 2016. Limited insight?
Objective testing of irritability in Huntington’s disease. EHDN Congress September 2016.
4. McLauchlan DJ, Craufurd D, Linden D and Rosser AE. Depressed Mood And Suicidal Ideation
In Huntington’s Disease: Contribution Of Reward, Effort, Executive Function And Depressive
Cognition. EHDN Congress September 2018.
5. McLauchlan DJ, Linden D and Rosser AE. Impulsivity In Huntington’s Disease: Impaired
Decision-Making And Motor Disinhibition. ECNP Barcelona October 2018.
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Appendix B
Scenarios for the Maze Task.
Open Scenarios
1. ”You are alone next to a red house.”
2. ”You are in a forest.”
3. ”You are at some cliffs.”
4. ”You are at a sandy shoreline.”
5. ”You are beside a path.”
6. ”You are in a cave.”
7. ”You are in a crowd next to a skyscraper.”
8. ”You are adrift in a boat at sea.”
9. ”You are in a castle. ”
10. ”You are in a farmyard.”
11. ”You are at a railway station.”
12. ”You are in a school.”
13. ”You are in a garden.”
14. ”You are at the top of a mountain.”
15. ”You are in an empty shop.”
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